To understand the structural dynamics of the current eurozone crisis, it is necessary to examine the longstanding internal contradictions that the system has inherited from its inception under the Maastricht Treaty and the neoliberal strategy which has governed its evolution from the first experiments in economic and monetary union in the 1970s. A brief narrative of the evolution of the European Monetary Union yields some insights into its peculiar institutional design. More specifically, the article examines the dangerously self-reinforcing logic between speculative bond markets and cascading, deflationary policies of austerity imposed on those countries encountering severe debt crises. This examination reveals the fragile foundations upon which the eurozone was constructed.

The plan to introduce a carbon pricing scheme in Australia has focused attention on the future relevance and necessity of using other policy instruments to reduce carbon emissions. Significant reports, including the Wilkins Review and reports by the Productivity Commission, have argued using the standard neoclassical economics framework that once a carbon price is established, it should be (almost) the only instrument needed to tackle climate change mitigation in Australia. With a small number of exceptions for complementary instruments to address some market failures, the use of other climate policy instruments, it is argued, will result only in unnecessary duplication and potential distortions. The aim of this article is to show that there are, in fact, a significant number of rationales for implementing several climate policy instruments in combination with a carbon price, and we should not be too quick to dismiss certain climate policy instrument combinations.

In Australia there is a systematic ranking of academic research performance, with a major impact metric being based on publications in prestigious journals. Other countries like Britain with its Research Excellence Framework also have similar metrics. While much analysis and publicity is devoted to the rankings of the quality of research, there has been very little focus on how this ranked research has then gone on to make a public policy impact. In the case of the economics discipline, there has been little exploration of the relationship between publication in a high-ranked journal and contribution to an analysis of Australia’s most pressing economic issues. This article investigates the extent to which articles in the Diamond list of journals from 2001 to 2010 addressed Australian economic issues. Our results indicate that articles on current policy issues accounted for a very modest fraction of total Diamond list journal articles. One possible explanation for this finding, which is investigated further, is the correlation between an economics department’s Excellence in Research Australia ranking and the number of staff who obtained their doctorates from an overseas university. Such a correlation has implications for the status afforded to economics research with a specific national focus.

Prof. Marglin argues for a new economics and a new conception of welfare as part of the move to a sustainable future. However, the typical criticisms of the treatment of welfare in economics appear wide of the mark, and there are good reasons to regard this treatment as accurate enough for the job at hand. The critics appear to miss how demanding the job of reshaping economics in their (implicit) desired image would be, and how unproductive it might turn out to be to insist on such a reshaping as a precursor to serious action.

The euro project is now at the threshold of disintegration as the fault-lines between the core/surplus countries and the peripheral/deficit countries experience a profound rupture. In the absence of political union or fiscal federalism, these centrifugal forces appear to be irreversible. It is difficult to envisage the current system, with its internal contradictions, surviving the crisis that now engulfs the entire eurozone. The present crisis is to a large extent the continuation of the longstanding neoliberal policies favoured by Germany, which have informed the creation of the euro. This article examines the historical context of the debt crisis and the institutional design of this flawed monetary edifice.

This paper revisits and fine-tunes a spin-off from Knight's (1921, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit) influential distinction between risk (‘probability of unknown events’) and uncertainty (‘unquantifiable randomness’): the contrast between actuarial institutions and entrepreneurship. It contends that this opposition is not exclusive and argues that the act of insurance does not automatically reduce entrepreneurial profits. To maintain this claim, the paper emphasizes hedging and, more specifically, draws on an innovative actuarial scheme – parametric (or index-based) insurance – which, unlike indemnity-based insurance, does not rely on a damage assessment but indemnifies the policyholder according to the variation of an index. This argument sheds new light on the function habitually assigned to actuarial institutions, amends the theory of entrepreneurial profits, and integrates hedging within entrepreneurial judgment.