This article indicates the complexity of the social relations of whites and Africans in Southern Africa and the myths by which they rationalise their behaviour.1 The situation is not identical throughout Southern Africa, but there are, as I will show, certain fundamental similarities which validate an over-all analysis in terms of a ‘colonial situation’.2

Each of the countries of Southern Africa (the Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, the three British High Commission territories of Swaziland, Bechuanaland, and Basutoland, and the Portuguese provinces of Mozambique and Angola) represents a distinct political unit, expressing in its constitution the limits of control and participation permitted to groups which are distinguished according to so-called ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, or ‘cultural’ differences. There has been a major distinction, explicit in some countries, disguised in others, between a dominant white minority and a subordinate African majority, a division corresponding to the ‘colonisers’ or ‘colonials’ on the one hand, and the ‘colonised’ on the other. But now Nyasaland has become independent Zambia, and Northern Rhodesia will achieve independence in October 1964.

Since 1960, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (N.F.D.) has become the centre of controversy between two African nations—the Somali Republic and Kenya. The area, about 102,000 square miles, includes the dominantly Somali-inhabited Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa Districts and the non-Somali (mainly Galla) districts of Marsabit, Isiolo, and Moyale.1 It consists of a vast, low plateau sloping rather uniformly from 2,000 feet east of Lake Rudolph towards Lamu on the Indian Ocean. Except for the Marsabit mountain region, it is semi-desert, covered by thornbush and useful only for grazing camels, cattle, goats, and sheep. The climate is hot, and the average annual rainfall is less than 12 inches. No commercially exploitable minerals have been found, and the flatness of the land often causes flash floods during and after the two rainy seasons.

This analysis of the problem, coming as it does from an Ethiopian, may seem biased against Somalia. Although I shall not claim objectivity, for I am a conscious Ethiopian, I must, nevertheless, state that I have not deliberately omitted or distorted facts to suit Ethiopia's case. My conviction that Ethiopia is in the right is quite apparent. I am equally convinced that it is not in the interest of either country to ignore their vital interdependence.

The accusation that Britain neglected the three High Commission territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, especially during the inter-war period, is a common one, both in standard works on the subject and in current controversies over their future. It has been alleged that an important reason for this neglect was the assumption made by successive British governments that their future status was uncertain, particularly in view of South Africa's repeated claim that the territories were geographically part of the Union, largely dependent on the latter's economy, and therefore should be transferred to South Africa's jurisdiction.1 In this article an attempt will be made to test the truth of these assertions in so far as there is evidence for a considered judgment.

It is commonly claimed by critics both within Nigeria and outside that, while the present Government preaches political non-alignment, it does not practise it, and indeed cannot because of Nigeria's economic alignment with the west. The present article seeks to assess the validity of this thesis. Three separate propositions are involved: first, that Nigeria professes but does not pursue a policy of non-alignment; secondly, that Nigeria is economically tied to the west; and finally, and most important, that there is a causal connexion between the two.

An understanding of Tanganyika's economy must begin with the bleak geographical facts. In 1945 an area of some 343,000 square miles, larger than France and Britain together, supported a mere seven million people. The size and distribution of this population resulted from an oppressive physical environment over which remarkably little human control was exerted. One example of this was man's subservience to the tsetse fly, which—as a result rather than a cause of under-population1— infested some 60 per cent of the land. Even more serious were the hazards of a rainfall that exhibited all the vices—inadequate and irregular in its geographical distribution, capricious in its seasonal visitations. Prolonged periods of drought were common everywhere except at the coast and near Lakes Victoria and Nyasa. As the overwhelming majority of the people were subsistence producers, the incidence of rainfall was a principal and variable determinant of economic welfare. Thus, for example, 1946 was a bad year; there were food shortages in every province and in some areas the Government had to organise famine relief. The rice crop failed almost completely, maize was grievously affected, and even sorghum and millet, the most drought-resistant of grain crops, were sufficient for only half the year. In the following year rainfall was heavy and well distributed; indeed in the Highlands it was excessive, destroying crops through flood and disease. But generally harvests were the biggest since 1943 and ‘a long back-log of tribal ceremonies’ was elebrated.2

Historians sometimes claim to be making their own modest contribution to the African revolution by re-establishing the identity of Africa's pre-colonial past. But it should not be thought that the relevance of their work to modern Africa can end there, nor even that this is the most difficult of the adjustments of perspective which they will need to make. Now that the colonial flags are coming down, European and African historians will need to look back—so far as is humanly possible, without anger—and try to answer the question of how the Europeans came to be there as rulers. (An even more difficult task, still not seriously begun, will be to appraise the lasting historical importance of their rule.)

African studies at Northwestern University will enter a new phase of their history in September 1964, when Professor Gwendolen M. Carter takes up her post as director of the Program and Herskovits Professor of African Studies. The new appointment coincides with an expanding intellectual involvement of the faculty with the developing countries of the world, which have been somewhat neglected by scholarship, and the future goals of the Program are closely related to this wider academic development. First, however, a note on the background.

Up to World War II, Germany was a major centre for the development of African studies, arising out of her colonial interests and general academic traditions. African studies were among the casualties of the Nazi catastrophe; and even the more recent revival of German interest in Africa is handicapped by the continued division of the country. Thus, while the West German Federal Republic has been the more active in building economic and cultural ties with the new African states, it is in East Germany that academics have given greater prominence to Africa.

This Association was founded in 1958 as a meeting point for all American scholars seriously interested in African affairs, and it is now one of the most active organisations in the field. African study in the United States started much earlier, with the pioneering field work of Melville Herskovits, the interest of Lincoln University in the education of young Africans, and the first steps by W. E. B. Du Bois to create a Pan-African movement. During World War II, there were attempts to organise an international conference on Africa. Most academic interest, however, dates from the late 1940's, when the Carnegie Corporation of New York extended its programme of grants to universities for area studies to include the African field, gave funds for fellowships and sent groups of mature scholars to Africa for ‘look-see’ tours. In the 1950's, the Ford Foundation made major grants to Northwestern, Boston, and Howard Universities, and established a field training fellowship programme under which a majority of the younger Africanists now active in the United States have been trained. Other university programmes have followed; there are now more than 20.

It is not easy to describe the objects, still less the activities, of the Africa Bureau in a few words. It is one of those organisations whose ambitions and influence are much greater than its physical size.

If you look at the dominating purpose behind the activities of the past 12 years, you will find it in the Bureau's sympathy with and determination to promote African independence. It was established in 1952 to provide accurate information particularly on the aims and hopes of African nationalism, to oppose unfair discrimination, and to encourage development in Africa. The need for such an organisation in Britain had been recognised primarily by Rev. Michael Scott, who on returning from South Africa sought help from people in Britain for the African people of South West Africa. An informal group advising on the intricate political and constitutional issues involved in bringing South West Africa's plight before the United Nations provided the nucleus from which the Africa Bureau grew, and since 1948, Michael Scott, honorary director of the Bureau, has attended the U.N. and given evidence as personal representative of Chief Hosea Kutako of the Hereros.

In East and Central Africa considerable investment in physical capital is now being made. This must be matched by investment in human capital, if the full benefit is to be gained. Professor John Lewis, of the University of London, stressed ‘The Place of Adult Education in Education Development Planning’ in his contribution to this conference. Educating children will produce results in six to ten years' time. Educational investment in adults can produce results more quickly. But at present the effort to educate adults, such as it is, is spread over many agencies. For significant results adult education must be integrated into a country's general development plan.

This conference was held on the initiative of the Afrika Verein and the Deutsche Stif tung für Entwicklungsländer. Its aim was to examine the theory and practice of regional planning and external co-operation within the framework of African development.

The Afrika Verein is a German organisation which took over from the Syndikats für Westafrika, which was founded in 1884, and is now one of the most important economic organisations concerned with Africa in the Federal German Republic. It advises merchants, businessmen, and sometimes even the government, and examines market possibilities and business conditions, from the political (i.e. psychological) as well as the legal point of view. The Deutsche Stiftung für Entwicklungsländer is more widely known. It specialises in development problems and its activities cover all the so-called ‘underdeveloped’ countries. Being a government body it originally dealt mainly with Asia and Latin America, but for the past two years, with the emergence of the new African states, it has been enlarging its African department.

This session was attended by the largest number to date of independent member states, and was much more representative of the African continent than the first, in January 1959, which was attended by only nine independent African states. Now there were delegates from 30 member states and 10 delegations from associate member states. Besides these, there were many observers from other governments, from specialised agencies, from intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. The newest member states were Kenya and Zanzibar, which had become independent towards the end of last year; and as a result of the break-up of the Central African Federation, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Southern Rhodesia separately had become associate members.

This seminar was arranged by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo for the purpose of bringing together scattered research workers for the exchange of ideas and methods. They were able to draw on experience from Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

P. Heintz, director of the Latin American School of Sociology, Santiago, opened the seminar with a talk on the relationship between anomie and development. He mentioned institutional anomie, the compartmentalisation of sectors of society, which occurs, for example, when education fails to make any contribution to the economy. Although he paid more attention to individual anomie, and how it can be absorbed into and dissolved by anomie structures, the institutional concept would appear to be extremely relevant to development problems. Labour markets and the transformation from ascribed to achieved status were mentioned as mechanisms to reduce institutional anomie.

This conference was sponsored by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (founded in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre) and the convenor was Ronald Segal, now editor of the Penguin African Library. What was intended initially as a small expert conference snowballed suddenly, and in the end 30 official government delegations (mainly from African, Asian, and socialist countries) and over 200 delegates attended. The conference chairman was Mongi Slim, the Foreign Minister of Tunisia, and others present included Diallo Telli, the chairman of the U.N. Special Committee on Apartheid, Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien, the vice-chancellor of the University of Ghana, and Tom Mboya and Mainza Chona, the Ministers ofJustice of Kenya and Northern Rhodesia.

For a contemporary observer of African affairs, the year 1960 is a convenient date of departure. A large number of new nations appeared on the scene with a bang. The economist, political scientist, and sociologist have hardly begun to evaluate and examine the consequences of this transformation. A significant fact has often escaped attention. Each independent country as it emerged from the darkness of colonialism began by accepting economic planning as an instrument of policy. As the development plans were being drafted, almost simultaneously new investment laws were debated and enacted.