When a firm's management needs to raise external capital in order to finance an investment project, it is likely to have better information about the project's future return than do potential investors. In such a case, as has been shown in the literature, management may be able to signal its information through the use of certain financial variables. However, the possibility that management may be able to use the level of investment in the project itself to signal their information has not been considered. The purpose of this paper is to examine this possibility. It is shown here that the level of capital investment may be able to perfectly reveal management's information, with a higher input level signalling more favorable information. It is further demonstrated that even in this equilibrium, financial variables still play an important role. Among other results, it is shown, in contrast to a conclusion of a study by Leland and Pyle, that in this setting the number of shares held by management may be negatively correlated with the favorableness of their information.

In the last several years, there has been increased theoretical emphasis on the agent-principal problem as it applies to corporate finance. This paper is an attempt to empirically test for the presence of the agency costs and their relation to the debt policy of corporations. We find that firms with higher insider ownership have greater debt ratios than firms with lower insider ownership, which may be explained by the agency costs of debt and/or the agency costs of equity. Other regression results tend to confirm the theoretically optimal relationships put forth by Myers. We find that high-growth firms use less debt rather than more debt, high-operating-risk firms use more debt rather than less debt, and firm size appears to be uncorrelated to the level of debt.

This paper investigates the efficiency of the market for foreign currency options with the help of a modified version of the Black-Scholes model. The evidence in the ex post tests is inconsistent with this hypothesis since we find a large number of opportunities for abnormal profits. A second set of tests is conducted on an ex ante basis to determine whether these profit opportunities exist even if the execution of the strategy is delayed by one day. The evidence from these tests provides more support for the hypothesis of market efficiency.

Previous anomaly research may have misinterpreted corrected, for the market index, mean returns on small firms. Assuming mean-variance preferences, it is shown theoretically that corrected mean returns (i.e., market line deviations) are not indicative of the relative desirability of increasing the proportional investment in small firms. The correct improvement criterion is derived and estimated. Tests indicate that the value-weighted market index is not significantly improved with greater weight on small firms, in the average month. When seasonality is considered, the observed performance improvements due to small or large firms are significant in some months, but the required portfolio position is unclear. If a case exists for a small firm anomaly in January, it probably exists in other months and it also exists for large firms. It is doubtful whether such an anomalous stock market exists.

This paper investigates the effect on shareholder wealth of two events that change management's choice between negotiated and competitive underwritten equity offerings. These two events are the suspension and termination of suspension of Rule 50. (This rule is based on the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and requires certain utilities to use the competitive method.) The results indicate that the shareholders of the affected utilities experience an abnormal negative return on the announcement of the suspension of Rule 50, and an abnormal positive return on the announcement of the termination of suspension. This evidence is consistent with the joint hypothesis: (i) competitive offerings are less costly than negotiated offerings, and (ii) manager-shareholder agency costs are a determinant of the corporate choice between these two methods of raising equity.

To date, a number of studies involving the use of bond prices and/or returns have utilized the published prices of trades on the New York and other exchanges. These exchange quotes reflect the odd-lot activities of individual investors and account for only a negligible portion of the trading in listed issues. In contrast, the vast majority of listed corporate trading occurs over-the-counter and involves round-lot trades between institutions. Given differences in market characteristics, odd-lot exchange prices may differ substantially from those in the round-lot institutional market. This study compares exchange quotations from Moody's Bond Record with prices assigned by Merrill Lynch's institutional pricing service and uses each set of prices to calculate return and risk measures. Institutional (Merrill Lynch) bond prices are shown to be systematically greater than exchange (Moody's) prices. In addition, bond returns based on Merrill Lynch prices are shown to yield significantly higher beta and R2 estimates, as well as significantly lower standard deviation and residual risk estimates.

This paper reexamines the issue of common stock market risk stationarity by applying a newly available exact test for random-walk regression coefficients. For each eight-year subperiod tested in the 1951–1974 interval, betas for individual New York Stock Exchange-listed stocks appeared to be nonstationary. The statistical powers of the exact test and of locally most powerful tests are compared to the power of the test employed previously by Sunder. These power considerations are cited to explain the differences between test results obtained here and those reported by Sunder.

A fundamental statistical test of serial independence is developed and applied to daily stock returns. Let xt be the deviation of the daily return on a stock from its sample mean after any autocorrelation present has been removed. If xt is serially independent, then the cumulative sum of xt over time is the position of a one-dimensional random walk on a line. The empirical distribution of step lengths over a large sample allows the distribution of the largest absolute excursion in a T-step walk to be calculated by repeated simulation. The observed maximal excursions are found to be significantly smaller than one would expect, based on serial independence and the observed distribution of step lengths. It is concluded that these daily stock returns are not serially independent and that the market value of the corporations studied has a tendency to return to an interval around the trend value.

In a recent paper, Johnson [7] has given an analytic approximation to the American put price that delivers values that are very close to numerical solutions. The limitation to the Johnson approximation is that it is only applicable to put options on stocks without cash dividends. This study modifies the Johnson approximation to value options on stocks that have one exdividend date prior to the option expiration date, and these approximation values are compared to the analytic solutions provided by the Geske and Johnson [6] American put option pricing model. The approximation values are generally very close to the analytic solutions.

This note shows that, appearances to the contrary, the lower bounds on the price of a call option obtained by Levy and by Ritchken are identical, and that this common bound is never inferior to the lower bound obtained by Perrakis and Ryan.