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2 - What does the Aristotelian phronimos know?
- By Rosalind Hursthouse
Edited by Lawrence Jost, University of Cincinnati, Julian Wuerth, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
Book:

Perfecting Virtue

Published online:

04 February 2011

Print publication:

03 February 2011, pp 38-57
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Summary

For the Aristotelian phronimos the practically wise man has phronesis, which is a form of knowledge, and it is this that enables him (characteristically) to make correct decisions about what he should do. Phronesis, excellence in practical reasoning, moral knowledge, can be acquired only by habitually engaging in virtuous action, not, for example, just by learning a written code of conduct. There is no short cut to what the phronimos knows. Nothing but the acquisition of personal virtue will yield it. When we bring this feature of phronesis right to the surface, it clearly suppresses a significant amount of the pretensions of contemporary normative ethical theory. Aristotelian anti-generalism still carries a nasty sting, for it entails that, unless the theorists have phronesis and hence virtue themselves, their "shorter ways" may well make it harder, rather than easier, to acquire virtue.