No court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.

Lord Scarman, speaking during the House of Lords report stage of the Contempt of Court Bill, stated that the relevant provision would “ameliorate the law relating to contempt of court so that the public right to be informed is not impeded or obstructed.” Similarly, Lord Morris, speaking in support of the same clause of the Bill, noted that it “creates a privilege in aid of truth, a privilege in aid of the public interest, a vital and essential privilege, particularly when one bears in mind the ever-encroaching power, whether direct or indirect, of the Executive over the well-being or otherwise of the taxpayer and voter.”

The Decision of the House of Lords in Clarence Wilson alters the law of included offences, but the extent of its impact is unclear. The decision is of unhappy importance not only as a disconcerting specimen of the functioning of our final court of appeal but also because of its possibly serious effect on the. theory of indictments. It has been subjected to devastating criticism by Professor Smith, and awkward questions upon it have been raised by Mr. Emmins. This article will seek both to underline the criticisms by a closer examination of the opinion and to suggest a more limited interpretation of it than has previously been considered.