The institutional logics perspective provides a powerful theory that emphasizes how symbolic beliefs and material practices are intertwined in relatively enduring configurations that can profoundly shape behavior across space and time. In this article, we build upon the arguments and insights of Haveman, Joseph-Goteiner, and Li, suggesting the need for a broader research agenda on the dynamics of institutional logics in China and around the world. Building on some of our recent writings, we argue for the need to go beyond the study of how logics have effects, to understand how logics themselves cohere, endure, and co-evolve in dynamic interrelationships with other logics.

Traditionally, women have been perceived as the fairer sex with a moral compass and with less inclination towards gaining wealth and taking risks. Past research has posited that women consider crime due to need. Recently one piece of research has considered greed due to the development and empowerment of women, the opportunities and power accorded to them in line with governance frameworks, policies and regulations that cover crimes, penalties and punishments, and cultural and social norms. Social perspectives influence the moral values passed down within social and family units. A pilot survey of female participants exposed to investigation and law and from two age groups of 18–39 years and 40–61 years reflected a significant change in culture and values. The older group was critical of corrupt behaviour and that the choices were the “right thing to do”. The younger participants were selective in their choices, choosing to deny or be silent if there was insufficient evidence and protection or where there was the involvement of someone dear. This reflects the power of knowledge, empowerment and education. The author discusses case studies of women exposed to crime, including organized crime, via their family or social networks to assess abuse of power and trust.

Using ethnographic data gathered in Beijing during 2017 and 2018, this article examines numerous urban population displacement events using the concept of spatial governance in order to understand the spatialization of governance in urban China. A particular focus of this article are the Beijing-wide displacements of the so-called “low-end population” that followed a fire in Xinjian Village in 2017. The analysis in this article uses geographic understandings of spatial informality to interrogate how space is made informal and subsequently illegal as a means of population control. The article puts forward the idea that spatial governance is one of the key forms, if not the key form, of governance in urban China. It highlights changes in governance that have resulted in space becoming not just a site for control, but the medium for techniques of control over China's urban population.

China's urbanization has revitalized grassroots governance under which millions of villagers have become increasingly keen to participate in grassroots elections and influence decision making in their village affairs. To maintain its political legitimacy over a rapidly transforming society, the authoritarian party-state has progressively promoted open, competitive grassroots elections in response to the increasing demand by villagers for more public participation. Based on in-depth field research in urbanizing villages in southern China, this article provides an empirical analysis of how the local state has adopted different interventionist strategies in elections to support villagers’ active participation while sustaining its direct leadership over daily village governance. Our findings explain why the recent development of open and transparent grassroots elections is reinforcing the ruling capacity of the socialist state rather than enhancing self-governance and grassroots democracy, although villagers now have more opportunities to defend their economic and social rights through elections.

The Chinese government has acknowledged that in order to turn Chinese universities into world class institutions, it will have to grant them a greater degree of autonomy. However, the reforms that have been introduced to achieve this goal run counter to a long tradition of central government oversight. The question now presenting itself is how much actual control government has devolved to universities. The qualitative evidence presented in this paper, obtained through interviews with university presidents and Party secretaries, not only confirms that, as one might expect, Chinese universities continue to operate “in the shadow of hierarchy,” but also and more importantly that formal efforts to devolve authority are being rendered ineffective by informal pressures and control mechanisms. Discussion reflects on the state of play in Chinese public administration studies, and urges public policy researchers examining devolution in China to account for both formal reforms and everyday “lived experiences.”

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the world's two largest countries requires feasible governance pathways that integrate politics, policy and administration. Using examples of successful mitigation at the local level in China (Guangzhou) and India (Gujarat), this article identifies integrated governance solutions that work in both cases through different types of linkages. In China, it is mainly intra-governmental linkages, while in India it is mainly state–society linkages. In neither case do international negotiations concerning emissions targets have significant effects, while national frameworks have only marginal effects. Approaching the problem in this comparative manner helps to clarify how greenhouse gas governance operates in each country, the lessons for central–local environmental relations, and the implications for international assistance.

Why do authoritarian regimes try to improve the quality of their governance? In the absence of democratic institutions to monitor, reward and punish their performance, authoritarian politicians are normally expected to seek their self-interest through corruption and rewards to cronies, rather than providing for the public welfare. However, the Chinese state has actively promoted improved governance in recent years, with greater attention to quality of life issues to balance the primary focus on sustaining rapid economic growth. This paper analyses intra-national variation in the provision of public goods in urban China and the impact of public goods on regime support. Does better governance lead to higher levels of public support for the regime, even in the absence of democratic elections? Our evidence suggests that it does, with a greater impact for the local level than for the centre.

This article examines food safety failures in China to cast light on how scale has deeply affected its regulatory politics. Contrary to studies that view China's food safety challenges as primarily resulting from corruption, local obstructionism or weak state capacity, I argue that China's massive production system, unwieldy bureaucracy, and geographic size pose regulators with a more fundamental policy challenge. As they attempt to build an integrated national regulatory regime, regulators must make difficult trade-offs in cost, policy design and applicability that emphasize the interests of certain stakeholders over others, resulting in a contentious “politics of scale.” The article assesses four failed scale management initiatives: food safety coordination bodies, campaigns, model production zones, and regulatory segmentation. As China transitions to scientifically assessed, risk-based forms of regulation, its pervasive food safety problem suggests the adaptive limits of China's unitary regulatory structure to manage scale and its ensuing politics effectively in a complex multilevel context.

We introduce a new perspective on the conceptualization and measurement of ownership identities of China's listed companies. Previous work analyzing the strategy and performance implications of the ownership structure in Chinese firms has used the official categorization provided by state bodies in China. In this categorization, state shareholding, legal person shareholding and A-shares dominate. This official categorization, however, obscures the ultimate identity of a shareholder; this can confound conceptual and empirical work on die strategy and performance implications of ownership identity. We refine the existing classification by recategorizing shareholders into 16 types, which can then be regrouped into relevant categories of shareholders, such as government or private, to enable analysis of ownership identity and ownership concentration issues in China's listed companies. Our new classification can help provide consistency in the burgeoning research on the strategy and performance implications of the concentration and identity aspects of ownership structure in China's listed companies.

Contemporary Chinese artists have long been marginalized in China as their ideas conflict with the mainstream political ideology. In Beijing, artists often live on the fringe of society in “artist villages,” where they almost always face the threat of being displaced owing to political decisions or urban renewal. However, in the past decade, the Chinese government began to foster the growth of contemporary Chinese arts and designated underground artist villages as art districts. This article explores the profound change in the political decisions about the art community. It argues that, despite the pluralization of Chinese society and the inroads of globalization, the government maintains control over the art community through a series of innovative mechanisms. These mechanisms create a globalization firewall, which facilitates the Chinese state in global image-building and simultaneously mitigates the impact of global forces on domestic governance. The article illuminates how the authoritarian state has adopted more sophisticated methods of governance in response to the challenges of a more sophisticated society.