When the Chinese Communists finally consummated their seizure of power in mainland China, one of the first tasks which faced them was that of elaborating a formal institutional structure for the exercise of regular public authority. Indeed, while the new leadership now undoubtedly enjoyed de facto control over the country and the mass of the people, it found itself quite destitute of those normal channels of state regulation and administrative management which serve to bestow legitimacy on a claimant to the role of national government and to distinguish a duly constituted, relatively stable political order from an altogether fluid interlude of revolutionary action predicated on ad hoc use of organised force under a central direction. The Party soon moved to make up for this grave deficiency by creating, on paper at least, a complex mechanism of state administration to back up its bid for recognition as the official spokesman for the Chinese nation and, concurrently, provide it with the wherewithal to play that role effectively.

The Chinese are still divided into two groups. One group is very left in its views, very vociferous, very active, very humourless, very narrow minded and forceful, and knows what it wants and intends to achieve its objects by fair means or foul, regardless of what the rest of the population may think. The other group is undoubtedly immensely larger, though one might be excused for not realising this, as it lacks cohesion and the people in it merely wish to be left alone to carry on their normal avocations. Since it has no strong feelings not only does this group not speak out, but in many cases it finds the line of least resistance is to support the other group when asked to do so.

The 1962 Annual Report for the District of Kuching, The Sarawak Gazette, May 31, 1963.

This article surveys the development of Chinese education within South-East Asian Chinese societies, and briefly relates it to the integration and assimilation of the hua ch'iao into indigenous societies.

On December 9, 1963, Singapore's Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, in presenting a general policy statement of his government for the coming year to the Singapore Legislative Assembly, noted that in Singapore's Nanyang University “a situation is developing which if left unchecked will make it more a University of Yenan than of Nanyang,” and that “Indeed the problems of Nanyang can never be resolved until the political abuse the Communists make of it is exposed and stopped.” Lee's remarks, like his previous ones on the subject of Nanyang University, did not fail to touch on a raw nerve of the University's problems. But as in the past, the raising of the spectre of Yenan has tended to obscure the complex patterns of pride and prejudice and the dilemmas of educational policy confronting the Malaysian Chinese community and indeed the hua ch'iao (Overseas Chinese) of Southeast Asia generally, of which the University is but an expression. Nanyang University's problems today provide an index to the paradoxes and the conflicting appeals as a whole that stir the community whose interests it was originally designed to serve.

If as a theorist Mao Tun was without a theory, as a polemicist he was without a polemic. What plagued him there also hurt him here, and for the same reason: he did not as yet have any firm conviction regarding his standpoint. He did not have a solid base to operate from.