A current trend in sociology characterises the end of the twentieth century as obsessed with risk. Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens are perhaps the leading expositors of this theme. Both emphasise a break with the past as the last millennium approached its conclusion, whereby changes in patterns of work, technological developments and the demise of traditional social forms have ushered in a new modernity. In their view, social organisations became more reflexive in their assessments of the circumstances of daily life, at a time when new technologies created the possibility of damage on a global scale. The result in the new social world is a society focused on risk. Some aspects of this assessment are uncontroversial. New technologies have emerged, whilst the role of the nation state has changed since its apogee in the nineteenth century. Other aspects of this new vision are, however, empirically more problematic. Furthermore, the degree to which social changes actually had the effects identified by Beck and Giddens remains an open question. Using the early twentieth-century regulation of mental defectives as a case study, this paper will interrogate this ‘discontinuist’ vision, exploring whether and how our understanding of risk has changed.

Like all babies, Harry Potter was born vulnerable. Like most babies, he was cared for and loved by those closest to him. When Harry was still an infant, however, the most horrible thing imaginable happened. His parents were killed by Voldemort; in turn, the evil wizard turned his murderous wrath on baby Harry. But Harry was too strong for Voldemort. Without realising it, he destroyed Voldemort’s powers and survived with only a jagged scar on his forehead. Harry Potter may have been vulnerable. But he was also capable of directing the history of the entire wizard world.

In this article I critically analyse the two historical models for conceptualising the child: the protectionist model and the children’s rights model. I argue that both models are inappropriate ways in which to conceptualise the child. Protectionism is paternalistic, essentialises the child, and denies the child a voice. Equally problematic, the children’s rights model presumes the social desirability of the liberal individual, and emphasises rights over relationships, and universal principles over concrete situations. Given the flaws inherent in these models, I propose a third way in which to conceptualise the child based on a feminist ‘ethic of care’. Drawing on the work of proponents of an ethic of care, I consider how the ethic might conceptualise the child, and how it might translate into a family law context.

This paper draws on an analysis of case studies from the line of research that examines contractual and working relationships in the aerospace industry (Cullen, Keast and Simpson, 2002; Cullen, Hickman, 2001; Cullen, 2005). These studies found a divergence between the parties’ intended working relationship and the agenda prescribed by formal contracts. The paper proposes that the ramifications of the contractual arrangements engender strains between the dynamic nature of collaborative transactions and the laissez-faire presumption of conflictual relations that underpins western commercial contract law, which in turn influences contractual relations and formal agreements.