In the past fifty years there have been changes in relation to the nature and sources of international law. Academic lawyers have welcomed these changes, which show a movement away from strict consent as the basis of international law. States and government law advisers have adopted a more conservative approach and emphasize the importance of consent as a basis for international law. Different approaches are apparent in the practice of the Human Rights Council. The Council has focused on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, much to the annoyance of Western states. The developing world sees the Occupied Palestinian Territory in much the same way as the United Nations saw apartheid in South Africa. The International Court of Justice has responded wisely to both these phenomena. It has given cautious approval to new notions of international law, encapsulated in the doctrines of obligations erga omnes and jus cogens. On the subject of Palestine the Court has given an Advisory Opinion which should form the basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. Unfortunately the international community has failed to give effect to this opinion.

This special issue of the Leiden Journal of International Law is presented as a tribute to John Dugard, a grand international lawyer of our time. It is a collection of essays written by former students, colleagues, and friends, who have had the privilege of working with him over the years.

In this speech delivered at the conference honouring Professor Dugard, President Higgins discusses various human rights issues that have come before the International Court of Justice, including self-determination, reservations to human rights treaties, the application of human rights instruments to occupied territories, and allegations of genocide by one state against another. President Higgins notes that in the past few decades the ICJ has been joined by regional human rights courts, commissions and treaty monitoring bodies. Similar human rights claims are surfacing in these diverse fora, but the acknowledged expertise of these specialist bodies and the desire to avoid fragmentation provide an impetus for all concerned to seek common solutions on evolving points of law.

International human rights law norms and ‘human-rightist’ imperatives are increasingly ‘mainstreamed’ into general international law. The writer makes two modest assertions: that the success of this trend (i) makes it now possible to speak of general international law ‘sources’ of human rights obligations; and (ii) undermines claims of the ‘specialness’ of the human rights legal framework, which are a source of perplexity for the general international lawyer increasingly used to taking human rights law (as lex generalis) into account when interpreting and applying general international law.

This essay recounts the protracted history of the proposal to create a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, from the days of Cold War controversies and divisions until the post ultimately came into being after the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993). While early proposals perceived the High Commissioner as an independent authority receiving complaints and lending good offices, the envisaged role of the High Commissioner progressively evolved over the years – with the setting up of a great variety of treaty-based and charter-based implementation procedures – to encompass comprehensive policy-planning and global human rights advocacy. Thus, as the UN official with principal responsibility for human rights activities, the High Commissioner became firmly embedded in the structure of the UN organization. This paper further underscores the catalytic role of non-governmental organizations in consistently pushing forward the high commissioner project, as it finally emerged in an atmosphere of high expectations.

This article focuses on state recognition in the European context and on the admission of states to the Council of Europe after the end of the Cold War. It argues that two global trends identified by John Dugard in the 1980s have continued since then: a common approach to state recognition has been adopted and the criteria for state recognition have increasingly been given normative content. This reflects that the constitutive theory of state recognition continued to be popular. The two trends have not automatically resulted in a more legal approach to the issues, as the case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates.

This contribution examines the problem of review of targeted sanctions imposed by the Security Council in the light of recent developments occurring in the EU context. Some recent judgments of the European Court of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI) are analysed, as rendered in the cases of Yusuf and Kadi and also in the more recent cases of the Mujaheddeen and Sison. These last two judgments show that flaws in the targeted sanctions regimes exist not only at UN level. The CFI also does not substantively review the listing when this listing is carried out by the Council of the EU. An examination of the progress made at UN level to address procedural flaws shows that, more than anything else, the real stumbling-block is the lack of a substantive review of intelligence information by an independent and impartial organ. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that we are on the way towards a better de-listing procedure, but are not there yet.

This article provides an assessment of the replacement of the UN Commission on Human Rights by the Human Rights Council, with a view to ascertaining whether the human rights architecture of the United Nations is now in better or worse shape. Institutionally, it is unique in that an international organ is dismantled and replaced by a new one for the sake of achieving greater effectiveness. What are the chances for success? For a proper assessment, the article first examines the status, functioning, and falling into disgrace of the UN Commission on Human Rights and, second, reviews the establishment of the new Human Rights Council as part of the UN reform process and identifies the new features of the Council compared with the previous Commission. Third, it discusses the work of the Council in its first year, in particular the extensive June 2007 decision on institution building of the UN Human Rights Council. The article concludes that the Council had a far from fresh and easy start, but that its establishment and functioning so far are not a radical departure from the acquis of the UN human rights regime. The first years of the Council are crucial for solid institution building and functioning credibly in an action-oriented way. The first members on the Council bear the heavy responsibility of seizing this historic opportunity.

According to Israel's Guide to the Mideast Peace Process, charges regarding the illegality of Israeli settlements in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) have no foundation in international law. Peace efforts between Israel and Palestine will have no chance of success as long as Israel uses its prolonged military occupation to promote and protect its annexation-in-disguise of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. John Dugard has passed on this hard truth consistently as Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the OPT. The international community should take the same hard line towards the Guide as it has done towards the Hamas Charter. If it wants to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, it should not allow Israel to bend the truth any more in respect of the legality of the Israeli settlements in the OPT as Hamas has done in respect of the illegality of Israel.

The essay argues that the absence of an international treaty definition of aggression in international law should not preclude the prosecution of its perpetrators. Two legal regimes of responsibility, namely the prohibition against aggression as an international wrongful act and the crime of aggression have been entangled. Once one separates the criminal liability of individuals from state responsibility, a definition of the crime of aggression can be seen. According to the author, the contours of such a new definition contain the requisite degree of certainty for judicial approaches instead of merely political approaches. Consideration is also given as to whether conspiracy to wage a war of aggression may also be regarded as a separate crime within international criminal law.

A few years before the expected convening of the First Review Conference on the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Special Working Group for the Crime of Aggression has made very significant progress in preparing the ground for enabling the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over what the Nuremberg Tribunal famously called the ‘supreme international crime’. The complex structure of this absolute leadership crime has been fully explored, including its implications for the interplay between the definition of the crime and the general principles of international criminal law. At the same time, the crucial analytical distinctions between state and individual conduct as well as between the substantive elements of the crime and the possible procedural role of the UN Security Council appear to be generally accepted. In the light of the momentum achieved on the diplomatic level, the First Review Conference presents a distinct and historic window of opportunity to the world's political leadership to complete the Rome Statute and thereby prevent its prominent lacuna from becoming permanent and thus turning into a legitimacy gap. The final phase of the negotiations should be guided by two principles. First, the substantive definition of the state act of aggression should stay within the legitimate limits of international criminal justice by not exceeding undisputed general customary international law. Second, a possible procedural role for the Security Council must not have the practical effect of placing the permanent members of the Security Council beyond the reach of the law.

This contribution is dedicated to Professor John Dugard. It discusses the most difficult issue to be resolved in the negotiations on the crime of aggression: the role of the Security Council in the exercise of jurisdiction over this crime by the International Criminal Court. The International Law Commission suggested a solution in the 1990s, but failing the required support and in the absence of subsequent agreement the 1998 Rome Conference could only prospectively give the Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. The post-Rome negotiations are characterized by, on the one hand, support from the five permanent members of the Security Council for the thesis that it should be exclusively for the Security Council to determine whether or not an act of aggression has been committed (as a precondition for the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC) and, on the other hand, a rejection of this thesis combined with a search for alternatives by many other states. According to the analysis below, in relation to cases involving the crime of aggression the preferred way for the ICC to proceed is to exercise jurisdiction over this crime after a determination of state aggression has been made by the Security Council. Nevertheless, the view according to which such a determination could exclusively be made by the Council is rejected, on the basis of the rules of the Charter, the practice of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and decisions of the International Court of Justice. Finally, an alternative arrangement is suggested for the cases in which the Security Council is prevented from acting because of the use of the veto or because of lack of support from its members.

In the early 1990s, two former members of the Afghan secret service applied for a residence permit in the Netherlands. Their request was denied on the basis of the exclusion clause of Article 1F(a) of the Vienna Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. There were serious reasons for suspecting that the men had committed war crimes during the Afghan civil war of 1979–92. In 2000, the immigration authorities transmitted the files of the two men to the public prosecution office, which initiated prosecutions in 2003. At the trial, defence counsel raised various preliminary challenges. They argued that the case should be declared inadmissible since relying on the immigration files would violate the nemo tenetur principle and the right against self-incrimination enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, the court had no universal jurisdiction over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions since there was no international rule mandating a right to universal jurisdiction over war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. The Hague District Court dismissed the defence challenges and eventually convicted the Afghan nationals to 9 and 12 years' imprisonment. The Hague Appeal Court endorsed most of the findings of the District Court and confirmed the convictions and sentences. The reasoning underlying the decisions, both at first instance and at appeal, raise questions particularly with regard to universal jurisdiction. In this article the defence arguments are explored and the reasoning of the courts is analysed.

The concepts of nationality and allegiance are central to the doctrine of diplomatic protection as well as to certain institutions of (horizontal) international criminal law such as jurisdiction over treason, passive and active personality jurisdiction, and the non-extradition of nationals. In this sense, there appears to be a clear parallel between these two fields of international law. Yet most scholars – including John Dugard – tend to place and keep diplomatic protection and international criminal law in distinct conceptual compartments, never addressing them in relation to each other. This study considers whether this prevailing strict doctrinal separation is necessary and justified – in other words, whether diplomatic protection and international criminal law are, or can, or should be bridged.

An overview of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection is followed by an assessment of the role of the Special Rapporteur, Professor John Dugard. It is concluded that the Special Rapporteur played a crucial role in the Commission's achievement on the topic.

This article is a personal account of the work of Professor Dugard at the International Law Commission from the point of view of someone who sits next to him in the Commission and has worked with him there for the past six years. It tries to show how his proposals and arguments, especially concerning the topic ‘Diplomatic Protection’, for which he was the Special Rapporteur, greatly directed the debate and led to the approval of innovatory articles such as those concerning refugees, stateless persons, and members of ships' crews and recommendations to governments to take the interests of people injured more seriously. Above all, it tries to show how international law-making processes can be influenced by the determination, the knowledge, and the intelligence of a person whose dedication to the defence of human rights and a fairer world order has been exemplary.

In the Diallo case, the ICJ was required to answer the question of whether the Republic of Guinea could exercise diplomatic protection not only on behalf of its national, Diallo, but also on behalf of two corporations which were incorporated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo but which were owned by a national of the Republic of Guinea. While the Court decided, in line with Barcelona Traction, that the exercise of diplomatic protection for violation of direct rights of shareholders was admissible, it did not accept the claim on behalf of the companies ‘by substitution’. In its reasoning it took a rather restrictive view of the existing exceptions to the rule that protection can only be exercised on behalf of nationals.

This article considers the work of John Dugard in the field of human rights and international law and the impact thereof on the South African legal landscape. After tracing the importance of Dugard's early work in South Africa in the fields of legal philosophy, human rights, and international law, the article turns to consider the later achievements in Dugard's prestigious career. The author highlights the numerous cases in which Dugard appeared as counsel before the South African courts, and considers the impact that Dugard had on the drafting of the South African Constitution in relation to international law and its use in interpreting the South African Bill of Rights. The final section of the article considers the shameful failure of the South African government to support Dugard in his bid to be appointed as a judge of the International Court of Justice. The author concludes that notwithstanding the fact that the government has not accorded him the recognition he deserves, Dugard's pioneering human rights work continues unabated in his various positions, including in his role as the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights abuses in occupied Palestine.

In this article I draw on John Dugard's criticism of apartheid judges to initiate a discussion of the role and functioning of judges in the post-apartheid era. Using John's critique of the limits of judicial interpretation in an illegitimate order, I extend the analysis to review the record of the Constitutional Court in adjudicating socioeconomic rights cases post-1994. In doing so I propose a radical interpretation of the Court's role in society and an activist functioning of judges in South Africa's constitutional democracy. I conclude that, notwithstanding the momentous changes in the South African legal order since 1994, John's critique of the judiciary retains much value and applicability today.