As philosophers attempt to treat aesthetic evaluationof some distinctive use sentences are put to, a prime model in terms suggested for offering a “value-judgment” has been that of rendering a verdict. Collingwood, for example, some time ago wrote that the critic and civil magistrate are alike in their use of language, for judgment “means” verdict. More recently, Arnold Isenberg and Frank Sibley have agreed that at least some aesthetic judgments are verdicts, and the late Margaret Macdonald has written a widely anthologized paper defending in detail this conception. In spite of its currency, the model has fatal deficiences and rather than illustrating important aspects of our critical talk, succeeds only in revealing some dubious assumptions at work in the search for special sentence uses. Since Miss Macdonald has offered the most extensive and subtle suggestions on this topic, I will concentrate on her paper, “Some Distinctive Features of Arguments Used in Criticism of the Arts” to illustrate the points I wish to make.