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Crime groups as criminal entrepreneurs – stealing heritage and cultural property: A case study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2023

John Kerr*
Affiliation:
University of Law, Bloomsbury Campus, London, United Kingdom
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Abstract

Crime groups are drawn to stealing heritage and cultural property because the thefts can be less dangerous than other illicit activities and there can be a lower chance of detection. In addition, there are financial opportunities such as selling the objects, using them as currency and collateral in illicit markets, and through rewards and ransoms. While these factors remain, crime groups operating as criminal entrepreneurs will continue to be attracted to this type of theft even if situational crime prevention strategies are implemented at locations. Unique and irreplaceable heritage and cultural property will be stolen, and societies will lose in artistic, cultural, heritage, historical, and financial terms. This article argues that, while people tasked with the policing and security of heritage and cultural property should focus on the potential thefts, policing agencies also need to focus on the crime groups, especially as heritage and cultural property thefts can be crime groups’ “Achilles’ heel.”

Type
Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Cultural Property Society

Introduction

Heritage and cultural property theft

Thefts present significant threats to often irreplaceable heritage and cultural property, the locations in which the objects are kept, the owners or guardians, and the related cultural spheres and economies. Concerning the global scale of the threat, stolen heritage and cultural property objects in many countries are rarely recorded distinctly from other property by policing and government agencies, and, therefore, the often proposed billion-dollar figures should be treated with skepticism.Footnote 1 Rather than terms such as “art crime” or “cultural heritage crime,” this article uses “heritage and cultural property crime” owing to its broad scope—for example, it includes antiquities and contemporary art. Globally, there is a growing body of academic and non-academic literature on heritage and cultural property crimes. This is helping to increase our understanding about where, when, why, and how the thefts happen and who is committing them. The literature also provides important knowledge about the protection, security, policing, and recovery of objects. Also appearing in the literature is the involvement of “organized criminals” or “criminals who are organized” who can be involved in other criminal activities as well.Footnote 2

In this article, rather than use the term “organized crime” because of its definitional issues,Footnote 3 “crime groups” is the term employed as it does not presuppose size, hierarchy, or ethnic configuration. In addition, it is important to highlight that crime groups often operate as or within “transnational crime networks.”Footnote 4 Regarding “organized” crime groups in the European Union (EU), Tom Vander Beken, Kristof Verfaille, and Aslihan Tekin explain that “[c]omplex, fluid, and heterogenous organised crime group structures operate on a global scale and display highly innovative and varied criminal activities mainly built around opportunities in the cyber world.”Footnote 5 In our globalized, neoliberal world, in which the Internet has further enabled illicit activities and opened up new opportunities for crime groups and networks,Footnote 6 crime groups are taking advantage of opportunities to engage in diverse criminal entrepreneurial activities. Stealing heritage and cultural property is one of them.

Despite the existing literature – much of which focuses on antiquities in contrast to this article, which takes a wider view to include more objects such as contemporary art – there remain significant empirical knowledge gaps about the thefts and who is committing them. This article increases the understanding about why and how crime groups are drawn to the thefts despite physical target hardening security measures and difficulties in selling on some objects. This all matters because, first, much of the stolen heritage and cultural property is valuable for artistic, cultural, heritage, historical, and financial reasons; second, many of the objects are unique and irreplaceable; and, third, the stolen objects are used in other criminal activities. Furthermore, the thefts provide a useful case study that sheds more light on how crime groups act as “criminal entrepreneurs” and why they are attracted to specific activities. By focusing on criminal entrepreneurship, especially through work by Gerard McElwee and Robert Smith,Footnote 7 this article reframes how the thefts should be viewed as it argues for more emphasis on the offenders’ business-style decisions in addition to a focus on the offences rather than on the too frequent overemphasis on the offences themselves.

Criminal entrepreneurs

With its roots in entrepreneurship studies, the term “criminal entrepreneurship” is useful for investigating the people who commit the thefts and their motivations. This is because the term centers on looking for opportunities in the pursuit of profit. Building on the economist William Baumol’s work,Footnote 8 Gerard McElwee and Robert Smith define criminal entrepreneurship as “the imaginative pursuit of profit without regard to the means used.”Footnote 9 Petter Gottschalk defines a criminal entrepreneur as “a person who takes the risks involved in initiating and developing an illegal business enterprise.”Footnote 10 Both definitions are useful, the former especially so as it captures the imaginative nature of entrepreneurship. This article merges both to define criminal entrepreneurship as the imaginative pursuit of profit without regard to the means used to initiate and develop an illegal enterprise. Baumol proposes three types of entrepreneurships: productive, unproductive, and destructive.Footnote 11 He argues that the type of entrepreneurship is greatly influenced by “the relative payoffs society offers to such activities.”Footnote 12 While Baumol chooses three categories, McElwee and Smith have produced a “nuanced typology” that includes nine categories, ranging from “[l]egal and productive” through to “[i]llegal and destructive”Footnote 13 in order to capture the complexity of types of entrepreneurships. The typology’s added depth is useful for this article, particularly as the crime groups involved operate with other entrepreneurs whose activities can also be extremely problematic. For example, the art, antiques, and antiquities market has been labelled as criminogenic by researchers.Footnote 14

In their study of a criminal family, Jackie Harvey and Rob Hornsby highlight how the use of the term “entrepreneurial” is helpful as it relates to the “decision making conduct” based on skills and methods of making decisions often present in licit entrepreneurship.Footnote 15 Related to decision making, Hornsby and Hobbs, in their work on tobacco goods smuggling during the 1990s and early 2000s, emphasize the “high-profit-low-risk” nature of the activity at that time and how it became attractive for many criminal entrepreneurs.Footnote 16 Their two analysesFootnote 17 are useful for examining the attraction of heritage and cultural property thefts to the offenders because of the decision making regarding possible significant payoffs for conducting the thefts and some of the thefts potentially being “high-profit-low-risk.”Footnote 18 This also relates to R. V. Gundur’s work on optimizing criminal careers through enterprise and the importance of risk to reward for criminal entrepreneurs.Footnote 19 Highlighting the importance of “efficiency” in trying to optimize a criminal career, he explains: “Efficient activities are more likely to involve reduced visibility to both law enforcement and competitors, which is a mark of reduced risk.”Footnote 20

This article’s focus on criminal entrepreneurship is important because advocates of crime prevention approaches focus predominately on environmental and situational factors, and on trying to understand “how” rather than “why.”Footnote 21 There needs to be more work that focuses on the “why” as well as on the “how” with respect to crime groups’ thefts of heritage and cultural property. This is crucial as it allows for more understanding about the business decisions and the entrepreneurial processes behind many of these thefts in a way that narrow foci on specific opportunities fail to do. It also highlights the need for more investigation into who could be drawn into carrying out the crimes, including crime groups that are currently not involved.

Methodology

This article uses data collected in three research projects: the first, in England and Wales (with a particular focus on London), in 2008–12; the second, in England and Wales, France, and Italy, in 2015–16; and the third, in Brazil, in 2019. The locations were chosen as they all have experienced significant amounts of heritage and cultural property crimes. The three projects employed qualitative mixed methods approaches: semi-structured interviews, observations, participant observations (in England), and parliamentary presentations (in Brasilia and London). In the first project, 33 interviews were conducted with people who worked in insurance companies and loss adjusting, private sector art detection and recovery, national galleries, a large national museum, a large public library, a commercial gallery, a midsized museum, a historic house, the public police (including the London Metropolitan Police’s Art and Antiques Unit), private companies/databases, an installation company, government departments/agencies/bodies, Interpol, and artists. In the second project, 12 interviews were carried out with people who worked in London’s Metropolitan Police Service’s Art and Antiques Unit, the Central Office for the Fight against Trafficking in Cultural Goods (OCBC) in France, the Carabinieri Headquarters for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Carabinieri TPC) in Italy, Historic England, insurance companies and loss adjusting, private sector art detection and recovery, and museums. In the third project, 10 interviews were conducted with the heads/directors of museums, people who work for public sector cultural heritage organizations, and people who work in the private cultural heritage sector in Brazil.

In addition, in the first project, observation fieldwork was conducted at 50 locations (all in London except for six galleries in France, the Netherlands, and Spain and two private residences in England outside of London). Participant observation research in an art installation company based in London was also conducted. In the second project, observation fieldwork was carried out at 32 locations in London, Paris, and Rome, and, in the third project, 26 locations were researched in Rio de Janeiro. All three projects included repeat visits. Informed consent was obtained prior to the interviews. For ethical reasons, universal anonymity was employed for all interviewees, locations, and the art installation company.

A limitation to the research is that the only offender interviewed was a former forger. Offenders from crime groups were not interviewed owing to access issues. Despite not interviewing crime groups, many interviewees had a wealth of knowledge and experience regarding heritage and cultural property thefts and professional experience of cases involving crime groups and, in some instances, of the crime groups themselves. Nevertheless, the implications of this were that, although the research strived for triangulation through a mixed methods approach,Footnote 22 the findings would ultimately provide a one-sided perspective, however “valid” or “reliable” they were. Overall, the research followed Simon Mackenzie’s approach that looks for the “underlying narrative” rather than for the “underlying truth.”Footnote 23

Findings

This section of the article begins by using the empirical data to examine who are the criminal entrepreneurs involved in the thefts. It then investigates why a specific type of criminal entrepreneur – members of crime groups – are drawn to the thefts as well as exploring why they can commit them. It considers, first, the potential financial opportunities; second, the reduced chance for detection and lower level of danger compared with some other illicit activities; and, last, the potential kudos in stealing the objects.

Who are the criminal entrepreneurs?

The research data show that there are different types of criminal entrepreneurs involved in the thefts. The significant types are crime groups; insiders who work at heritage and cultural property locations; “receivers” or “fences”; people who work in the art, antiques, and antiquities market; and buyers of heritage and cultural property. Although this article focuses on people in crime groups, it is important to briefly consider the other criminal entrepreneurs because they help to create opportunities and conditions for successful enterprise activities for the crime groups. Insiders who steal heritage and cultural property are often criminal entrepreneurs as they can be seeking “high-profit-low-risk” opportunities within the locations where they work.Footnote 24 Interview data from the four study regions highlighted that insiders can pose a significant threat and are involved in many thefts, especially at locations with fewer resources spent on security. In Brazil, England and Wales, France, and Italy, insider thefts particularly happen at museums, country houses, churches, outdoor locations with heritage and cultural property, and cultural sites. Smaller locations with fewer resources to monitor staff are particularly targeted. In Brazil, this has also been the case with some large locations such as a national museum. With access and low visibility to policing agencies and competitors, insider thefts can be extremely “efficient” and, depending on the location and the objects, profitable.Footnote 25

“Receivers” or “fences” play a role as they can help to move on stolen objects and provide an important step between the thieves and the market. Interviewees such as loss adjusters and private detectives explained how in England and Wales there were many opportunities to dispose of objects to receivers, particularly as there was little policing attention on them. These receivers can operate within different parts of the market. Interviewees including loss adjusters, heads/directors of museums, and private detectives from the study regions spoke about how the market enables the movement of illicit heritage and cultural property items. This will be examined in more detail later in the article. Related to the market, some buyers of heritage and cultural property can also be labelled as criminal entrepreneurs owing to either their awareness that they are buying stolen objects or the lack of checks into the provenance of the objects they are acquiring. The market itself can also assist in ways that relate closely to McElwee and Smith’s idea of “blurring” boundaries in criminal entrepreneurship, in which “[t]he opaqueness prevents us from seeing the light, because of a lack of transparency, murkiness and perhaps even deliberate obfuscation.”Footnote 26 Although they are not writing about the market, the description fits well.

Why are crime groups drawn to stealing heritage and cultural property?

Financial opportunities

The most significant motive for criminal entrepreneurs being drawn to the crime is the financial opportunities that the thefts can provide. The data highlight that there are three crucial reasons behind this motive.

To sell on the stolen heritage and cultural property

Crime groups steal heritage and cultural property, or are involved at different stages of the thefts, to sell on the objects. They also adapt to potential opportunities to enable this to happen. As a loss adjuster in England and Wales pointed out in relation to the offenders drawn to stealing heritage and cultural property: “Criminals are highly adaptable.” This may seem obvious, but it is important to highlight as they can be people with little or no knowledge of the objects but are drawn to steal them owing to the potential opportunities for enterprise. One example of this comes from Brazil where a crime group from the state of São Paulo specialized in the thefts of religious items across different states to sell on the objects. With churches being among the most vulnerable locations in Brazil, as is also the case in England and Wales, France, and Italy, this group was taking advantage of such opportunities. These thefts in Brazil were far from isolated cases. According to a public prosecutor in the state of Minas Gerais, crime groups had been stealing sacred objects from the state’s churches and museums for collectors and antique dealers. The scale was so large that by 2012 an estimated 60 percent of the state’s sacred heritage and cultural property was no longer in its original location.Footnote 27

Furthermore, in addition to targeting specific locations, crime groups target objects with particular financial value. For instance, interviews with private detectives and loss adjusters highlighted that, for thefts in London, low- to mid-value objects were being targeted as they could be moved on quicker for cash than high-value stolen heritage and cultural property because the high value objects can be identified more easily. This highlights crime groups’ desire for successful, efficient illegal enterprise that involves reduced visibility as well as sensible decision making to maintain and potentially grow the enterprise.

Crime groups also target specific objects. For example, while the data show that the disposal of objects is becoming harder owing to the digitization of images and the use of databases, crime groups have targeted certain types of objects such as those made of jade and porcelain in spates of thefts because there is an international market for these objects. In England and Wales, a senior police officer and a policing advisor to a national body spoke of their concerns regarding a particular spate of thefts in 2012 of Chinese objects. Similar thefts also happened in northern France in 2015 and 2018. These thefts highlight the opportunities and the “decision making conduct”Footnote 28 undertaken by crime groups, in addition to the significance for the offenders of the international nature of the crime and the importance of “transnational crime networks.”Footnote 29 Moreover, they emphasize the challenge that the international flows pose for agencies trying to combat the thefts and the movement of the stolen objects.

In Brazil, an interviewee who works in a public sector cultural heritage organization highlighted the international nature of the threat: “We warn of the illicit trafficking in cultural goods, which has shown its scope worldwide.” It is worth noting, though, that a director of a museum and an interviewee who works in a public sector cultural heritage organization both made the point that, while a lot of stolen cultural heritage is moved abroad, many objects are trafficked across states and remain in Brazil. Keeping the objects in Brazil can be a decision that results in still making considerable amounts of money whilst potentially lowering the risk of detection from national and international policing. With respect to Europe, a private art detective explained how stolen objects can be “whipped across” European borders. This was supported by other people who work in insurance and policing in England and Wales and Italy who spoke about the significant movement of stolen items abroad, with Switzerland being one notable location into which (and through which) stolen objects are consistently moved. According to interviewees, this form of trafficking can be because of the openness of some borders in Europe, and, in Brazil, because the country has the third longest border in the world (16,886 kilometers) as well as because of agencies’ foci on other illicit activities. An officer from the Carabinieri TPC highlighted that offenders are very adaptable in how they move objects across borders: “The systems used to pass through borders’ controls are many and hard to classify for their continuous evolution.” This highlights crime groups’ ability and need to keep imaginatively developing the “illegal and destructive” enterprise.Footnote 30

The data highlight how the Internet has opened up more opportunities, especially to sell on lower-value items. In England and Wales, in relation to heritage and cultural property, a loss adjuster called the Internet “[a] tool for thieves,” and a private art detective spoke about victims of thefts seeing their objects being sold online. In France, an officer from the OCBC gave an example of antiquities from Iraq that had been sold illegally online to France, and another officer spoke about illegally excavated objects in France being sold online. The reduced visibility provided by the Internet clearly benefits the enterprise.

The theft of metal objects is another good example of criminal entrepreneurs adapting to an opportunity and their “decision making conduct.”Footnote 31 In contrast to paintings produced on canvases, metal objects have a material value as well as value in artistic, cultural, heritage, and historical terms. Although the object might be worth significantly more if it is sold on as the intended object, money can be made from selling the object for scrap metal. Examples include more than 6,700 churches and 42 commercial heritage properties in England known to have been the victims of metal thefts between 2009 and 2014,Footnote 32 and people in Brazil removing metal from monuments and selling it to scrap dealers. In Brazil, an interviewee who works for a public sector cultural heritage organization spoke about the ease with which people could sell on stolen metal from historical assets and public monuments in Rio de Janeiro to scrap dealers and how the thefts were systematic. Data collected in Rio de Janeiro from observation research supported his claim about the systematic nature of these thefts.

According to a loss adjuster in England and Wales, crime groups might not melt down the object at the time of the theft but wait in anticipation of a rise in the price of the metal. This potential attempt to gain as high a profit as possible shows the extent of entrepreneurship involved in the activity and is an example of an “imaginative pursuit of profit.”Footnote 33 Potentially, the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 in England and Wales has helped combat these thefts to an extent as it prevents the legal sale of scrap for cash and introduced the need for identity and address verification of the seller.Footnote 34 An interviewee who works for a non-department governing body in the United Kingdom said that “[i]t is better than what we had before.” However, the thefts are continuing, especially at churches, and are often carried out by crime groups. In comparison to stealing paintings, stealing metal objects can arguably be more “efficient” as it can involve less risk in the processes of the actual theft and in gaining a profit afterwards.Footnote 35 This is another example of the decision making involved in the enterprise. Even when crime groups might struggle to sell on a stolen object, many interviewees pointed out that the groups can try to use the stolen object as collateral or currency in other activities.

To use as currency and collateral in illicit markets

Although interviewees in all four study areas highlighted that it can be hard to sell on some stolen heritage and cultural property, particularly high-value objects owing to these items being identified more easily now owing to the digitization of images and the use of databases, interviewees pointed out that stolen objects can be used as currency and collateral within illicit markets and are used in relation to other criminal enterprises such as illicit drugs and weapons. For example, a private art detective explained: “It’s found that art is being used as a currency to fund other forms of criminal behaviour.” A loss adjuster said: “It can be put to use as collateral which is … the theory that quite a lot of art work is used as collateral for drugs and guns etc. … operations.” Interviewees such as loss adjusters, public police, and private detectives highlighted that the stolen objects’ usefulness increases when operating across national borders owing to the ease with which they can be transported in comparison with other items such as arms, cash, and illicit drugs. The Carabinieri TPC gave an example of works of art stolen from Italy discovered in Jamaica, where a politician had been keeping them in relation to a payment for illicit drugs. The use as collateral and currency is another example of the “imaginative pursuit of profit”Footnote 36 as well as “developing an illegal business enterprise”Footnote 37 and “efficiency”Footnote 38 because cash and other illicit goods are targeted more by customs and other policing agencies. It also helps to explain why crime groups with no links to heritage and cultural property crime can be drawn to it. This is important because, while crime prevention approaches can be useful in highlighting this type of opportunity, examining it through a criminal entrepreneurship lens allows for more understanding about the enterprise and business-style decisions involved and for a greater focus on not only seeing an opportunity in an area about which they are aware but also actively looking for business opportunities across different areas.

To use for ransoms and rewards

The data also draw attention to the use of stolen heritage and cultural property in trying to acquire financial gains through ransoms and rewards. Interviewees who work with insurance said that, while criminal entrepreneurs can try to gain a ransom, it is more likely that instead of an outright ransom demand, the objects are used in attempts to gain the rewards that might be offered by an insurance company or the owner of the object. Rewards can play a significant part in the recovery of stolen art and are viewed as a useful inducement. Interviewees who work for insurance companies in England and Wales were very clear that they do not pay ransoms and that any reward payment needs to go through the chief constable or assistant chief constable of the county police force. Nevertheless, another interviewee who works in insurance highlighted that offering rewards is potentially very contentious. There can be grey lines between ransoms and rewards, and it is important to highlight that globally there is a long history of ransom attempts.Footnote 39 In short, the payment of rewards and ransoms can result in the return of the object but can also encourage the thefts. There is also the issue highlighted by interviewees who work with insurance that some thefts of uninsured items are not reported to the public police for reasons such as fear of negative publicity, and, therefore, it is very hard to know if the owners have paid a ransom for the return of an object. This desire for low visibility can be attractive to crime groups seeking low visibility themselves in “high-profit-low-risk” activities.Footnote 40

Reduced chances for detection and less danger than with other illicit activities

Other important motives for criminal entrepreneurs choosing to steal heritage and cultural property are that they can face less danger when carrying out the thefts compared with some other illicit activities and there can also be less chance of being detected.

Less dangerous than other illicit activities

In line with criminal entrepreneurs looking for “high-profit-low-risk” activities,Footnote 41 the data illustrate how stealing heritage and cultural property can be less dangerous than stealing from other locations, and, therefore, the activity becomes attractive for crime groups. For example, in England and Wales, as some activities such as bank robberies became more dangerous in the 1980s and 1990s to the extent that those carrying them out could be shot, offenders sought activities that posed less danger for them such as stealing heritage and cultural property. A private art detective in England and Wales explained: “So, there was a very heavy likelihood that when a bank job went down the police had inside information … people would be shot … criminals would be shot … they actually then looked for other soft targets and they picked on art and antiques.”

Bank robbers in England and Wales also moved into the less dangerous activities of tobacco goods smuggling in the 1990s and early 2000sFootnote 42 and value-added tax gold fraud from 1980 to the early 1990s.Footnote 43 It can be argued that the offenders were being “efficient”Footnote 44 in switching activities, especially as there was initially less public policing attention. While the danger they faced lessened with the move into the different illicit activity of stealing heritage and cultural property, it is important to note that, according to the interviewees, some of these offenders are prepared to use significant violence in the thefts, particularly in private houses.

Crime groups assess and then target locations that they think will potentially pose less danger for them. For instance, the data consistently show that, in all four study regions, the most targeted locations are churches, small museums, locations with outdoor heritage and cultural property, and private houses. A key reason for this is the lower level of danger to the thieves owing to there being less of a security presence and the nature of this presence. For example, interviewees who work in museums in Brazil and England highlighted how small museums and country houses open to the public often rely on volunteers, some of whom are of retirement age. Expectations on what these people can do must be managed. Particular examples of lower-danger locations being targeted include specific spates of thefts from country houses and churches in England and Wales; rural locations in France; churches in Italy; and churches, old palaces, and farm estates in Brazil. Other examples are the theft of metal objects and illegal excavations of objects from outdoor spaces. The type of risk assessments that crime groups make in looking for less dangerous activities overlap with their risk assessments regarding the reduced chance of detection.

Less chance of detection of the offender

In search of “high-profit-low-risk” activities, targeting locations with less security makes obvious sense for lowering the chances of detection.Footnote 45 In Brazil, disused palaces and farm estates are an example. Another example is the targeting of churches in all the study regions, many of which have high-, mid-, and low-value items and limited security. To avoid detection after carrying out a theft, there have been examples of offenders in Italy cutting out sections of stolen paintings and selling these sections separately, according to an officer from the Carabinieri TPC. While this is highly destructive for the artistic, cultural, heritage, and historic value of the original painting, it demonstrates the adaptability of the offenders in seeking opportunities to avoid detection. Although clearly a “destructive” form of entrepreneurshipFootnote 46 that will also result in a lower profit, it is an “imaginative pursuit of profit” as it lowers the chance of detection and can still result in a profit.Footnote 47 Even when the thefts from some of these lower security locations might be of objects of lower value, the potential profit can still make undertaking the theft worthwhile if the risk of detection is low.

In addition, the chance of detection in Brazil and Europe is potentially lowered because of the aforementioned reason that it can be easier to move stolen heritage and cultural property across national borders than other illicit goods that are being targeted by customs and other policing agencies. This also partly relates to it being less of a priority than other illicit goods. For example, a senior customs official in Brazil spoke about illicit cigarettes, drugs, and weapons being more of a priority. An OCBC officer in France said that they had prevented the trafficking of 250 chalices but that this would be viewed as nothing compared to a haul of cocaine at a harbor. Interviewees who work in insurance and private detection also highlighted the issue that, within some countries – for example, England and Wales and the United States – public police forces and policing agencies can be reluctant or slow to work with each other across county or state lines.

The chance of detection for offenders is further lowered by the fact that the private sector is more focused on the recovery and return of the objects than the offender. A private art detective said: “[R]ecovery of the masterpiece is the important thing.” A public police art detective in England and Wales reiterated this issue when they said that, while their focus was on the “criminals not recovery,” with private recovery companies, it was “first recovery, then, second, criminals.” With the private sector doing a lot of the policing in countries such as England and Wales, this can be a significant factor. While this is less the case in Italy with its large public policing presence and also a lesser extent in France, both countries are exceptions globally. The data support the point made by Derek Fincham that, “[s]o long as we are just concerned about recoveries and returning art, the criminals who are stealing our collective cultural heritage are going to continue.”Footnote 48 While recoveries are crucial, so is a focus on the offenders.

Furthermore, if a crime group is unsuccessful in gaining a profit through attempts to sell on a stolen object or in using it for a ransom or reward or for collateral or currency in an illicit deal, then the object can be destroyed, left somewhere to be found, or hidden to be used in the future for the reasons stated or for other motives such as attempted plea bargains and reduced sentences.

Opportunity to do reconnaissance of potential targets

A huge number of indoor and outdoor locations have heritage and cultural property on display to the public. In England and Wales, some private houses also have it on public display on specific days for tax purposes. The openness of these sites provides offenders with opportunities to do reconnaissance of the security of the locations and assess aspects such as the potential value, inertia (weight), visibility, and access (VIVA), which is taken from the routine activity theory,Footnote 49 and whether objects are concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, and disposable (CRAVED), which is also from the routine activity theory,Footnote 50 and make their own risk assessments as to whether the activity is “high-profit-low-risk”Footnote 51 or even moderate/low-profit-low-risk. Interviewees explained how, in Italy, the scale of outdoor heritage and cultural property creates many opportunities for thieves. An interviewee who works in a public sector cultural heritage organization in Brazil said that, although some disused palaces and farm estates might not be open to reconnaissance, there can be minimal security at the premises, which then makes reconnaissance low risk. A private art detective spoke about how reconnaissance in England and Wales can even be as simple as knocking on doors of private houses to look inside the houses on the subterfuge of selling products or offering services. Routine activity theory is useful for analyzing opportunities at the locations, but it does not capture sufficiently why the crime groups are attracted to investigate the opportunities in the first place.

Lack of regulation in the market

The fact that the market can be labelled as “criminal” and a “wild west” marketFootnote 52 and lacks sufficient regulation, to the extent that a private art detective called it “dangerously lax,” can draw crime groups to operate with people within it. It can also encourage them to steal heritage and cultural property owing to the potential disposal opportunities that still exist. A private art detective summed it up: “You have to understand with the art market that it’s the last, great unpoliced financial market.” In Brazil, an employee of a public sector cultural heritage organization explained: “The characteristics of the market in cultural heritage and antiquities facilitate the trafficking of illicit goods.” This statement fits with research that has highlighted that Brazil could be a significant intermediate marketplace for colonial-period art stolen from countries such as Bolivia and Peru.Footnote 53 This is a reminder, first, that, although it can be difficult to sell on stolen high-value objects, there are still opportunities owing to the national and international demand for some objects; second, that lower-value stolen objects can be moved on because there are likely to be fewer checks on these objects despite databases and the digitization of images, and, third, that there are other criminal entrepreneurs aside from crime groups operating and profiting in the market.

Furthermore, as pointed out by a private detective and interviewees who work in private detection and for insurance companies, not all thefts are reported. This point is supported by data specifically on heritage crimes that have highlighted that, in 2012, one in three heritage crimes in England were not reported.Footnote 54 While stealing heritage and cultural property fits in McElwee and Smith’s neo-Baumolian typology as “[i]llegal and destructive,” it is hard to categorize the market within the nine categories that range from “[l]egal and productive” to “[i]llegal and destructive,” as it is an entrepreneurial entity that is legal but criminogenic.Footnote 55 “Legal but destructive,” “[l]egal but unproductive,” “[i]llicit and unproductive,” and “[i]llicit and destructive” are all categories in which the market could be placed. However, even if categorization is difficult, it is clear that the market’s criminogenic and opaque configuration and practices attract crime groups to steal heritage and cultural property and make it part of their wider enterprises.

A lack of public policing attention makes it an attractive criminal activity

Although there are examples of heritage and cultural property being a public policing focus, globally, it is more common for there to be a lack of focus. One obvious example of it being a public policing focus is Italy, which has its large Carabinieri TPC unit of 250 plus staff, a command office, an operational department, regional units across the country, its Leonardo database, and operations and training abroad. In France, there is some public policing focus but to a lesser extent than in Italy. It has its national OCBC unit with about 25 staff (including civil and military police officers), its Treima database, operations and training groups, and liaison officers. In Brazil, there is a national unit that covers crimes related to heritage and cultural property objects and locations that are registered as being in the Brazilian public interest for cultural heritage reasons. If an object is not registered, then the Civil Police will deal with the case. As well as a central office, the unit has representatives in every state. There could be more public police involvement, but such forces would rely on an increase in resources. In England and Wales, there is no national unit, and the only public police force that has a unit is London’s Metropolitan Police, although a growing number of other forces have liaison officers. There are also training courses for police officers available from Historic England. There could be more public police involvement, but heritage and cultural property are low priorities in government and police forces, as evidenced by the county forces’ slowness in working with each other.

An interviewee who works in insurance highlighted that, when offenders believe that a specific type of crime is not being looked at with any particular interest, they will then carry on with it. Similarly, concerning England and Wales specifically, a private art detective said that the offenders “know there are no art and antique squads now,” and another private art detective highlighted the lack of public policing focus. Both private detectives argued that this made the thefts more attractive for offenders. This is in line with Gundur’s argument about offenders optimizing criminal careers by choosing “efficient activities” that involve reduced visibility to law enforcement.Footnote 56 Regarding offenders’ perceptions of public policing activity, an OCBC officer in France spoke of the importance of public police presence and used the looting of archaeological sites in France as an example: “When you show up with the blue lights – it has an impact.” The Carabinieri TPC is very aware of this situation. As well as putting on well-publicized exhibitions across Italy to promote its activities and show its successes, it appears in national and international documentaries and uses national and international media in its investigations to highlight its successes. This can help deter crime groups looking imaginatively for “high-profit-low-risk” activities.Footnote 57

In Brazil, the head of a national museum and an interviewee who works in a public sector cultural heritage organization spoke about improvements in public policing. However, an interviewee who works in a public sector cultural heritage organization highlighted that issues remained such as some Federal Police officers not acting even when they had information about thefts. Interviewees in Brazil consistently spoke about the lack of resources spent in the sector, and an interviewee who works in a public sector cultural heritage organization highlighted the effect of the lack of spending on the policing of well-organized crime groups: “We are aware that the major challenge is the instrumentalization of more modern mechanisms or technologies for information exchange, compatible with the level of organisation of groups that commit illicit trafficking in cultural goods.” An interviewee who works in a public sector cultural heritage organization in Brazil highlighted the scale of the challenge: “[I]n Brazil the thefts are systematic.” The frustration for people who work for public sector organizations in Brazil is that parts of the protection and policing of heritage and cultural property exist already and there are many good proposals to improve them but they all require investment.

Kudos

Despite crime groups being drawn to the thefts for the motive of profit with a low risk, the self-identity of criminal entrepreneurs within crime groups can be a factor in the thefts. A loss adjuster claimed that there were kudos in the criminal world for carrying out this type of theft. He emphasized that it could help offenders make a name for themselves. The media portrayal of the thefts can feed this potential. One interviewee who works for a database spoke of the media not reporting facts but “imposing a narrative.” He spoke about elements of glamour in the narrative despite the activity not being glamorous at all. An OCBC officer spoke of his frustrations with some of the French media not including key information – for example, not mentioning the law regarding metal detecting in a documentary. A loss adjuster said that, despite some of the thefts including violence, there can be a “Robin Hood” narrative proposed. The crime groups can also play on this idea. For example, a leading member of a crime group in England and Wales has said: “I really feel I’ve got the fucking right to rob the Lords out there. I feel I’ve got the right to rob the Sirs, Lords and the Ladies. … If I feel the need where I’ve got to rob a country manor, stately home I will do so.”Footnote 58

This also relates to the lack of an “ideal victim.” Concerning public antipathy toward victims of art fraud, Sara Mazurek uses Christie’s work on the ideal victim and argues that, potentially, these victims are very low in the “hierarchy of victims” owing to their involvement in a market that “leaves openings for fraud” and “perceived personal shortcomings.”Footnote 59 Arguably, some victims of heritage and cultural property thefts can receive a similar response, especially if they are wealthy and/or insured.

Relevance of the motivations of crime groups on the protection of heritage and cultural property

As crime groups act as criminal entrepreneurs in their search for opportunities for “high-profit-low-risk,”Footnote 60 it is understandable why opportunity-based approaches to preventing crime such as rational choice theory, routine activity theory, and situational crime prevention (SCP) should be a focus in trying to combat these crime groups from stealing heritage and cultural property. The emphasis of these approaches on target-hardening and crime-reducing opportunities in the physical environment provide useful practical assistance for combating certain thefts in locations that have heritage and cultural property. For instance, Louise Grove and Ken Pease’s SCP techniques for preventing different kinds of heritage crime, based on Derek Cornish and Ronald Clarke’s 25 techniques of SCP, have useful practical ideas to combat the crimes.Footnote 61 In addition, acronyms such as CRAVED and VIVA are helpful for assessing whether objects are potentially suitable targets.Footnote 62 Furthermore, it is worth highlighting that some rational choice and situational crime approaches in criminology also consider “bounded rationality” in which offenders might be motivated by factors such as status, kudos, and power.Footnote 63

The data from the four study regions provide much evidence about the importance of focusing on the potential crime and preventing it through target-hardening measures and how this benefits the heritage and cultural property locations. However, a lack of focus on the offenders means that it is easier for them to continue to operate as criminal entrepreneurs seeking opportunities and for other crime groups to be drawn to this area. In effect, specific thefts might be prevented – for example, some large museums and private residences in Brazil, England and Wales, France, and Italy have such good security that there is very little opportunity to steal objects from these locations, but the offenders can seek and imaginatively pursue other opportunities at different locations. There is a debate over whether offenders will be displaced to other locations. For example, one loss adjuster said: “There are people constantly drifting around, whether it’s the West End or comparable areas in New York, Paris etc., just waiting for … to see a weakness and they’ll be in there.” In contrast, the head of security at a national art museum in London said that it was unlikely that his site’s excellent security made other locations a target as there was “not a natural deferment.” However, the targeting in the study regions of specific locations such as private houses, country houses, churches, small museums, disused palaces and farm estates, outdoor locations, and archaeological sites points to some displacement from highly securitized locations to these often more vulnerable locations.

Regarding displacement to other criminal activities, Cornish and Clarke, in their work on rational choice theory, argue that the difference between types of crimes and their uniqueness in terms of benefits, challenges, and costs means that offenders will not move to another type of crime if one type of crime is prevented.Footnote 64 However, other proponents of SCP approaches are aware that crime groups might be less easily deterred than some other offenders from committing crime if a specific type of crime is prevented, and these researchers accept that the crime groups might seek alternatives.Footnote 65 The data used for this article show that some crime groups involved in the thefts are engaged in a range of criminal activities including heritage and cultural property thefts, and, therefore, the idea that they will not seek other opportunities within heritage and cultural property fields or, if these opportunities are closed, in other areas of crime does not hold ground. This is why the data from all the study regions illustrating the importance of focusing on the offenders as well as the thefts, owing to crime groups being able to target other opportunities if prevention of the acts is the key focus, is important as it contradicts some crime science proponents such as Marcus Felson who has argued that, to understand and reduce “organised crime,” people should “[f]ocus on the acts, not the group engaging in it.”Footnote 66 The research conducted in the four study regions shows the need to focus on the crime groups and their diverse activities across different areas of crime and investigate how their “imaginative pursuit of profit”Footnote 67 in “high-profit-low-risk”Footnote 68 activities has drawn them, and could attract other crime groups, to steal heritage and cultural property. In addition, using the term “criminal entrepreneurs” pushes the emphasis more onto looking at the crime groups and their imaginative pursuit of profit for their illegal enterprises as well as the acts.

Writing about heritage specifically, Grove and Pease argue that, owing to the unique value of heritage items, if displacement were actually to occur and the crime was to move to other targets, it would be “regrettable but not without residual merit.”Footnote 69 This viewpoint has its merits as replaceable objects of no heritage, cultural, or artistic value might be stolen instead, and, therefore, the loss might not be as great. However, if crime groups cannot be successful with the thefts and move to another non-heritage and cultural property target or activity that they hope to be “high-profit-low-risk,”Footnote 70 the effects of the other activity can also be severe. For example, interviewees who work in public and private policing and government organizations highlighted that other activities engaged in by groups that have stolen heritage and cultural property include the trafficking of illicit drugs and weapons, fraud, money laundering, and armed and unarmed robberies of other items (including rhino horns and cash dispensers).

The data has shown that there can also be a diffusion of security and policing benefits from successfully focusing on crime groups involved in the thefts. For example, the reason why members of a well-known crime group in England were convicted in 2008 was because of their heritage and cultural property thefts rather than their other activities. A private art detective said: “It took so long for police to do anything. Drugs, armed robberies, thefts, violent crimes. Achilles’ heel was art. Police should have realized this long ago.” Similarly, members of a well-known crime group from Ireland that operates globally were convicted in 2016 because of a spate of museum thefts that targeted Chinese objects and rhino horns rather than for the array of other activities in which they had been involved.

Conclusion

Although it can be difficult to sell on high-value stolen objects, the theft of heritage and cultural property is an attractive criminal activity for crime groups because it offers potential financial opportunities such as selling on the stolen objects and using them as currency and collateral in illicit markets or for ransoms and rewards. In addition, it can be less dangerous than other illicit activities, there can be less chance of detection, and there are opportunities to do reconnaissance at many potential targets. Furthermore, there is a lack of regulation in the market, and, indeed, the market itself is criminogenic. There can also be kudos in stealing the objects. Owing to these factors, the thefts offer crime groups operating as criminal entrepreneurs “high-profit-low-risk”Footnote 71 and moderate/low-profit-low-risk illicit activities that are “efficient” as they often involve reduced visibility to policing and competitors.Footnote 72 While this situation remains, even if crime prevention strategies are implemented at locations, crime groups will continue to be drawn to the thefts, especially as they can focus on the more vulnerable locations that do not have the capacity for extensive target-hardening measures. If this is the case, then unique and irreplaceable items will carry on being stolen and societies will lose in artistic, cultural, heritage, historical, and financial terms.

Specific arrests and convictions of members of crime groups in Brazil and England and Wales demonstrate that the thefts can be the “Achilles’ heel” of crime groups that carry out a range of activities. Public policing agencies need to have this awareness, whether they are working independently or as part of a policing matrix or co-production, especially as private policing’s focus is more on the recovery of the objects rather than on the offender. Changes to sentencing guidelines and legislation such as the Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 in England and Wales can also help. However, a critical aspect is the supply-demand feature in entrepreneurial activities and the “imaginative pursuit of profit.”Footnote 73 While crime groups stealing heritage and cultural property need to be targeted, it is also essential that other criminal entrepreneurs operating within the heritage and cultural property worlds, especially in the market, are targeted as well. The research from the four study regions makes clear that the market plays a role in attracting crime groups to seek to profit in this area as it engenders criminal entrepreneurship. This supports previous research that has highlighted that it is imperative to focus on the demand for stolen heritage and cultural property as well as the market that benefits from this demand.Footnote 74 This article reiterates this call. If demand were significantly lowered for the stolen objects and there were more regulations in the market, the thefts would be far less attractive for crime groups as they are drawn to them largely for the entrepreneurial potential of profit at a low risk, and this opportunity could be reduced significantly.

Acknowledgments

Thank you to both the reviewers and the editor of the International Journal of Cultural Property for their very useful comments.

Footnotes

2 Knauss Reference Knauss2007; Mackenzie Reference Mackenzie, Manacorda and Chappell2011, Reference Mackenzie, Hufnagel and Chappell2019; Miranda Reference Miranda2012; Campbell Reference Campbell2013; Kerr Reference Kerr2015, Reference Kerr2020; Runhovde Reference Runhovde2021; Interpol, Assessing Crimes against Cultural Property 2020 Survey of Interpol Member Countries, September 2021.

3 See, e.g., Gottschalk Reference Gottschalk2009; Chappell and Polk Reference Chappell and Polk2011; Paoli and Vander Beken Reference Paoli, Beken and Paoli2014.

5 Vander Beken Verfaille, and Tekin Reference Beken, Tom, Tekin and Beken2015, 269.

10 Gottschalk Reference Gottschalk2009, 1.

12 Baumol Reference Baumol1990, 893.

16 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

18 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

20 Gundur Reference Gundur2019, 387.

21 See, e.g., Cornish and Clarke Reference Cornish and Ronald Clarke1986; Felson and Clarke Reference Felson and Clarke1998; Clarke and Newman Reference Clarke and Newman2006; Farrell Reference Farrell2010.

24 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

25 Gundur Reference Gundur2019, 387.

32 Historic England, New Guidelines Target Heritage Thieves, 2015, https://historicengland.org.uk/whats-new/news/new-guidelines-target-heritage-thieves (accessed 10 December 2022).

34 Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013, c. 10.

35 Gundur Reference Gundur2019, 378.

37 Gottschalk Reference Gottschalk2009, 1.

38 Gundur Reference Gundur2019, 378.

40 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

41 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

42 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007.

43 Lashmar and Hobbs Reference Lashmar and Hobbs2018.

44 Gundur Reference Gundur2019, 387.

45 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

49 Felson and Clarke Reference Felson and Clarke1998.

51 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

53 Oosterman and Yates Reference Oosterman and Yates2020.

54 David Bradley, Jane Bradley, Mike Coombes, Louise Grove, and Chris Thomas Young, “6165 The Extent of Crime and Anti-social Behaviour Facing Designated Heritage Assets,” Historic England, 2012, https://historicengland.org.uk/content/docs/legal/researchpaper-pdf/ (accessed 8 December 2022).

57 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

58 Country Strife: Summer with the Johnsons, documentary, Raw TV, British Broadcasting Corporation, 2005.

59 Mazurek Reference Mazurek2019, 413.

60 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

66 Felson Reference Felson2006, 16.

68 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

70 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

71 Hornsby and Hobbs Reference Hornsby and Hobbs2007, 553.

72 Gundur Reference Gundur2019, 387.

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