This Chapter provides an overview of the two broad types of control that arbitral tribunals exercise over proceedings in state courts. First, in both international commercial arbitration and investment treaty arbitration, arbitral tribunals may exercise indirect control over state courts through their jurisdiction over the parties before them as part of their inherent power to protect the integrity of the arbitral proceedings. They do so through the issuance of provisional measures, typically in the form of anti-suit injunctions. In this context, investment treaty tribunals have the additional power to issue measures addressed directly to the host state courts. Second, and uniquely to tribunals established pursuant to investment treaties, the activities of the judiciary may come within the exercise of principal jurisdiction by the arbitral tribunal. Under investment treaties, the tribunal may be seized with a claim for international responsibility arising out of measures taken by a state’s courts which can be broadly organised into two categories: expropriatory and non-expropriatory claims as a result of the improper administration of justice.

This chapter argues that an adequate account of group rights requires an embedded understanding of moral duties and rights within the context of common action for a common good. Drawing from Alasdair MacIntyre, I explain why group agency for a common good, through various social practices, grounds a framework of natural justice with correlative duties and rights, including various group moral rights. This account of natural justice is completed by an appeal to the common agency of an institutionalised political community for a political common good. I argue that human rights are a subset of moral rights, which ‘cry out’ as a matter of justice for political enforcement or realisation, whether against violations of fundamental natural law precepts or dereliction of core political responsibilities. These include group rights where the protected aspects of personal human flourishing are pursued through the common action of groups, such as families, trade unions, religious communities, and political communities. Moreover, group rights are essential to human rights – human rights presuppose the group moral right of political authority to administer justice for the common good.

The model of how republican government should work that was most often invoked in council debates or by commissions framing legislation was an abstract one, the “well-ordered republic”. A well-ordered republic was not seen as necessarily unchanging. Reforms could be presented as needed not just to correct abuses, but to restore and reinvigorate institutions, or as essential routine maintenance of the workings of government. In practice, what were presented as reforms of institutions were often changes introduced to consolidate or strengthen particular regimes. Reform of laws was less liable to be a political partisan measure, but the administration of justice was always open to political influence. The fair and effective administration of justice was a cornerstone of any concept of a well-ordered republic, but for those involved in partisan regimes, whether good justice was impartial justice was open to question, and their idea of a well-ordered republic was one ordered to suit them.