The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the first international instrument that includes a general provision on the mental element required before criminal responsibility for an international crime attaches (Article 30). This article analyses that provision from a comparative perspective, drawing on common law and civil law understandings of intent. It analyses the jurisprudence and commentary concerning Article 30 in detail, and attempts to draw some conclusions as to what aspects of the common law and civil law concepts of intent are covered by it.

Recognition in contemporary international law is generally seen as a declaratory act. This is indeed the only plausible explanation in situations where a new State emerges consensually and in the absence of territorial illegality. Unilateral secession and territorial illegality, however, create different legal circumstances in which the applicable rules of international law imply and even presuppose that (collective) recognition could have constitutive effects. This article therefore suggests that the interpretation of the legal nature of recognition and non-recognition should not start on the premise that recognition always merely acknowledges the fact of the emergence of a new State. This is not to say that States cannot exist without being recognized. Rather, the legal effects of recognition may depend on the mode of a certain (attempt at) State creation.

Several recent detentions of generic pharmaceutical products transiting through the European Union (EU) for suspected infringements of intellectual property rights raised serious concerns for public health advocates and threatened to expose systemic problems existing in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The detentions not only garnered international attention, but India and Brazil formally began WTO dispute settlement proceedings against the EU. The parties recently reached a mutually agreed solution to the matter and the proceedings have been halted, leaving unanswered the complex legal and technical questions raised by the detentions of pharmaceuticals in transit. Despite a solution being reached in this dispute, the matter will undoubtedly resurface in the near future for a number of reasons. For instance, the EU is attempting to export its laws to its trading partners through the negotiation of free trade agreements and in other forums such as the recently concluded Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement which increases the likelihood that similar detentions will occur at some point in the future. Moreover, recent trends in international intellectual property law indicate a move towards increased protection and enforcement in at least the short and medium term. The issue therefore offers the opportunity for rich legal analysis into an underexplored, yet increasingly important, aspect of WTO law.

The standard of review applied by WTO decision-makers in disputes under the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures Agreement plays a critical role in determining the scope of SPS risk regulatory authority afforded WTO Members by governing the degree to which such measures must be science-based. The standard of review question in SPS jurisprudence finds resonances in international environmental legal adjudication of highly technical disputes, as well as in comparative law concerning judicial review of science-based risk regulation in the United States and European Union. This article considers recent case law of the WTO Appellate Body in Continued Suspension and Australia–Apples and the extent to which these decisions permit a more deferential approach on the part of WTO decision-makers in evaluating the scientific underpinnings of Members' disputed SPS measures. It is argued that the case law has failed to articulate a strong normative rationale for the current interpretation of the standard of review applied in SPS disputes. Drawing on social scientific findings regarding the limitations of science-based risk assessment in diverse risk settings, the article contends that a more coherent and principled approach to application of the standard of review would allow for its adjustment according to the nature of the risk situation under consideration.

Chinese judicial practice demonstrates great diversity in enforcing exclusive jurisdiction clauses. In practice, the derogation effect of a valid foreign jurisdiction clause is frequently ignored by some Chinese courts. It may be argued that these Chinese courts fail to respect party autonomy and international comity. However, a close scrutiny shows that the effectiveness of an exclusive jurisdiction clause has close connections with the recognition and enforcement of judgments. If the judgment of the chosen court cannot be recognized and enforced in the request court by any means, the request court may take jurisdiction in breach of the jurisdiction clause in order to achieve justice. Chinese judicial practice demonstrates the inevitable influence of the narrow scope of the Chinese law in recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It is submitted that the Chinese courts do not zealously guard Chinese jurisdiction, or deliberately ignore party autonomy and international comity. Instead, the Chinese courts have considered the possibility of enforcement of judgments and the goal of justice. Applying the prima facie unreasonable decision test is the best the courts can do in the specific context of the Chinese law. The status quo cannot be improved simply by reforming Chinese jurisdiction rules in choice of court agreements. A comprehensive improvement of civil procedure law in both jurisdiction rules and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is needed.

On 1 July 2011 the UK Bribery Act 2010 and accompanying guidance finally came into force, marking the end of years of controversy about how and when the United Kingdom would implement the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The United Kingdom's very delayed implementation of the Convention provoked an increasingly threatening response from the OECD Working Group on Bribery, and highlighted this body's lack of binding enforcement procedures. By contrast, the OECD's reliance on non-binding guidelines has proved successful in that the UK Guidance draws heavily upon the OECD's guidance on how corporations should prevent the bribery of foreign public officials.

The Durban Climate Conference,1 marked by tension, high drama and sleepless nights, agreed on a set of historic decisions under the climate regime 36 hours after the scheduled end of the conference. The climate regime—comprising the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change2 and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol,3 and decisions taken by Parties under these instruments—has been plagued in the last few years, in particular after the debacle at Copenhagen,4 by doubt and uncertainty. Doubt over its ability to meet climate goals, and uncertainty over its future, in particular that of the Kyoto Protocol. At Durban, Parties strengthened the climate regime with decisions to implement the 2010 Cancun Agreements,5 extend the beleaguered Kyoto Protocol, for a second commitment period,6 and launch a new process to negotiate a post-2020 climate regime.7 This new process, christened the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, is intended to craft the agreement that will govern, regulate and incentivize the next generation of climate actions.

If from the imperfect evidence of foreign law produced before it, or its misapprehension of the effect of that evidence, a mistake is made by an English court, it is much to be lamented, but the tribunal is free from blame.1 The mistake to be lamented presently is the High Court decision in Yukos Capital Sarl v OJSC Rosneft Oil Co2 that a Dutch judgment3 gave rise to an issue estoppel in English proceedings, precluding a party from disputing as a fact the partiality and dependence of the Russian judiciary.4 The decision was a mistake because on a proper construction of Dutch law the significance of the Dutch judgment was—if anything—evidential, not preclusive.5 The outcome is lamentable, because a party was unduly shut out from litigation by the application of English preclusion law to a foreign judgment that was not preclusive in the jurisdiction where it was originally given.6

Where a pregnant woman travels and subsequently gives birth to a child abroad, should the left behind father be able to petition for the ‘return’ of his child under the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction? An affirmative answer would not only presuppose that the abduction of the child had been in breach of the father's actually exercised rights of custody, but would also depend on which country, if any, the child was habitually resident in immediately before the ‘abduction’.

The end of 2012 will herald the twentieth anniversary of ‘deadline 1992’, the projected date for the completion of the EU's internal market. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 references to ‘1992’ have been deleted from the Treaties, and so it may be tempting to suppose, rather more than twenty years since the first contribution on the Free Movement of Goods to this section of the Quarterly,1 that this is old news. Isn't the law governing the internal market in general and the free movement of goods in particular now well settled?