This article examines recent measures undertaken by major commercial banks to mitigate and address human rights risks associated with their financial dealings in the arms industry. By reviewing the corporate policies of 20 leading banks that provide financing to top arms manufacturing and exporting companies, the article provides insights into three significant aspects of banks’ efforts: the development of defence sector policies, the implementation of risk assessments for adverse human rights impacts, and the application of exclusion clauses. These measures highlight the increasing recognition by banks of the need to address the ethical, social and human rights implications of financing arms deals, contributing to the broader regulatory and normative framework governing the arms industry.

In comparison to other high-risk industrial sectors, human rights due diligence (HRDD) in the arms sector remains unclear and underdeveloped. This article elucidates how supply chain regulations can provide pertinent guidance for clarifying and elaborating the standards and requirements of the HRDD obligations of arms companies. Part I reaffirms the importance of independent HRDD obligations for arms companies due to the significant human rights risks posed by arms exports. Part II contextualises the limitations in the development of HRDD in the arms industry by examining the corporate policies of major arms companies. Part III explicates why supply chain regulations for conflict minerals are suitable guidance for clarifying and elaborating the HRDD obligations of arms companies. Part IV details five elements of an HRDD framework for arms companies that are essential for comprehensively identifying, evaluating and addressing the human rights risks of arms exports. Part V offers concluding remarks.

Scholars and policymakers agree that major powers have leverage over their more junior partners. Giving security assistance or providing arms is supposed to increase this leverage. However, major powers often hit roadblocks when trying to influence the behaviour of their junior partners. This article demonstrates that junior partners are often successful in constraining the behaviour of the major power partners, and have particular success in extracting additional resources from their major partners. This article develops the concept of loyalty coercion to explain that leverage is based on rhetorical and symbolic moves, rather than material preponderance. It then uses cases of US arms sales to show that weapons transfers did not lead to US leverage, instead opened opportunities for junior partner influence. The article contributes to scholarly and policy perspectives on alliance management and reputation, and leverage in world politics.

What are the politics of, and prospects for, contemporary weapons control? Human rights and humanitarian activists and scholars celebrate the gains made in the UN Arms Trade Treaty as a step towards greater human security. Critics counter that the treaty represents an accommodation with global militarism. Taking the tensions between arms transfer control and militarism as my starting point, I argue that the negotiating process and eventual treaty text demonstrate competing modes of militarism. Expressed in terms of sovereignty, political economy, or human security, all three modes are underpinned by ongoing imperial relations: racial, gendered, and classed relations of asymmetry and hierarchy that persist despite formal sovereign equality. This means human security is a form of militarism rather than the antithesis of it. Drawing on primary sources from negotiations and participant observation with actors involved in the campaign for the ATT, the argument challenges the idea that human security has scored a victory over militarism. It also complicates our understanding of the nature of the accommodation with it, demonstrating the transformation as well as entrenchment of contemporary militarism. The argument reframes the challenges for controlling weapons circulation, placing the necessity for feminist, postcolonial anti-militarist critique front and centre.

Proliferation of major conventional weapons (MCW) in larger numbers, at greater levels of sophistication, and to more actors is at best a waste of valuable resources and at worst fuel for more and bloodier conflicts. Given a track record of violence, repression, and corruption, norms against exporting weapons to active conflicts and human rights abusers, as well as norms in favor of transparency in weapons transfers, have grown more salient in recent years. Yet international efforts such as the UN Conventional Arms Trade Treaty show little promise for mitigating these ills. This article finds an alternate route toward moderating global arms transfers. It shows, with supporting data, how the United States, pursuing its own political interests, leverages its massive market power to slow the proliferation of dangerous technology, reduce resources spent in the developing world on weapons, stymie the deadweight losses of corruption in the arms industry, and lower the rewards for human rights abusers.

This article looks at the origins, purposes and conflicts of national interests and policies that were the primary influences in shaping the substance of the Arms Trade Treaty, which came into force at the end of 2014. It then proceeds to a more legally focussed analysis and, having identified several important issues which have had to remain undiscussed, concentrates on detailed examination and evaluation of the most important provisions of substance. These are firstly the scope of the Treaty—defining the equipment or materiel covered (Article 2). There follows analysis of the provisions which contain the obligations on exporting States, ranging from absolute prohibitions (Article 6) to ‘export assessments’ (Article 7), which in practice will be the most frequently applicable. The paper concludes by identifying several valuable provisions in the Treaty whilst also highlighting several significant weaknesses and omissions. It contends that evaluation of the Treaty's likely contribution to controlling the recognized evils of the arms trade is premature at this stage and, further, that efforts towards that end must focus on the practice and law of domestic administrative implementation, rather than international law.