This final chapter shows how further enquiry into artefacts’ metaphysics forces us to return to artefacts’ physics. At the same time, this further enquiry is in turn shown to fall outside the interests of a metaphysician and to be the task of a natural philosopher. For this reason, the chapter looks at artefacts as objects of inquiry and distinguishes between perspective of the natural scientist, the maker, and the user on the one hand, and the perspective of the metaphysician on the other. This discussion allows us to wrap up the results, to reassess the relationship between the Physics and the Metaphysics, and to evaluate the respective contributions of these works to Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts.

Famously, in the Canon of Pure Reason, Kant present a practical argument to the effect that our beliefs in God and immortality are justified. I argue that reading the Critique of Pure Reason as the doctrine of method of metaphysics provides a straightforward explanation of the systematic place of Kant’s practical argument in the Canon. Customarily, the relevance of the Critique for the practical part of metaphysics is restricted to proving the theoretical undecidability of God and immortality, but the Canon clearly goes beyond establishing that. According to its positive task as the doctrine of method of metaphysics, the Critique must establish that metaphysics can achieve ‘architectonic unity’. I argue that showing that this unity is possible for metaphysics requires showing that there is conceptual space for coherently accommodating our commitment towards the existence of God and immortality within it.

Aristotle’s sense of the movement out of dynamis (potential, capacity) and into energia (actuality) was itself ethically neutral, designed to account for a wide range of types of becoming. Yet it also provided a way of conceptualizing the translation of interior states of being into embodied action. Aristotle’s dynamis-energia continuum, along with his taxonomy of voluntary and involuntary behavior, provided the foundational ethical terms by which early moderns negotiated legal cases, theological disputes, and, just as crucially, the regular dilemmas presented by daily social life. Within this context, the Shakespearean stage became a signal space for working out the era’s complicated ways of understanding the move from dynamis to energia as it pertains to intentional ethical action. This chapter focuses on Julius Caesar and Richard II, two plays that take as their central concern the uncertain intentions of potentially rogue agents and the fashioning of multiple forms of community that occurs in response to such ambiguous interior states. By attending closely to the shifts from dynamis to energia within communities as well as individuals – and to variant resonances of these concepts largely lost to modern audiences – Shakespearean drama freshly reimagines classical ethical ideals as a means for fostering communal tranquility within post-Reformation English culture.

A passage at 1048b18–35 in chapter six of Metaphysics Book Θ, forging a distinction between activities Aristotle classes as energeia, actuality, and those he calls kinesis, change, has become a favourite subject of discussion by analytic philosophers. This chapter argues that this now celebrated section does not fit into the overall programme of Θ, was not written for Θ, and should not be printed in the place we read it today. It is an isolated fragment of uncertain origin. Although there is good reason to accept that it is authentic Aristotle, its focus is rather different from what it is usually taken to be. Moreover, the distinction is unique in the corpus, and should not be imported into other Aristotelian contexts such as Nicomachean Ethics X or De Anima II.5. The chapter first documents the passage’s anomalous standing within the manuscript tradition. It then argues that Aristotle’s focus here is on verbal aspect, not tense. Next corruptions in the transmitted text are discussed, in light of the hypothesis that the passage was originally imported as a marginal annotation, and a revised text is proposed. Finally, the uniqueness of its philosophical content is established. It is a freak performance.

This is a close scrutiny of De Anima II.5, led by two questions. First, what can be learned from so long and intricate a discussion about the neglected problem of how to read an Aristotelian chapter? Second, what can the chapter, properly read, teach us about some widely debated issues in Aristotle’s theory of perception? I argue that it refutes two claims defended by Martha Nussbaum, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Sorabji: (i) that when Aristotle speaks of the perceiver becoming like the object perceived, the assimilation he has in mind is ordinary alteration of the type exemplified when fire heats the surrounding air, (ii) that this alteration stands to perceptual awareness as matter to form. Claim (i) is wrong because the assimilation that perceiving is is not ordinary alteration. Claim (ii) is wrong because the special type of alteration that perceiving is is not its underlying material realisation. Indeed, there is no mention in the text of any underlying material realisation for perceiving.

The basis of Aristotle’s strategy for bringing together time and distance covered in an account of motion is his understanding time, distance, and motion as continua. Against the background of Parmenides’ notion of continuity and the atomistic understanding of magnitudes, this chapter investigates Aristotle’s notion of continuity. It demonstrates the extent to which Aristotle adopts a mathematical notion of continuity according to which divisibility without end is crucial, and it expounds his appropriation of this mathematical notion for the physical realm. The main characteristics of Aristotle’s account of continuity turn out to be a new part-whole relation (in which the whole is prior to the parts since it is only by dividing the whole that we gain parts), a new account of limits, a new understanding of infinity, and a careful distinction between potential divisibility and actual division. We see how this new understanding of continuity helps counter the mereological problems of Zeno’s motion paradoxes by making it illegitimate to define time, space, and motion in terms of an additive part-whole-relation.

Chapter 3 is devoted to explaining the most fundamental category of domination in capitalism: “totality.” According to Adorno, the ubiquity of the exchange of commodities makes society in capitalism a totality. Individuals, on pain of perishing, must necessarily follow the logic of exchange. The totality, therefore, effectively functions as a “spell” from which nobody can flee. Turning to the logic of essence, I then reconstruct the dialectical development of the category of totality. Hegel first conceives of totality as an “actuality” that, like an organism, has the ability to maintain and reproduce itself across different circumstances. The most determinate form of actuality for Hegel is “substance.” Although individuals as “accidents” constitute substance, they remain subject to the “absolute power” of substance. It seems to individuals that they have power over each other, yet the power of individuals is an objective illusion. In fact, it is the totality of substance that makes one individual powerful and the other powerless.

Chapter 5 discusses the dialectic of necessity and contingency in Hegel’s logic, and explains what it means to say that the power of the totality over individuals is “absolutely necessary.” For Hegel, necessity does not exclude contingency, but rather requires contingency. Hegel’s conception of the interrelation of necessity and contingency underpins Marx’s analysis of capitalism. A capitalist economy is essentially a market economy, and the economic laws of capitalism obtain not despite but rather through the irregularities and contingencies inherent to the market. Given the lack of central economic planning, individuals have the illusion of freedom in the market, yet, Marx argues, such an illusion only contributes to the “despotism of capital.” Finally, I elaborate on the various shapes of freedom in capitalism, and argue that such freedoms are not the freedoms of self-determination, but result from contingency and randomness.