Despite the Western Front’s reputation for stagnation, the armies there strove for tactical, technological and organisational advantage. Learning was the fourth command task, and the chapter describes both how and what the German army learned about combined arms battle, the key to tactical success. By mid-1916, it had fallen behind the enemy. Evolution of doctrine to remedy this, resistance to it and measures to overcome the resistance. Case study on converting the doctrine into reality by training of command teams and formations.

Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of German combined arms performance in the spring fighting. Different lessons learned and OHL’s more directive approach when updating doctrine to prevent chaos. Positive reputation of the doctrine but important tactical defects persisted. Strong evidence from this period both for and against the German army as a learning organisation: this ambivalence an important cause of uneven success converting learning into improved performance.

The British Army took part in numerous operations, ranging from small expeditions to the West Indies, Africa and along the European littoral to major operations in Portugal, Spain and Belgium. Initial struggles with these responsibilities, together with those of imperial policing and maintaining order in Ireland would oblige the Army to implement extensive reforms, particularly in tactics and unit organisation, even while the system of purchase for officers remained intact. While British infantry produced mixed results in the field during the French Revolutionary Wars, in time it became noteworthy for its musketry and remarkable doggedness in battle. Chronically understrength and notoriously difficult to control, the cavalry tended to play only a minor part on campaign, while shortages of artillery and engineers plagued the Army throughout this period. Albeit comparatively small, in creating an Iberian foothold which soon developed into a major theatre of operations, the instrument forged in the battles and sieges of the Peninsula and southern France helped drain Napoleon’s resources over a substantial period and established the high standard of battlefield performance which was to reach its apogee on the field of Waterloo, from which would emerge one of history’s greatest commanders – the Duke of Wellington.

Guillaume Apollinaire is without doubt the most prolific French poet of the Great War. In addition to his major poetry collection, Calligrammes (1918), he wrote and published plays, stories, journalism, and criticism during the conflict. His writing is nothing if not wide ranging.He considered poetry a spiritual activity and an escape from the traditional classification of genre. He also believed there was no boundary between art and life – the two are inextricably linked – and, further, that art and life transform one another.This porous nature, not without its ambivalences and paradoxes, constitutes a major key to the interpretation of his work. The diversity and originality of his oeuvre, the trajectory of the author and the importance of his legacy help to explain how and why he became a poet of war in France, a country that ignored the tradition of 'war poets' that had developed in Great Britain.

Chapter 1 details the multiple problems the Austro-Hungarian monarchy faced in the First World War: fiscal challenges and ethnic problems resulting from eleven different nationalities residing within the Dual Monarchy. A depiction of Conrad von Hoetzendorf and his disastrous military plans and defeats, as well as Emperor Franz Joseph, Alois Berchtold. It emphasizes the inferior training of the Habsburg Army, its obsolete weaponry and lack of consistent and adequate training. Lack of a central command, ethnic concerns and complicated reserve system.

This chapter discusses the growth of military systems in Western Europe during the period from 1460 to 1560, the preliminary stage of what has often, controversially, been called the ‘military revolution’. The main characteristics of military violence generated by dynastic wars were the inexorable growth of armies and the problems of pay and supply which accompanied this. Military technology affected both the nature and duration of wars: artillery came to dominate both in siege warfare, naval warfare and on the open battlefield. The lives of professional soldiers were drastically affected by new forms of trauma and medical treatment remained rudimentary. At the same time, the relations between soldiery and civilians continued to be conflictual, especially in war zones. Endemic violence accompanied any war. The features specific to this period combine a more intensive kind of violence brought about by changes in military technology and the scale of war with a broadly dysfunctional control system. This meant that the larger armies and more destructive campaign had an impact of casualties and losses among the soldiery as well as a chaotic impact on the ‘civilian’ population, though the patterns of ‘collateral’ violence remained much the same as they had been for centuries.