This essay offers a reinterpretation of the constitution of intellectual property as an academic subject by focusing on the work of Thomas Anthony Blanco White (1916–2006). His textbooks were fundamental for the development of ‘intellectual property’ in Britain and the Commonwealth. Not only did they provide the basis for a discipline in the making, their timely publication also helped to connect and, more importantly, constitute a diverse audience of articled clerks, practitioners and students. This essay traces the making of Blanco's first booklets and his subsequent rewriting of them, which culminated in the publication of what would become a standard textbook writing technique in British intellectual property in the twentieth century. In explaining the history of these textbooks and their pivotal role for the recognition of intellectual property as an academic subject in the university curriculum, the essay explores the ways in which a distinctive knowledge of and writing about intellectual property emerged in Britain in the post-war years.

Specialist environment courts and tribunals (SECs) are, in the main, reflective of highly dynamic forms of adjudication, mixing judicial forms with powers more traditionally found in the executive. However, despite their novel legal nature the literature on SECs is predominantly promotional and it fails to address the challenges to legitimacy and governance engendered by these institutions. Nor does it evince a robust theory of environmental adjudication. These omissions not only impoverish the discourse but practice unsupported by theory is creating an unstable edifice. To illustrate this point the difficulties experienced in New Zealand are examined. The argument is made that only by confronting the challenges created by SECs can we begin to lay the foundations for a new theoretical model capable of explaining and accommodating environmental adjudication.

While the illegitimate pressure theory provides a more satisfactory theoretical basis for duress in contract law than the overborne will theory, it insufficiently addresses why a victim who has given deliberated consent should be excused from contractual responsibility. The paper proposes that the additional element of ‘excusable consent’ enhances the current analytical framework: first, by recognising that the law makes value judgments of both the threatening party's actions and the victim's response; secondly, by lightening the burden of the illegitimate pressure element and providing it greater focus; and, thirdly, by providing a better fit for considerations such as ‘no practical alternatives’ that strain the existing framework.

In this paper we report the results of an empirical study of 112 appellate decisions on the contributory negligence doctrine in England and Wales between 2000 and 2015. It is the first study of its kind in any common law jurisdiction, and builds on earlier research in which we looked at the doctrine's operation in first instance courts. Our dataset comprised every appellate decision in which contributory negligence was an issue that was handed down during the study period and which we were able to access electronically. The most important findings include the fact that appeals succeed more frequently in relation to the existence of contributory negligence than with respect to apportionment; that the overall prospect of winning an appeal on contributory negligence does not depend on whether the first instance court is a county court or the High Court; that claimants are nearly twice as likely to win an appeal regarding the existence of contributory negligence as defendants; and that by far most common discount imposed following an appeal is 50%.

In 1919, Balfour v Balfour gave birth to the intention to create legal relations doctrine in contract law. In a dispute between a husband and wife, Lord Justice Atkin said that domestic commitments were not within the jurisdiction of contract law. It has had profound implications for how contract cases are decided, and how contract law is understood. In this paper, I focus on the radical implications of this doctrine for contract theory. Charles Fried said famously that contracts are promises. But if contracts are promises, why is it that contract law requires not only promise, but after Balfour a further intention, that the promise be legally enforceable? That tension between the promise theory of contract and the intention to create legal relations doctrine has led some to doubt the place of promise in contract. Dori Kimel, for example, says that the doctrine is a portal between the realm of promise, where people are attached, and the realm of contract, where detachment prevails. But such dichotomies are misleading. Contract is not separate from promise. It is one of the ways that promise fulfils its function of giving meaning and shape to human relationships.

How can the incapacity defence in contract law coexist with the concept of universal legal capacity advanced by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)? In the absence of clear guidance from the CRPD on the link between legal capacity and mental capacity, and given the silence of this Convention on the concept of contractual capacity, this article stresses the need to redefine contractual capacity in a manner that responds not only to economic interests (eg upholding the security of transactions) but also to social interests (including the protection of values such as dignity). The discussion insists that incapacity and disability must never be conceptually equated and calls for a definition of contractual incapacity that moves beyond the medical condition of individuals (whether this is known by or apparent to the other contracting party) and which considers the circumstances of the transaction. These arguments are explored in the context of English contract law, focusing on the question of contractual validity when a party lacked the mental capacity to understand the transaction and the other party was unaware of the incapacity and acted in good faith.

This paper examines the cross fertilisation of ideas about interactive teaching from law to physics and back again. In particular it considers the origin, legacy and merits of Langdell's teaching model and the way it has been used by a physics professor, Eric Mazur, to support arguments for what is commonly known as the ‘flipped classroom’. It examines the similarities and differences between Langdell's and Mazur's approaches and the adoption by some law teachers of Mazur's model. It also considers how this phenomenon bares out a thesis advanced by educationalist Lee Shulman that when it comes to teaching, both professional and liberal disciplines are pursuing many of the same ends. Finally it considers the implications of adopting Mazur's approach for the discipline of law and issues some words of caution.

Contemporary state authorities in the United Kingdom and elsewhere have increasingly sought to regulate the use of public space. This paper explores through a doctrinal and socio-legal analysis how recently introduced Public Spaces Protection Orders (PSPOs) are being used in England and Wales to enforce majoritarian sensibilities at the expense of due process and civil liberties. PSPOs were introduced in October 2014. These orders grant considerable discretion to local authorities to use the threat of criminal sanction to regulate activities in public spaces that they regard as being detrimental to the quality of life of residents. This paper provides the first comprehensive critique of how these orders are used to target minority and vulnerable groups, while curtailing fundamental freedoms. The paper includes suggestions for reforms to make the PSPO function in a manner that is more compatible with a rights-based approach.