The changing rights of legally designated officers provides a comprehensive framework for following American constitutional development over time, in both public and private settings. Rights are defined as judicially enforceable claims on the person or actions of another; development, as enduring change in constitutional provision, structure, and doctrine. It is proposed that constitutional development as a historical process has consisted of a shift in the balance between the rights of officers and the rights of citizens. The framework is demonstrated empirically in connection with the Bill of Rights, federalism, and the separation of powers. Officers' rights is recommended as a method for studying constitutions comparatively and for linking constitutional development to other political events and phenomena like social movements and parties.

In this article I address the historical interrelationship of law and social science. I explore the separation of “law” and “social science” during the later 19th century, examine their relationship over the next 50 years, and finally take up their more elaborate post-World War II interaction, culminating in the birth and development of the law and society movement. The narrative focuses on two realms of encounter, the intellectual and the institutional, or “spatial,” and in the latter case on two particular locales—the academy and the state. Histories of the interaction of law and social science have mostly pursued its academic aspect, resulting in a history of encounters expressed primarily as pedagogical disputes. But encounters between law and the social science disciplines are also competitions between distinct languages of state formation. Moments of encounter are moments of rivalry in the state, not simply in the common room. Mostly, I conclude, law wins.

Legal scholars have recently been extolling the explanatory potential of behavioral law and economics. This new scholarship seeks to marry insights from traditional microeconomics with findings from the behavioral sciences to produce a descriptively accurate and predictively powerful account of human motivation and decisionmaking to put in the service of legal policy. I examine the claims being made on behalf of this new approach. I argue that legal scholars cannot simply use behavioral science in the place of standard microeconomics. More specifically, I argue that once empirical findings are incorporated into legal policy analysis, it becomes necessary to forsake aspirations of broad generalizability and predictive determinacy. I conclude that legal policies and initiatives need to be informed by a modest conception of social science. Such a conception acknowledges the limitation of social science knowledge and recognizes that strong causal explanations of human behavior cannot be permitted to supplant normative debate.

In this article, I compare the efforts to protect two transboundary watersheds that are home to some of the largest industrial areas in the world: the Great Lakes basin in North America and the Rhine river in Western Europe. Specifically, I show that the industrial discharges into the Great Lakes have been more toxic than the releases into the Rhine. This is puzzling as the laws and international agreements pertaining to the Great Lakes have been more stringent than those concerning the Rhine. I solve this puzzle in three steps. First, I show that the many voluntary investments in water protection by companies along the Rhine have outdone the considerable efforts that the U.S. laws have required of Great Lakes corporations. Thereafter, I argue that these different inclinations to invest in water protection have sprung from two alternative modes of conducting environmental politics: an adversarial one in the Great Lakes basin and a more consensual one in the Rhine valley. Last, I use an historical-institutional approach to show which institutional differences (at both the domestic and international levels) have led to the emergence of these different modes of conducting environmental politics in the two basins.

The legal consciousness of ordinary citizens concerning offensive public speech is a phenomenon whose legal status has been vigorously debated, but which has received little empirical analysis. Drawing on observations in public spaces in three northern California communities and in-depth interviews with 100 subjects recruited from these public locations, I analyze variation across race and gender groups in experiences with offensive public speech and attitudes about how such speech should be dealt with by law. Among these respondents, white women and people of color are far more likely than white men to report being the targets of offensive public speech. However, white women and people of color are not significantly more likely than white men to favor its legal regulation. Respondents generally oppose the legal regulation of offensive public speech, but they employ different discourses to explain why. Subjects' own words suggest four relatively distinct paradigms that emphasize the First Amendment, autonomy, impracticality, and distrust of authority. Members of different racial and gender groups tend to use different discourses. These differences suggest that the legal consciousness of ordinary citizens is not a unitary phenomenon, but must be situated in relation to particular types of laws, particular social hierarchies, and the experiences of different groups with the law.

In this article I examine how and why the term “sexual harassment” has been defined very differently in American and French law. Drawing on political and legal history, I argue that feminists mobilized in both countries to create sexual harassment law, but encountered dissimilar political, legal, and cultural constraints and resources. Having adapted to these distinct opportunities and constraints, feminists and other social actors produced sexual harassment laws that varied by body of law, definition of harm, scope, and remedy. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for studies of culture, gender and the state, globalization, and public policy.

A striking feature of the historical American criminal justice system has been the exclusion of racial minorities from decision-making positions, such as juror. In this study of criminal justice in a New Mexico county in the late 19th century, however, Mexicans are the vast majority of petit jurors, and frequently they decide the fates of European-American defendants. A regime of racial power-sharing between Mexicans and European-Americans characterized the administration of the criminal justice system. Racial power-sharing served the ends of American colonizers in legitimizing their governance after an initial violent occupation. Perhaps more surprisingly, it also served the ends of both elites and middle status Mexicans, at least some of the time. Criminal law—and, particularly, the jury as an institution—served both the colonizers and the colonized in this context.