The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will probably be remembered in history as an outstanding example of relatively successful intergovernmental cooperation among developing countries. OPEC's achievements in raising the oil export income of members appear remarkable in view of the deep sociopolitical divisions among them—occasionally verging on armed conflicts. Nevertheless, OPEC countries have managed not to let these conflicts wreck their common interest in obtaining substantially better terms from the international companies and from consumer countries. That OPEC countries could obtain better terms is not only the result of member solidarity but also of the relatively inelastic demand for petroleum. Another crucial factor favoring OPEC is that major consumer countries have been moderate in their drive to collectively countervail OPEC, except indirectly by allowing their international oil companies to join forces ostensibly in defense of consumers' interests. Major consumer countries have also declined so far to split forcefully the OPEC coalition. The continued existence of OPEC largely depends on (1) members' perception of gain outweighing sacrifices or frustrations of working together, and (2) the tolerance of major industrial importing countries.

This study concerns the involvement of transnational, nongovernmental associations in the international decisions leading to the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, at Stockholm, and the establishment of the UN Environment Program. It identifies those organizations that were involved, characterizes the political functions performed by them, and describes their points of access into the UN environmental policy process. A number of propositions about transnational associations are also examined in light of the Stockholm experience.

The 1972 decision of the Norwegian people to reject admission to the European Community has raised some fresh questions about the Nordic countries and Nordic integration. Was the Norwegian decision a protest vote on mainly domestic grounds? Or was it a rejection of the whole structure, system, and ideology of the European Community—as having grown too bureaucratic, too self-centered, and too concerned about economic gains and trade and growth rates rather than about human values? Yet, if the Community was no longer an attractive alternative, what were Norway's other alternatives? The ocean-oriented, outgoing Norwegians could hardly have turned isolationists. Should we read the Norwegian referendum as a “yes” to Nordic cooperation rather than as a “no” to continental Europe? Whatever tipped the scales in Norway's 1972 referendum, the so-called Nordic alternative seems bound to become more prominent in Scandinavia, since Norway has reached a Swedish-modelled trade agreement with the European Community as a substitute for membership.

In the field of political science in general and in the study of international organizations in particular, leadership has been a particularly neglected concept. It has served as a kind of residual category —a handy, or bothersome, exogenous variable. Attempts that have been made, in the international organization context, to isolate leadership as an independent variable and to proceed with comparative analysis have, at best, centered on whether a particular leader followed certain maxims or strictures for good leadership or on what battery of tactics a leader may more or less successfully employ in a given context. No attempt has been made, however, to set the parameters for the relevance of various leadership maxims or to separate the quality of leadership from the specific kinds of resources and constraints that prevail in any given task environment. Thus, general comparison of leaders remains conceptually impossible.

In recent years, a considerable body of literature has dealt with relations between the so-called developed and developing nations. More recently, a number of analysts have attempted to gain leverage over the problem by utilizing a systemic perspective that links centers and peripheries.

In the closing months of the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War and for about two and one-half years thereafter, the American voluntary agency CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere) operated a rehabilitation program in Nigeria's East-Central State. With funds largely provided by USAID, it concentrated on rebuilding or extending basic structures, like bridges and water systems, and on distributing badly needed planting material. During much of that period, while the war for Bangladesh's independence still raged, the British voluntary agency Oxfam also sought, in timely fashion and on its own initiative, to improve the condition of refugees who had fled to camps within India. Its major emphases were on supplementary feeding, medical assistance, sanitation, shelter, and clothing.

Messrs. Laitin and Lustick make a useful advance in conceptualizing the components of leadership skill. It is quite obvious that such a venerable but often ill-conceived topic cannot be exhausted, even conceptually, within the space of a short article. I should like here to make three qualifying remarks, which are intended not to detract from the advance made by the two authors but to situate their contribution within a somewhat wider perspective. These remarks are directed toward the impact or consequences of leadership. They concern: (1) the relationship of leadership skill to leadership effectiveness; (2) pathological leadership, producing negative outcomes; and (3) the Tolstoyan question about the extent to which “A king is the slave of history,” i.e., whether political leadership does have room for maneuver and can significantly affect outcomes.