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In someone else’s words: Judicial borrowing and the semantic authority of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2023

Martin Lolle Christensen*
Affiliation:
Department of International Law and Human Rights, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, Denmark
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Abstract

Since its first judgment on the merits in 2013, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Court or ACtHPR) jurisprudence has bourgeoned. In building this jurisprudence, the African Court has borrowed significantly from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This article empirically maps judicial borrowing in the jurisprudence of the African Court and connects this practice to the theoretical framing of the semantic authority of interpretive actors in international law. The article argues that judicial borrowing allows the African Court to borrow the semantic authority of these more established actors in the field of international human rights law. The practice has allowed the Court to boost its interpretive claims. The article posits that the Court is simultaneously internalizing external references: it transforms them into an internal part of its jurisprudence. Therefore, the African Court is transforming what was initially the semantic authority of its homologues in Strasbourg and San José, into assertions of its own semantic authority. This transformation allows the Court to assert itself as the central authority for the interpretation of human rights in Africa. These findings shed new light onto wider scholarly debates on the characteristics of African human rights jurisprudence in the field of international human rights law.

Type
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law in association with the Grotius Centre for International Law, Leiden University

1. Introduction

The African Court is the youngest of the three regional human rights courts, albeit with a prolonged beginning. The discussions surrounding the enactment of an African Court started in the 1960s, but the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) was not signed until 1979, and was only ratified in 1986.Footnote 1 The protocol establishing the African Court was adopted in 1998, but it was not until 2009, a decade later, that the African Court started issuing judgments.Footnote 2 Its first judgment on the merits was issued four years later, in 2013. Access to the Court is limited to cases sent from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, from state parties, or, if state parties have acceded to the optional protocol, via petitions by single individuals or NGOs, although only a handful of states have ever done so.Footnote 3 In less than ten years, since its first judgments on the merits, the African Court has created an expansive jurisprudence addressing a wide variety of human rights issues, which arise not only from the obligations of the African Charter, but also from other regional and international human rights instruments. In developing this jurisprudence, the African Court has decisively engaged in the practice of judicial borrowing, relying heavily on the existing human rights case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).

Any international court will be confronted with a number of (similar) challenges that must be tackled in order to affirm itself and its authority within its context:Footnote 4 issues of member state participation (or lack thereof), questions concerning access for individual claimants, and problems of lack of impact, insufficient compliance and backlash.Footnote 5 The African Court has not been spared these difficulties, and much scholarly attention has been paid to the Court and its context in recent years.Footnote 6 This article adds to this burgeoning literature on the ‘young’ African Court by focusing on the Court’s rapid development of jurisprudence. The article explains and illustrates how the Court has developed its jurisprudence by engaging in judicial borrowing from its regional counterparts in Europe and the Americas. It will argue that judicial borrowing has allowed the Court to not only borrow precedent from its judicial homologues, but also to borrow their semantic authority to bolster its own interpretive claims.Footnote 7 This article shows how this borrowing leads to an internalization process, which transforms the external case law into a part of its internal jurisprudence. Thus, the article contributes to the study of the African Court by providing a novel, empirical dimension to the study of the emerging jurisprudence of the African Court, which highlights the use of external judicial decisions as a key practice in its development. This sheds new light on how the African Court situates itself within the fields of international law and international human rights law, where African institutions have historically only found a marginal role for self-expression.Footnote 8

Using the African Court as a case study, this article further contributes to research on international courts and their judicial practice. It links this practice to a broader theoretical framework, which emphasizes the role of interpretive actors in the making of international law. The practice of judicial borrowing thus becomes a focal point for a rethinking of how international courts develop their interpretive authority, and for understanding how the African Court has situated itself within the international human rights system.

This article first describes the judicial practice of cross-citation, or judicial borrowing, and its prominent but underexplored role in international legal scholarship. This practice is then articulated into the interpretive theory of Venzke, as an illustration of the borrowing and assertion of semantic authority. This theoretical framework lays the groundwork for the case study of the African Court which, after a brief section on the chosen methodology of the citation network approach, constitutes the article’s substantive contribution. The case study first gives an overview of the innovative and open design of the African Court, before exploring the role of judicial borrowing in the Court’s burgeoning jurisprudence. The article concludes by linking this practice back to the construction of semantic authority and discusses the characteristics of the emerging African jurisprudence in light of ongoing scholarly debates on the position of Africa within the international legal system.

1.1 The mundane cross-citation practice of judicial borrowing

Judicial borrowing describes a practice in which courts refer to and borrow from the case law of other judicial bodies: the borrowing of ‘precedent’.Footnote 9 This practice occurs among both domestic and international courts and is a well-studied, and sometimes controversial, phenomenon.Footnote 10 But generally, one court citing another as part of its legal reasoning is hardly noteworthy, as this citation is rarely the key interpretive element leading to a particular outcome. It is often, however, functionally relevant, and judicial borrowing is regarded as an important feature of the international legal system. Scholars have described it as a panacea for many configurational problems in the international legal system, a cure for fragmentation,Footnote 11 and a road to a jus commune,Footnote 12 or the unity,Footnote 13 integration,Footnote 14 and constitutionalization of international law.Footnote 15 One international court referencing another is clearly perceived to be significant, and the importance of ‘precedent’ in the construction of international law cannot be overstated, despite its formal placement as a ‘subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law’.Footnote 16

Yet, despite the perceived importance of judicial borrowing, the practice itself, in its repetitive and mundane nature, has rarely received the in-depth attention it deserves.Footnote 17 Cross-citation practices reflect an interlinkage between multiple international bodies, and highlight the dynamic relationships between regional human rights courts. By studying the citation practices of the African Court, this article illustrates the relationships established between this Court and its homologues in Strasbourg and San José and explores the implications of this practice for the authority of the African Court and its jurisprudence.Footnote 18 Thus, the practice becomes the lens through which to see broader developments in the jurisprudence of the African Court.

The argument is that the practice of judicial borrowing reveals how international courts use external judicial decisions to bolster their interpretive claims. The repetitive and aggregate citation practices of the African Court show how external references become integral to internal jurisprudence, thus reinforcing the case law itself going forward, and emphasizing the particular character of the African human rights jurisprudence. The article theorizes this observation by applying the notion of ‘semantic authority’, exploring the idea that international legal actors make international law through their interpretative claims, and that the assertions of these claims are bound to the authority of the interpretive actors. As such, judicial borrowing becomes linked to international legal theory that emphasizes the role of interpretation in international law. The following section discusses this theory and its connection to the practice of judicial borrowing.

1.2 The importance of interpretation and the semantic authority of interpretive actors

Recent years have seen an increase in the attention paid to the importance of interpretation in international law.Footnote 19 Venzke, in particular, has illustrated how international law is ‘made’ through interpretation.Footnote 20 He argues that, whereas formal legal sources may well be a legitimate starting point for the law, the law is made through specific actors’ interpretation in specific contexts. Through the interpretation of formal legal sources, powerful actors, such as international courts, make international law, or at least push the law in the direction they see fit. As Venzke writes: ‘Interpreters speak the language of international law with the intention of seeking acceptance for their claims about the meaning of norms.’Footnote 21

Venzke has coined the concept of semantic authority to show how particular actors’ interpretations are accepted as the valid reading of international law.Footnote 22 The semantic authority of these actors suggest a likelihood that their interpretative claims of the law will be accepted by other actors, thus becoming a new reference point for future interpretations.Footnote 23 Therefore, semantic authority indicates the capacity of an actor to establish content-full reference points for legal discourse, which other actors will find almost inescapable.Footnote 24 As a concept, semantic authority contributes to a clearer view of where international law originates from.Footnote 25

When regional human rights courts interpret their respective human rights instruments, they are engaged in a struggle over the meaning of the law.Footnote 26 Their semantic authority depends on states’ and other relevant actors’ acceptance of their interpretation of international human rights law, and it is thus these actors that the courts engage in a struggle with, through their interpretive practices.Footnote 27 Furthermore, semantic authority is essential for courts to be able to develop ‘normative expectations’; in other words, for law-making.Footnote 28 But not all actors automatically enjoy semantic authority, and it must therefore be built up over time through interpretive practices.Footnote 29 The interpretive actor wants others to believe and follow their claims, to the exclusion of other possible interpretations.Footnote 30 The objective of the interpretive actor is ‘to make their partial view of [a] meaning appear as the total view, their preference seem like the universal preference’.Footnote 31 At the same time, the successful view is one ‘that other actors can hardly escape’.Footnote 32 Bianchi makes a similar point with a focus on international law academics, stating that there is an inclination to ‘construct stories that we hope will gain adherence to our arguments, give us authority to speak for the discipline and convince a decision-maker to undertake certain conduct’.Footnote 33 Klabbers, building on David Kennedy, puts it even more bluntly: ‘Whoever controls the process of interpretation, therewith controls the truth, or at least the meaning to be given to the text subject to interpretation.’Footnote 34

This article contributes to this debate by showing how regional human rights courts engage in communicative processes, wherein one court invokes the interpretations put forward by another through their ‘precedents’, and in this way establishes the authority of their own interpretations over time. By invoking external judicial decisions, regional courts ‘borrow’ the semantic authority of their counterparts to support their own interpretive claims. At the same time, the courts also refer back to their own case law in order to give credence to the semantic authority they have established.Footnote 35 Semantic authority clarifies the intricacies of the relationship between international courts and their respective and conjoined authority, and further highlights how international law is shaped by multiple actors engaged in a legal discourse which brings regional human rights law to life.Footnote 36 In a similar vein, Venzke has shown how the UNHCR ‘struggles for the law, tries to increase its own semantic authority, and seeks to use the authority of others in its struggle’.Footnote 37

In distinguishing semantic authority from persuasion, Venzke stresses that the interpretive claim must be heard and followed, even if the other actor does not endorse it.Footnote 38 This is not only true of interpretations that emanate from the court itself. On the contrary, a regional human rights court is unable to simply dismiss a state party’s invocation of another court’s jurisprudence. The court must engage, often by distinguishing between cases in some way.Footnote 39 This would not occur if the reference was not considered relevant. It is evident that regional human rights courts, as international courts, are actors which can have strong semantic authority. Their judgments form a necessary part of any attempt to understand the content of their regional human rights instruments.Footnote 40 Their interpretations of international human rights law are difficult to ignore – if another court’s jurisprudence is invoked by a state, the respondent court must engage.Footnote 41

In this article, the process of interpretation shaping international law, and how specific actors’ interpretations find acceptance among other actors in the international sphere, is told as a story of the ‘internalization’ of external judicial decisions. I define internalization as a descriptive term for the process of comparison, interpretation, and adaption that occurs when courts refer to external judicial decisions and then, sometimes across multiple cases, appropriate the content of the external reference into their own jurisprudence. This contrasts with the understanding of internalization explored in Koh’s Transnational Legal Process.Footnote 42 This article’s conception of internalization is not about the transfer and internalization of legal norms, but about the borrowing and internalization of specific interpretations of shared legal norms, in this case procedural rules and the human rights norms of the regional human rights instruments and international human rights law. Thus, this conception helps describe the prolonged, or lingering, effect of external judicial decisions on the internal practice of international courts, long after their initial borrowing. The concept of semantic authority is relevant for this story of the development of the African Court’s jurisprudence. In the process of internalizing external judicial decisions, we can see a transfer of whose semantic authority is relevant for the court. As will be shown below, the internalization process in the African Court indicates a growing independence and reliance on its own case law, where external judicial decisions had previously been more routinely referred to. This self-reliance evidences the African Court’s growing perception of its own semantic authority. It reveals how the youngest of the three regional human rights courts is developing and sustaining its jurisprudence, while still retaining connections to the interpretations of its more established counterparts.

2. Methodology

This article approaches international law as a practice that is best studied by combining a doctrinal approach with empirical methods, in this case a citation network analysis.Footnote 43 This approach is thus complimentary in its interpretive and empirical parts, with the aim of grasping a better understanding of the legal practice in its totality.Footnote 44 The case study relies on a unique dataset: a network of references to external judicial decisions in all the African Court’s judgments on the merits in the period from 2013–2020 (49 judgments), gathered by the author.Footnote 45 The dataset includes the numerical value of the number of references to the judgments of other courts in each individual judgment, as well as nominal data on the source of the reference, whether the reference was referred to by the defendant state, and other aspects of the specificity of the reference. For the sake of conciseness, the scope of inquiry is limited to references to the other regional human rights courts and other international courts that do not overlap in jurisdiction.Footnote 46 This precludes references to other regional courts within the same geographical sphere (e.g., the ECOWAS Court of Justice), as well as references to judgments with overlapping facts.Footnote 47 Similarly, since they are not international courts, references to the UN Human Rights Committee and other UN Treaty bodies have been excluded.Footnote 48

For the purposes of the empirical analysis, a reference is understood as any direct citation of an external judicial decision found in either the main body of a judgment or in a footnote to the main text. Implicit or general references to the jurisprudence of other courts are not counted as the reference must be specific to fulfil the research’s purpose of studying a specific practice.Footnote 49 Each individual reference in a judgment is counted, meaning that multiple citations to the same external judicial decisions are counted several times, unless the reference is identical to the previous one.Footnote 50 The scope has been limited to judgments on the merits. This has been done because they are the centrepieces of the court’s work and a consistent element for comparison. It is a formal, binding, ruling which often summarizes the entire course of the case, from petition to remedy. More importantly, because of its central role, the inclusion of external judicial decisions in the judgment is a direct acknowledgment of another international court. The inclusion of a reference in the official judgment, even in a footnote, Footnote 51 is therefore worth taking note of.Footnote 52 It is the repetitive nature of these references that necessitates the inclusion of citation networks to understand them in their aggregate form.

2.1 Visualizing networks

There are two numerical elements of the dataset: the number of judgments and the number of references within the judgments, the two elements forming a citation network. A citation network, like those studied here, is the result of the citations (directed edges) between a multitude of different judgments (nodes).Footnote 53 This can be visualized using standard graphs and figures to show variation in usage from judgment to judgment, adding trendlines and other statistical elements to develop the argument made in the study. However, the citation network can itself be visualized.Footnote 54

The nodes and edges can be accorded various sizes and colours based on different metrics, and the network can be moved around manually, or by using algorithms that simulate a physical system which places the nodes in community clusters and giant ‘clouds’ or ‘webs’.Footnote 55 A static ‘snapshot’ of the network is then taken.Footnote 56 These visualizations do not necessarily communicate the data in a clear, effective, and ‘objective’ way, in line with the mantra of ELS visualization. Footnote 57 The networks are instead shaped by aesthetic choices made by the scholar. Footnote 58

The aesthetics of networks, as a structure composed of links and nodes in proliferating multiplicity, highlight the ‘extensibility, complexity, internal asymmetry, and interdependence of individual parts’.Footnote 59 The networks visualized in the case study communicate the data they contain, but at the same time tell a story of emergent complexities within the African Court’s jurisprudence, and interlinked developments between the African Court and the other regional human rights courts.Footnote 60

3. The design and practice of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights

The African Court is, by design, open to the use of external international instruments, and external jurisprudence has played a prominent role in the emerging jurisprudence of the Court. This section first describes the open design of the African Charter, before turning to the empirical and substantive analysis of the jurisprudence of the African Court.

The African Charter is the founding instrument of the African Human Rights System. The African Charter contains a number of important innovations, which distinguish it from the ECHR and the ACHR.Footnote 61 Of relevance here is that it is designed to include a wider area of law than the two other regional human rights systems. Whereas the ECHR and ACHR are limited to the jurisdiction and state obligations contained within their respective instruments, the African Court has jurisdiction ‘to interpret the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned’.Footnote 62 As sources of law, it can apply ‘the provision of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned’.Footnote 63 This means that the African Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae over, in addition to the Charter itself, any alleged violations of UN and sub-regional human rights instruments, such as the ECOWAS Treaty.

Chapter IV of the African Charter is dedicated to applicable principles for the interpretation of the Charter.Footnote 64 Article 60 instructs the Court to ‘draw inspiration from’ international law on human and peoples’ rights, particularly from the African and United Nations instruments on human rights. Article 61 adds that general or special conventions laying down rules expressly recognized by member states of the African Union, African practices, custom, legal precedent, and doctrine, as a subsidiarity measure for determining the principles of law, must be taken into consideration. Article 60 is particularly interesting as it directly offers the ability to interpret the African Charter in the light of other international law, without specifying whether the African states in general, or the specific state, must be bound by it. Although it does not specify what ‘draw inspiration from’ entails, it can be seen as a broader, or less restricted version of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which is limited to applicable international law.Footnote 65 The interpretive clauses of the African Charter have meant that the African Court has not needed Article 31(3)(c) of VCLT for its reasoning, and the Court has rarely referred to the VCLT in its judgments.Footnote 66 The expanded jurisdiction, as per Article 3.1. of the Protocol of the Court, and the principles of interpretation in Articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, thus reveal a treaty design that is focused on the incorporation of international human rights law into the African system. As other human rights treaties do not contain equivalent clauses, this implies that there must have been a specific purpose to this inclusion, which correlates with the wider proliferation of human rights mechanisms around the time of the drafting of the Charter and Protocol.Footnote 67

The open structure of the African Charter allows external judicial decisions to play a central role in the interpretation of the rights and procedures within the regional instruments. This, in turn, opens the African Court up as a venue for broader human rights issues to be addressed, and turns it into a judicial mechanism for all international and regional human rights treaties ratified by a state party. While this is an explicit part of the African Charter, the other regional human rights courts have to employ ‘decompartmentalization techniques’ to use external sources.Footnote 68 Thus, the African Court is a new ‘judicial animal’.Footnote 69 However, its novel design raises associated questions about the Court’s authority within the African system and its engagement with the broader system of international law: does the Court become a mere extension of existing human rights instruments, some of them universal? Footnote 70 Its design decentralizes the African Charter as the main instrument in the protection of human rights within the African human rights system, and situates it as just one among many human rights instruments.Footnote 71 Yet, as will be shown below, the African Court recentres the African Charter, and its own settled case law, through its judicial practice.

3.1 The use of external judicial decisions by the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights

To date, few cases have been brought before the African Court due to problems of access and the lack of state parties signing up to the Court.Footnote 72 In spite of this, the pace of development is similar to the early history of both the IACtHR and the ECtHR.Footnote 73 The dataset is therefore relatively small, but is nevertheless revealing when it comes to the use of external judicial decisions by the African Court (Table 1, above).

Table 1. References found in ACtHPR judgments (2013 – 2020)

The African Court issued 49 judgments on the merits between 14 June 2013Footnote 74 and 4 December 2020.Footnote 75 Sixty-nine percent of the judgments include external references, meaning that only 15 judgments did not include any. The dataset includes 206 external references:Footnote 76 133 are references to the European Court and 49 to the Inter-American Court; plus 16 references to the International Court of Justice and seven references to international criminal courts (the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Court).

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of references in the 49 cases. It shows a general decline in external references, and an inclination of the Court to cite the European Court over the Inter-American Court. However, given that the European Court of Human Rights has issued around 20,000 judgments, and the Inter-American Court only about 481, this might not signal a preference as much as the simple fact that there are more ECtHR references to choose from. The polynomial trendline shows an increase in more recent cases, curving the trendline back up. This later upswing is discussed further below.

Figure 1. A stacked column chart showing the total number of external references in each judgment, and the references to the cited courts.

Though individual references to external judicial decisions vary in content and form, it is still possible to identify some trends. There is often a general reference to the practice of the other regional courts in the main text, with a selection of cases in the footnotes.Footnote 77 In some cases, the reference is introduced by simply stating that this is the approach adopted by the Inter-American Court or the European Court, which is a comparison to ‘courts of similar jurisdiction’.Footnote 78 This phrasing does not tell us much about the value that the African Court places on external references. It merely highlights approaches, and solutions, that similar courts dealing with similar issues have opted for. However, the African Court often uses an expressive vocabulary, which stresses the role of the external reference. The African Court is ‘fortified in its reasoning’ by the judicial decisions of other courts.Footnote 79 The other courts have adopted approaches which ‘should be taken into account’.Footnote 80 The jurisprudence of the other regional courts ‘reveals’ criteria which may be used by the African Court.Footnote 81 The Court is ‘persuaded by the conclusions’ of the European Court.Footnote 82 It considers legal questions ‘in [the] light of the case law of the Inter-American Court’.Footnote 83 These phrases show the emphasis that the African Court places on the value of the other regional human rights courts as sources of authority. Judge Ben Achour of the African Court confirms this when he links the use of external judicial decisions to the experience of other established courts.Footnote 84 In his view, external case law is used in the very construction of the reasoning of the Court, and forms part of the essence of developing an African jurisprudence.Footnote 85

The Court’s first case on the merits already made apparent that external case law is an integral part of the reasoning of the African Court. Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R Mtikila v. United Republic of Tanzania concerned constitutional amendments in Tanzania restricting the right to form political parties and to participate in elections.Footnote 86 The African Charter does not explicitly state the requirement for a restriction imposed on a human right to be lawful, but the African Court conducted a three-pronged test: the restriction must be prescribed by law, it must serve a legitimate aim, and it should be proportionate to the aim pursued.Footnote 87 The Court inserts this test into its interpretation of Article 27(2) and notes that ‘this is the same approach [as that used by] the European Court’.Footnote 88 In fact, unlike the African Charter, both the ECHR and ACHR explicitly mention the legitimate purposes and proportionality tests, and have built their respective approaches to restrictions on that basis.Footnote 89 Rather than attempting its own construction of a test for the balancing of rights, the ACtHPR immediately based its approach on the ECtHR and the IACtHR, regardless of the design differences between the respective instruments.Footnote 90

The weaknesses of the African Charter (the duties and ‘clawback clauses’Footnote 91 ) and the vagueness of the rights recognized within it (a common feature among most human rights instruments) are adjusted and contained by the use of external decisions.Footnote 92 As noted above, the duties aspect of Article 27(2) is nullified by the first case on the merits, as the African Court instead adopted the approach of the European Court.Footnote 93 In the same way, in other early judgments, the African Court uses the case law of the European and Inter-American courts to fill out the contours of the rights contained in the African Charter. In Lohe Issa Konate v. Burkina Faso, the Court draws extensively from ECtHR jurisprudence on the freedom of expression and its legitimate restrictions.Footnote 94 In African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, concerning the Ogiek people, the Court uses the case law of the IACtHR on indigenous peoples’ rights to elaborate on peoples’ right to existence and right to culture under the African Charter.Footnote 95 Finally, in a number of the Tanzanian Fair Trial cases, discussed below, the contours of Article 7 (right to be heard) are expanded and consolidated through the use of European jurisprudence.

3.2 Developments in the African jurisprudence

Figure 1 (above) shows a general decline in the use of external judicial decisions over the years, as the jurisprudence of the African Court developed. There is a significant decline in external references after the initial cases establishing a basic settled case law, which occurs in parallel to an increase in internal references, as shown in Figure 2 (above). The expansion of internal jurisprudence reduces the use of external judicial decisions. This shift from external to internal citations evidences the development of the jurisprudence of the African Court and highlights the overarching effect of an internalization process. The internalization process can be seen more clearly by visualizing the use of external judicial decisions as a network. By including both the citations of external judicial decisions and the African Court’s citations of its own jurisprudence (including citations to admissibility decisions), the network in Figure 2 displays how the declining use of the external correlates to a growing self-citation network.Footnote 96

Figure 2. Central nodes of red (ACtHPR judgments on the merits) and blue (ACtHPR cases declared inadmissible but that are cited by judgments on the merits) are shown chronologically from 2013 to 2020 (arrow indicates start). ECtHR (green) and IACtHR (yellow) are placed in a circle according to when they are first cited. The size of nodes is relative to the number of times they are cited.

Figure 2, in four stages (¼, ½, ¾, and the full network), displays the growing citation network of the African Court as a circular wheel, expanding chronologically as judgments have accumulated.Footnote 97 It illustrates the distribution of citations to external judicial decisions and the growing intricate citation network between the African judgments. In the first stage, from 2013–2017, the Zongo, Konate, Alex Thomas, and Abukari cases establish a fundamental jurisprudence in the areas of the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression and unlawful detainment, together with some principles related to procedure and reparations.Footnote 98 This jurisprudence is built with frequent reference, comparison to, and borrowing of the case law of the European and Inter-American Human Rights Courts. In the second stage (until 2018), the additional cases are almost exclusively fair trial cases against Tanzania.Footnote 99 The newly established African jurisprudence, rather than the external case law, becomes the reference point in these repetitive cases. In the third stage (until 2019), there is a continuation of the use of external references, as the jurisprudence expands into new areas beyond the right to a fair trial.Footnote 100 The completed image (until 2020) displays the full network, and shows how cases that move into new areas continue to refer externally, whilst those on established matters only refer internally.Footnote 101 At this point, the internal citations are so inter-connected that the inner circle resembles a ball of yarn.

3.3 Looking more closely at the internalization of references to external judicial decisions

This section examines a specific area of the jurisprudence in more detail in order to give a clearer picture of both the substantive use of external judicial decisions in the African Court and the internalization process in action. The focus is on cases against Tanzania which deal with the right to a fair trial as per Article 7 of the African Charter. Article 7 can be distinguished from comparable provisions in other human rights instruments as it does not expressly mention the right to a fair trial, but instead cites the ‘right to be heard’ and contains a relatively limited number of procedural rights.Footnote 102 The section shows how the African Court expanded the scope of Article 7 through its use of external sources of law.

The Tanzanian Fair Trial cases represent the only real cluster of judgments in the Court’s case law, and thus the ideal area in which to study the evolving citation practice of the Court. The cluster consists of 24 different cases concerning applicants serving lengthy prison sentences, the majority handed down on robbery charges.Footnote 103 All the applicants claimed numerous violations of their right to a fair trial under Article 7 of the African Charter, among other violated rights.Footnote 104 Alex Thomas and Wilfred Onyango Nganyi are the two first cases, concluded respectively in 2015 and 2016 (within a few months of each other). In both cases, the alleged violation of the right to a fair trial receives the most attention. The violation encompasses the arrest procedure, the trial, and the appeal process. The European Court and the Inter-American Court are cited extensively in these parts of the judgment. In Alex Thomas, 18 European Court and seven Inter-American Court judgments are cited, and Wilfred Onyango Nganyi cites 11 European Court judgments and one Inter-American Court judgment.

The external judgments are mostly cited as comparisons to courts with a similar jurisdiction, or to strengthen the African Court’s reasoning which is aligned with the other courts.Footnote 105 In two instances, however, the judicial decisions of the European Court are directly adopted by the African Court. When assessing whether the trial was an unduly lengthy process, the African Court adopts a ‘principle of reasonable time’ developed by the ECtHR and adopted by the Inter-American Court.Footnote 106 The European Court stipulated three elements to be taken into account when establishing the fairness of the duration of judicial proceedings: the complexity of the issue, the procedural activities, and the conduct of the judicial authorities.Footnote 107 The African Court uses these three elements to conclude that the time spent on the proceedings was unreasonable, and that there had been a violation of the right to a fair trial. On this matter, the African Court refers not only to the European case law but also to the case law of the Inter-American Court.Footnote 108 It is interesting to note that the African Court only cites older Inter-American case law, which implements the three elements determined by the European Court, and not more recent cases in which a fourth element for consideration was added.Footnote 109 Since Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia in 2008, the Inter-American Court has additionally considered ‘the effect on the person involved in the procedure’.Footnote 110

Borrowed interpretive criteria are repeated in the two judgments when deciding whether the applicant is entitled to free legal aid. The right to legal aid is not specifically mentioned in Article 7 of the African Charter, but because of Article 7 of the Protocol to the African Charter, the Court could refer to Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which does contain an explicit right to legal aid.Footnote 111 It is not entirely clear whether the African Court is interpreting the content of Article 7 using Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, or is in fact directly applying Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR.Footnote 112 In Alex Thomas, the Court uses the two terms interchangeably.Footnote 113 Irrespective of this opaque understanding of the source of the right, the right to free legal aid is found to be present and applicable.Footnote 114

In both cases, the African Court relies on four factors identified by the ECtHR, which should be taken into account when determining whether the situation demands legal aid:Footnote 115 the seriousness of the offence, the severity of the potential sentence, the complexity of the case, and the social and personal situation of the defendant.Footnote 116 The African Court applied these four factors to the applicable facts, and found that the applicants were entitled to legal aid, which should have been granted to them.Footnote 117 Thus, in Alex Thomas and Wilfred Nganyi, the African Court establishes criteria for determining the right to legal aid, a right found in an external instrument, with elements borrowed directly from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

In subsequent cases, the African Court began to internalize external judicial decisions. In Abubakari, several external references are still made and used to push forward certain arguments. For example, Abubakari refers to the ICTY Čtelebići judgment on the burden of proof in allegations of discriminatory treatment.Footnote 118 A similar reference to the Diallo judgment of the ICJ on the burden of proof is found in Kennedy Owino Onyachi.Footnote 119 In Abubakari, there are further references to the ECtHR and IACtHR regarding the right of the accused to be informed of the charges brought against them.Footnote 120 The ECtHR is referred to in relation to whether or not a judgment must be delivered in public,Footnote 121 but on the issue of legal aid, the judgment instead refers back to Alex Thomas and the reasoning applied by the Court in this case.Footnote 122

This internal reliance continues in Kennedy Owino Onyachi, which also refers back to Alex Thomas when assessing the right to legal aid.Footnote 123 However, the African Court now uses the four factors previously found in ECtHR case law as an internal part of its own jurisprudence. In Onyachi, the African Court states that ‘in assessing these conditions, the Court considers several factors, including …’.Footnote 124 There is explicit ownership in this phrasing, which suggests that the criteria are part of the reasoning of the African Court itself. Onyachi refers to Granger v. United Kingdom, on the right to free legal aid, but this reference to the ECtHR is phrased as a ‘see also …’ together with references to Alex Thomas and Abubakari, rather than indicating the European cases as the source of the criteria.Footnote 125

Thus, what was initially a standard developed by the European Court of Human Rights has become the African Court’s own standard. This transformation, or internalization, of the external judicial decisions is even clearer in the following cases. Christopher Jonas v. Tanzania and Kijiji Isiaga v. Tanzania do not cite any external judgments – the Court instead relies on its own reasoning from its previous judgments.Footnote 126 The references to the European Court and the Inter-American Court are no longer considered a necessary part of the argumentation, as the African Court has a sufficient ‘settled jurisprudence’ of its own.Footnote 127 Nguza Viking (Babu Seya) and Johnson Nguza (Papi Kocha) v. Tanzania makes one reference to the Diallo judgment of the ICJ, but this is found in a direct and identical reference to the Court in the Kennedy Owino Onyachi case.Footnote 128 The reference therefore pertains primarily to a past reasoning of the African Court.

While there are occasional references to external judicial decisions in the Tanzanian Fair Trial cases following Christopher Jonas, these are used to confirm the reasoning of the African Court,Footnote 129 or are invoked by other parties.Footnote 130 The adoption of external principles is not renewed. External judicial decisions reappear, however, in some more recent fair trial cases, which have expanded into new issue areas, such as inhumane treatment (in Armand Guehi v. Tanzania),Footnote 131 or the death penalty (in Ally Rajabu and Others v. Tanzania).Footnote 132

This example shows the development of the African Court case law through a string of related cases, as illustrated in Figure 3 (below). The African Court has expanded the ambit of the right to a fair trial under Article 7 of the African Charter, both with the inclusion of Article 14 of the ICCPR, and through reference to the jurisprudence of the other regional courts.Footnote 133 The Court has applied and internalized certain approaches of the other regional human rights courts and used them to hold Tanzania responsible for violations of its human rights obligations to resolve a systemic fair trial issue.

Figure 3. Citation network of the African Court highlighting the 24 Tanzanian Fair Trial cases (blue) and the 51 cited external judicial decisions (red).

3.4 Internalization and progress beyond the fair trial cases

The Tanzanian Fair Trial cases show how the practice of using external judicial decisions changed and decreased as the African Court began to rely on its own settled case law. As stated, to date, the Tanzanian cases are the only ‘cluster’ of cases in the case law of the African Court. Most other areas have only been dealt with in a few cases, which makes it difficult to identify any repetition of this internalization process, as yet, in other areas. Internalization must be caused, at least partially, by the repetitious nature of cases and the desire to expedite rulings effectively.Footnote 134 Having said this, looking at different areas of the case law offers a broader perspective of the Court’s practice.

In the last three years observed (2018–2020), the Court issued 37 judgments on the merits, three times as many as in the previous five years. The majority of these cases are a continuation of the Tanzanian Fair Trial cases, but the Court also issued judgments against Benin, Côte D’Ivoire, Ghana, and Rwanda. The jurisprudence of the African Court continues to expand into new areas, such as the right to marry,Footnote 135 the right to property and non bis in idem,Footnote 136 the right to residence,Footnote 137 the mandatory imposition of the death penalty,Footnote 138 and the right to work.Footnote 139 While there has been a general decline in the number of references to external judicial decisions, these judgments, which deal with novel legal problems, reinvigorate the practice of judicial borrowing. The general decline in references, and the selective increase in these newer judgments can be seen in both Figures 1 and 2.

References to external judicial decisions appear frequently in these cases as a persuasive tool or to substantiate the interpretation. For instance, in Lucien Ikili Rashidi v. United Republic of Tanzania, the ECtHR case Stretch v. United Kingdom is invoked in relation to the requirement to take into account the possible consequences that a sudden loss of residence could have for an individual.Footnote 140 In Fidéle Mulindahabi v. Rwanda, on the question of whether the right to work implies security of employment, the Court cites the Inter-American Court case Lagos del Campo v. Peru.Footnote 141 Furthermore, Sebastian Germain Ajavon v. Republic of Benin found a violation of the principle of non bis in idem. Besides using the jurisdictional scope to invoke Article 14(7) of the ICCPR, as the principle is not found in the African Charter itself, the African Court borrows from the ECtHR’s understanding of non bis in idem in Grande Stevens and Others v. Italy, concerning a prohibition on prosecutions of second offences arising from facts that are substantively the same.Footnote 142 In Ally Rajabu and Others v. United Republic of Tanzania, the African Court notes the emphasis that the Inter-American Court places on the conflict between the right to due process and the mandatory application of the death penalty for certain crimes in Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago. In the same case, it is noted that ‘in arriving at its finding with respect to this issue, the Court is persuaded by the conclusions of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Soering v. United Kingdom’.Footnote 143

3.5 Internalizing external jurisprudence to bolster the African Court’s semantic authority

The case study of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights shows the extent to which the Court uses external judicial decisions. The Court actively refers to external judicial decisions to compare the case before it to cases from other courts with a similar jurisdiction, to strengthen its arguments, or to borrow approaches. The Court shows no hesitation in borrowing from and comparing itself to the older regional human rights courts. Venzke has shown how the WTO Appellate Body enhanced its semantic authority by establishing a de facto precedent of its own jurisprudence, thus reinforcing its claims to the correct interpretation of the GATT.Footnote 144 Hernández has also used the concept of semantic authority to explain how the ICJ relies on its settled jurisprudence to increase its normative power.Footnote 145 Both show how international courts use their settled jurisprudence to build their semantic authority for present and future interpretations of international law. The case study shows that, while this development is also apparent in the jurisprudence of the African Court, as seen in the increased level of self-citation, the Court was initially borrowing the authority of the other regional human rights courts. As the references above show, the African Court states it is fortified in its reasoning and persuaded by the conclusions of the other regional human rights courts. These phrases, and the general use of the principles and standards developed by the other courts, are clear examples of the interpretive authority ascribed to the other regional courts by the African Court in its jurisprudence. As its own jurisprudence develops, particularly in repetitive cases, this borrowing of external authority stops, and the African Court can both develop, and lay claim to, its own authority through its own case law. I characterized this evolving practice as an internalization process, indicating the prolonged effect of a repetitive practice. The evolving jurisprudence of the African Court has been shaped by its use of external judicial decisions, and that use is contingent on the building of a settled African jurisprudence. Over time, the borrowing of the semantic authority of other interpretive actors has become an expression of the authority of the African Court itself. The African Court roots itself in the open terrain of the African human rights system.Footnote 146

4. Characterizing the jurisprudence of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights

The use of the jurisprudence of other regional human rights courts has allowed the ACtHPR to expand its scope and to reinforce the contours of the rights of the African Charter. But reliance on other regional human rights courts raises some specific questions. Mujuzi asks why the ACtHPR would refer to the ECtHR rather than to the practices of the African Commission or the UN Human Rights Committee.Footnote 147 Unlike the ECtHR, these institutions are parts of instruments ratified by the respondent state. Mujuzi warns that ‘the Court should be sensitive to the manner in which it chooses international jurisprudence on which it will rely, as otherwise it risks being criticized for “Europeanising” its jurisprudence’.Footnote 148 This criticism mirrors longstanding critiques of international human rights law and its specific characteristics. TWAIL scholars, among others, have exposed how the rhetoric and instruments of human rights have been imposed on African people, and critical historians have shown how the human rights movement is linked to a neoliberal world order that perpetuates colonial and imperial hierarchies.Footnote 149 These discourses on the issues of existing international human rights law often revolve around the dilemma of engagement vs. dismissal.Footnote 150

The African Union is itself a mild, even conservative, form of Pan-Africanism, built on the notions of state sovereignty and reciprocal non-intervention in domestic affairs.Footnote 151 Thus, it is a pragmatic institution, rather than a critical or progressive one.Footnote 152 The African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, as an instrument of the African Union, follows the same engagement with the international system. However, the case law of the Court has expanded into a number of areas reaching beyond the content of the African Charter. In observing this case law, Gathii and Mwangi characterize the work of the Court as an ‘opportunity structure’ that has a supportive function for opposition parties, minorities, and civil society groups.Footnote 153 The African Court is thus pushing the boundaries of the African Charter, in line with Gathii’s optimistic views on the potential for international law to benefit individuals, aspiring towards universality without ascribing to a pure legal formalism.Footnote 154 This trend is visible in the way in which the Court even ascribes normative force to rights only found in external instruments, and in its pragmatic use of existing human rights jurisprudence.

The study of the jurisprudence shows that the African Charter has become centralized in the African human rights system. While applicants often invoke the broad jurisdiction of the Court to claim violations of human rights instruments beyond the African Charter, the Charter is taken as the starting point for any potential human rights violations. The African Court only moves beyond it when the African Charter is silent on a particular issue.Footnote 155 Yet, even in these cases, the Court eventually expands its interpretation of the African Charter to include certain rights and obligations, even if they initially came from external legal instruments.Footnote 156 Furthermore, the changing use of external judicial decisions, particularly in repeated judgments, centralizes the internal jurisprudence as the point of reference for future judgments. When the African Court makes a claim to its own semantic authority, it is also making a claim concerning the role of African jurisprudence within the international human rights system. Thus, the African Court is asserting its place as a participant in the international legal system.

In its design and practice, the African Court is pragmatic when it comes to the existing human rights system. Yet, at the same time, it is aspirational when it comes to the universal ideals promised by international human rights law.Footnote 157 This pragmatic universalism is expressed in the practice of the Court just as it is evident in the design of the African Charter.Footnote 158

This pragmatic universalism does not answer the question of whether this means that the specific interpretations of human rights norms become ‘African’ in substance or only in form. The use of European and Inter-American case law changes over time and is used in repeated cases as part of the African Court’s own reasoning. The substance remains the same, but there is a clear change in the interpretive practice of the Court. Rather than reaching beyond its own jurisprudence, the Court reaffirms its own position. This warrants a degree of scepticism as to whether the external has become ‘African’, or is simply just the external, being appropriated. Whether or not the transfer of an interpretation from one regional human rights court to another changes the regional character of the interpreted norm, or whether it simply reaffirms the universal nature of the norm, is a highly debated issue that this article does not aim to resolve.Footnote 159

To contrast the idea that the transfer of an interpretation is an active choice on the part of the African Court to bolster its own semantic authority, you could consider the idea that the interpretation is actually imposed upon the citing court. From this perspective, the interpretive authority of the ECtHR is a hegemonic imposition that the African Court cannot escape and must necessarily abide by.Footnote 160 The ‘European interpretation’ would as such retain its European characteristics. However, it would be stretching the contours of semantic authority to say that the regional courts are forced to follow the interpretations of the more ‘authoritative’ among them.Footnote 161 Quantitatively speaking, the ECtHR is the most cited court and, on its part, cites others infrequently.Footnote 162 Does this mean that the other regional courts are unable to escape from the ECtHR’s interpretive claims? No. What it entails is that they must engage with claims raised by states or applicants that invoke the interpretations of the ECtHR. There are examples from the case law of the IACtHR and in the case study above from the ACtHPR, where it is the state that refers to the more subsidiarity-based, democracy-centred jurisprudence of the ECtHR.Footnote 163 Conversely, in Kurt v. Turkey, the ECtHR was urged by the applicant to follow the reasoning of the IACtHR’s Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras.Footnote 164 These invocations were addressed and distinguished, rather than simply dismissed.Footnote 165 However, the vast majority of the references are invoked by the courts themselves, or are at least not explicitly mentioned as being invoked by a party to the case. The regional courts are therefore rarely the ‘target’ of the semantic authority of other regional courts, but are more likely to be ‘directing’ this authority. The external judicial decisions, and the interpretations they contain, become authoritative reference points that are used to reach intended audiences.Footnote 166 As Venzke states, ‘[a]ctors struggle for the law in the law and in interaction with other authorities, trying to undermine some and support others’.Footnote 167 The regional courts knowingly, or inadvertently, support each other to undermine the interpretive claims brought against their own positions.

5. Conclusion

The African Court has developed a broad jurisprudence in the decade since its first judgment on the merits. This article has highlighted the role that judicial borrowing has had as a judicial practice in the consolidation of this jurisprudence. By borrowing frequently from its regional counterparts in Europe and the Americas, the African Court has utilized existing human rights jurisprudence as a fundamental part of its argumentation. In this article this was theorized as the borrowing of the semantic authority of well-established actors in the international human rights system. By studying this borrowing in its aggregate form and as a repetitive judicial practice of cross-citation, the article has given credence to the internalization of the external judicial decisions, and in turn, shown how the African Court has centralized its own jurisprudence.

This article has described regional human rights courts as ‘brothers in arms’. These institutions rarely have reason to come into conflict with each other’s interpretations and instead use each other as argumentative supports. Venzke proposed the concept of semantic authority to capture ‘the struggle’ for the meaning of the law. The African Court and its homologues in Strasbourg and San José are rarely opponents in this struggle – they are quite firmly on the same side in a larger contest for the meaning of international human rights law. What remains, in the words of Simma, is a struggle among friends.Footnote 168 The collaboration between the different courts can enhance their authority and increase the value of external authorities. As Schauer writes: ‘Citation practice is a practice, and thus an institution, and consequently every citation to a particular source legitimizes the institution of using sources of that type.’Footnote 169 At the same time, the African Court’s jurisprudence is becoming increasingly self-referential, as opposed to continuing the practice of cross-citation. The article has argued that this bolsters the semantic authority of the African Court and turns its jurisprudence into the central and authoritative reference body for interpreting and understanding the African Charter and human rights in an African context.

Footnotes

*

This article, born out of a PhD thesis at the European University Institute, was initially presented at the AjV conference ‘Who Speaks International Law’, held in Bonn, Germany on 4 September 2021. Thanks to the participants, particularly Başak Çalı, for useful comments. Many thanks to the two anonymous reviewers for their feedback, and to Lucía López Zurita for helpful comments. The article is written by the author in his personal capacity. Any views or opinions presented in the article belong to the author and do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

References

1 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘Banjul Charter’), CAB/LEG/67/3 rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982); F. Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa (2012), 158.

2 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

3 Thirty-three out of the 55 African Union member states have ratified the protocol, but at the time of writing only eight have accepted the right to individual petition from individuals and NGOs. See further F. Viljoen, ‘Understanding and Overcoming Challenges in Accessing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, (2018) 67 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 63.

4 K. J. Alter, L. R. Helfer and M. R. Madsen, ‘How Context Shapes the Authority of International Courts’, in K. J. Alter, L. R. Helfer and M. R. Madsen (eds.), International Court Authority (2018), 24.

5 These challenges persist and reemerge throughout the lives of international courts.

6 T. G. Daly and M. Wiebusch, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Mapping Resistance Against a Young Court’, (2018) 14 International Journal of Law in Context 294; J. T. Gathii and J. Wangui Mwangi, ‘The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights as an Opportunity Structure’, in J. T. Gathii (ed.), The Performance of Africa’s International Courts: Using Litigation for Political, Legal, and Social Change (2020), 211; M. A. Plagis and L. Riemer, ‘From Context to Content of Human Rights: The Drafting History of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Enigma of Article 7’, (2021) 23 Journal of the History of International Law/Revue d’histoire du droit international 556; see Viljoen, supra note 3; M. A. Sanchez, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Forging a Jurisdictional Frontier in Post-Colonial Human Rights’, (2023) International Journal of Law in Context 1; N. De Silva and M. A. Plagis, ‘NGOs, International Courts, and State Backlash Against Human Rights Accountability: Evidence from NGO Mobilization Against Tanzania at the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, (2023) 57(1) Law & Society Review 36.

7 Expression of ‘homologues’ taken from L. Burgorgue-Larsen, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case Law and Commentary (2010), 152.

8 S. N’Zatioula Grovogui, Sovereigns, Quasi Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law (1996), vol. 3; J. T. Gathii, ‘Africa’, in B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (2012), 407.

9 The characteristics of ‘precedent’ are not discussed further in this article. For an overview of the puzzling character of ‘precedent’ in international law, see H. G. Cohen, ‘Theorizing Precedent in International Law’, in A. Bianchi, D. Peat and M. Windsor (eds.), Interpretation in International Law (2015), 268.

10 See F. Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’, (2008) 94 Virginia Law Review 1931 for an overview of the controversies in the US debate on the practice. See also N. Miller, ‘An International Jurisprudence? The Operation of “Precedent” Across International Tribunals’, (2002) 15 LJIL 483; U. Linderfalk, ‘Cross-Fertilisation in International Law’, (2015) 84 Nordic Journal of International Law 428; E. Voeten, ‘Borrowing and Nonborrowing among International Courts’, (2010) 39 Journal of Legal Studies 547.

11 M. Andenæs and E. Bjørge, A Farewell to Fragmentation: Reassertion and Convergence in International Law (2015).

12 E. F. Mac-Gregor, ‘What Do We Mean When We Talk about Judicial Dialogue?: Reflections of a Judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (2017) 30 Harvard Human Rights Journal 89, 126.

13 L. Lixinski, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law’, (2010) 21 EJIL 585.

14 A. Peters, ‘The Refinement of International Law: From Fragmentation to Regime Interaction and Politicization’, (2017) 15 International Journal of Constitutional Law 671.

15 W. Sandholtz, ‘The ECtHR, Transregional Dialogues and Global Constitutionalism’, (2020) 9 Global Constitutionalism 543.

16 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1)(d).

17 I take inspiration from Ridi’s observation that doctrinal accounts on the use of precedent in international adjudication ‘have generally failed to consider the aggregate dimension of the phenomenon’. See N. Ridi, ‘The Shape and Structure of the “Usable Past”: An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Precedent in International Adjudication’, (2019) 10 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 200, at 200.

18 ‘Authority is a complex attitude by subjects towards an institution that should involve a coherent and cohesive view of the legitimacy of obeying that institution; and such approach or attitude must be built and internalized over time’. See H. P. Olsen, ‘International Courts and the Building of Legal Authority Beyond the State’, in H. P. Olsen and P. Capps (eds.), Legal Authority beyond the State (2018), 7; I. Venzke, ‘Semantic Authority’, in J. d’Aspremont and S. Singh (eds.), Concepts for International Law: Contributions to Disciplinary Thought (2019), 815.

19 See Bianchi, Peat and Windsor, supra note 9.

20 I. Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists (2012).

21 Ibid., at 37. This is similar to the ‘grammar’ of international law that Koskenniemi emphasizes. M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (2006), 566. See likewise, W. M. Reisman, ‘International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication (The Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture)’, (1981) Proceedings of the ASIL Annual Meeting 101.

22 See Venzke, supra note 20, at 62–4; Venzke, supra note 18; I. Venzke, ‘Semantic Authority, Legal Change and the Dynamics of International Law’, in Olsen and Capps, supra note 18, at 102.

23 See Venzke, supra note 18, at 824.

24 I. Venzke, ‘International Courts’ De Facto Authority and Its Justification’, in Alter, Helfer and Madsen, supra note 4, at 396.

25 See Venzke, supra note 18, at 816–17. It is a concept built on American Legal Realism, the work of Rudolf von Jhering and the Freirechtsschule, and linguistic pragmatism.

26 See Venzke, supra note 20, at 146–7.

27 The primary actors they want to follow their interpretive claims are the member states, that is, their ‘compliance partners'. A. Huneeus, ‘Courts Resisting Courts: Lesson From the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights’, (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 493; R. Kunz, ‘Judging International Judgments Anew? The Human Rights Courts before Domestic Courts’, (2019) 30 EJIL 1129.

28 A. Von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, ‘On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority’, (2013) 26 LJIL 49; A. Von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, ‘Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers’, in A. Von Bogdandy and I. Venzke (eds.), International Judicial Lawmaking: On Public Authority and Democratic Legitimation in Global Governance (2012), 3.

29 See Olsen, supra note 18, at 96. For insight into broader studies into how international courts build their authority see Alter, Helfer and Madsen, supra note 4.

30 This links the concept of semantic authority to the notion of interpretive communities in international law. See M. Waibel, ‘Interpretive Communities in International Law’, in A. Bianchi, Peat and Windsor, supra note 9, at 147.

31 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’, (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197, 199 (emphasis in original). See also Venzke, supra note 20, at 61.

32 See Venzke, supra note 24, at 396.

33 A. Bianchi, ‘International Adjudication, Rhetoric and Storytelling’, (2018) 9 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 28, 33 (emphasis added).

34 J. Klabbers, ‘Virtuous Interpretation’, in M. Fitzmaurice, O. Elias and P. Merkouris, Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (2010), 17, at 20, referencing D. Kennedy, ‘The Turn to Interpretation’, (1985) 58 Southern California Law Review 251, 265.

35 See G. Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (2014), 158, arguing the ICJ has built its semantic authority by referring back to its own case law. See also a similar argument in W. Alschner and D. Charlotin, ‘The Growing Complexity of the International Court of Justice’s Self-Citation Network’, (2018) 29 EJIL 83.

36 Regarding the ECtHR: ‘a thick body of case law glosses over the naked treaty texts … [it is not] possible to understand the law or formulate a legal argument without reference to earlier decisions'. See Venzke, supra note 24, at 396.

37 See Venzke, supra note 18, at 823. See further Venzke, supra note 20, Ch. 3.

38 See Venzke, supra note 24, at 394. Semantic authority has several similarities but also distinctions from the concept of Persuasive Authority known from Comparative Law. Primarily, this distinction lies in persuasive authority’s focus on who is cited, and not the content cited. Semantic authority is interested in the claim itself. Cf. Schauer, supra note 10.

39 M. Shahabuddeen, ‘Distinguishing’, in M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996), 110.

40 See Venzke, supra note 24, at 396.

41 Here, the notion of authority used by Venzke must be distinguished from accounts such as Weber’s which suggest that the addressee of authority must surrender judgment. This is a substantial requirement in international law. To make authority applicable, Venzke states that the relevance of authority is that it ‘does need not persuade, nor does it require a surrendering of judgment’. As such, it falls between the concepts of persuasion and force. See Venzke, supra note 18, at 822. Compare with M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (1978), vol. 1, 217.

42 H. H. Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’, (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181.

43 U. Šadl and H. P. Olsen, ‘Can Quantitative Methods Complement Doctrinal Legal Studies? Using Citation Network and Corpus Linguistic Analysis to Understand International Courts’, (2017) 30 LJIL 327.

44 See Ridi, supra note 17.

45 Dataset on file with the author.

46 See similar distinctions between different kinds of uses of external judicial decisions in A. Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, (1994) 29 University of Richmond Law Review 99, 103, and M. Bobek, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts (2013), 50.

47 If there is an overlap in jurisdiction, then the external reference may be due to a number of reasons, from judicial co-operation, comity, or overlapping facts, that would detour the study. Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals (2004), 278–81. One reference to the International Criminal Court in The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Libya was excluded because of this overlap.

48 The relationship between the UN Human Rights Committee and regional human rights courts has been discussed in W. Sandholtz, ‘Human Rights Courts and Global Constitutionalism: Coordination Through Judicial Dialogue’, (2021) 10 Global Constitutionalism 439; C. M. Buckley, A. Donald and P. Leach (eds.), Towards Convergence in International Human Rights Law: Approaches of Regional and International Systems (2016).

49 There are many other judicial practices that could be studied using a similar approach, especially by moving beyond the judgments into the wider arena of international courts. See J. L. Dunoff and M. A. Pollack, ‘International Judicial Practices: Opening the Black Box of International Courts’, (2018) 40 Michigan Journal of International Law 47.

50 The main text will often contain a reference to a specific judgment, perhaps with a quotation from a specific paragraph, with a specific reference in the footnote. These cases are counted once. However, multiple references can refer to the same external judicial decisions but to different paragraphs or to the same paragraphs for different purposes. These instances are counted twice.

51 The inclusion or exclusion of footnotes is discussed in depth in Ridi, supra note 17, at 240–2.

52 References found in separate opinions of judgments on the merits are excluded from the quantitative inquiry.

53 For a recent overview of the approach see U. Šadl and F. Tarissan, ‘The Relevance of the Network Approach to European Case Law: Reflection and Evidence’, in C. Kilpatrick and J. Scott (eds.), New Legal Approaches to Studying the Court of Justice: Revisiting Law in Context (2020), 92. The analytical value of the approach has been highlighted by Ridi, supra note 17, and Alschner and Charlotin, supra note 35.

54 P. Jagoda, Network Aesthetics (2016).

55 See, e.g., M. Jacomy et al., ‘ForceAtlas2, a Continuous Graph Layout Algorithm for Handy Network Visualization Designed for the Gephi Software’, (2014) 9 PLOSONE e98679.

56 While the picture shows a static imagine, ‘a network is never a static structure, even as network graphs, maps, or visualizations might sometimes suggest a fixed form. Networks depend on an active flow among interlinked vertices’. See Jagoda, supra note 54, at 8.

57 L. Epstein and A. D. Martin, An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research (2014), Pt. IV; E. R. Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information (2001).

58 ‘[T]he reader is going to attach significance to the data … and it is the same sort of significance the author wants him to attach [to it].’ J. H. Merryman, ‘The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950’, (1954) 6 Stanford Law Review 613, 651.

59 See Jagoda, supra note 54, at 8.

60 See M. L. Christensen, ‘Networks and Narrative: Visualizing International Law’, (2021) 13 European Journal of Legal Studies 27.

61 A prominent substantive aspect is the inclusion of peoples’ rights. See U. O. Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1997), 89; F. Ouguergouz et al., The African Charter of Human and People’s Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2003), 211.

62 See 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 2, Art. 3.1. Compare this to the restricted wording of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights ‘Pact of San Jose’, Art. 62.3; and 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Art. 32.1.

63 See 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ibid., Art. 7.

64 See African Charter, supra note 1, Arts. 60–66.

65 A. Rachovitsa, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Uniquely Equipped Testbed for (the Limits of) Human Rights Integration?’, in E. Bribosia and I. Rorive (eds.), Human Rights Tectonics: Global Dynamics of Integration and Fragmentation (2018), 69 at 76–7.

66 Ibid., at 82.

67 Ibid., at 75. For the drafting history see Plagis and Riemer, supra note 6.

68 L. Burgorgue-Larsen, ‘“Decompartmentalization”: The Key Technique for Interpreting Regional Human Rights Treaties’, (2018) 16 International Journal of Constitutional Law 187, 190.

69 A. Rachovitsa, ‘On New “Judicial Animals”: The Curious Case of an African Court with Material Jurisdiction of a Global Scope’, (2019) 19 Human Rights Law Review 255.

70 Rachovitsa has raised this question in, respectively, ibid., at 26, and Rachovitsa, supra note 65.

71 Rachovitsa has pointed out that the ACtHPR needs to nurture the specificities of the African Charter rather than just letting to be one instrument among many. See Rachovitsa, supra note 65.

72 See Viljoen, supra note 3.

73 Compare with the ECtHR, see E. Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights (2011), 191, and IACtHR, T. Buergenthal, ‘Remembering the Early Years of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (2005) 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 259, 269.

74 Rev. Christopher R. Mtikila v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2013] ACtHPR, App. No. 011/2011.

75 Houngue Eric Noudehouenou v. Republic of Benin, [2020] ACtHPR, App. No. 003/2020.

76 Excluding references to overlapping institutions. See above.

77 See, for example, Lohe Issa Konate v. Burkina Faso, [2014] ACtHPR, App. No. 004/2013, para. 158, which refers to the European Court’s view on criminal defamation laws, with three footnotes that include a total of 12 references to specific judgments.

78 Alex Thomas v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2015] ACtHPR, App. No. 005/2013, para. 95.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., para. 104.

81 Wilfred Onyango Nganyi & 9 Others v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2016] ACtHPR, App. No. 006/2013, para. 136.

82 Ally Rajabu and Others v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2019] ACtHPR, App. No. 007/2015, para. 149.

83 Fidèle Mulindahabi v. Republic of Rwanda, [2020] ACtHPR, App. No. 004/2017, para. 95.

84 Remarks by Judge Ben Achour, 2nd International Human Rights Forum (Regional Courts), 25 March 2021, organized by the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Cedh - 20210325/1 (EN)’ (European Court of Human Rights/Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, 28 August 2021), available at vodmanager.coe.int/cedh/webcast/cedh/2021-03-25-1/en.

85 Ibid. Abdoulaye Nikiema, Ernest Zongo, Blaise Ilboudo & Burkinabe Human and Peoples’ Rights Movement v. Burkina Faso, [2014] ACtHPR, App. No. 013/2011.

86 See Mtikila, supra note 74, paras. 66–75.

87 Ibid., para. 106.

88 Ibid., para 107.1. Art. 27(2) of the African Charter states that ‘the rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest'.

89 See, e.g., Art. 8(2) of the ECHR, and Art. 16(2) IACHR. A. Rachovitsa, ‘Balancing Test: African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR)’, available at opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law-mpeipro/e3636.013.3636/law-mpeipro-e3636.

90 See ibid.

91 L. Mapuva, ‘Negating the Promotion of Human Rights through “Claw-Back” Clauses in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights’, (2016) 51 International Affairs and Global Strategy; M. W. Mutua, ‘The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties’, (1994) 35 Virginia Journal of International Law 339.

92 See the conclusion in Rachovitsa, supra note 65; D. Shelton, ‘Konaté v. Burkina Faso’, (2015) 109 AJIL 630.

93 This is a continuation of the practice of the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights. See R. Murray, ‘Borrowing International Human Rights Law: Some Examples from the Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in C. C. Jalloh and A. B. M. Marong, Promoting Accountability under International Law for Gross Human Rights Violations in Africa (2015), 517.

94 See Konate, supra note 77, paras. 154, 158, 159. Twenty references to the ECtHR and one to the IACtHR regarding various considerations to take into account when restricting freedom of expression.

95 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, [2017] ACtHPR, App. No. 006/2012, paras. 147, 153, 186 contains three references to the IACtHR case law.

96 In comparison, Alschner and Charlotin have visualized the growth of self-citation in the International Court of Justice. See Alschner and Charlotin, supra note 35. See likewise for the WTO Appellate Body and the ICSID, Ridi, supra note 17, at 209.

97 A circle is a classic way to represent movement, periodicity, and transformation. See M. Lima, The Book of Circles: Visualizing Spheres of Knowledge (2017), 40.

98 First ten cases, as well as most of the inadmissible cases. From Rev Christopher R Mtikila, supra note 74, to Kennedy Owino Onyachi and Another v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2017] ACtHPR, App. No. 003/2015. For the remedies regime created via Alex Thomas, supra note 78, and Mohamed Abubakari v. United Republic of Tanzania, Judgment of 3 June 2016, ACtHPR, App. No. 007/2013, see M. A. Plagis, ‘The Makings of Remedies: The (R) Evolution of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights Remedies Regime in Fair Trial Cases’, (2020) 28 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 45.

99 First 22 cases, ending at Diocles William v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2018] ACtHPR, App. No. 016/2016.

100 First 35 cases, ending at Ally Rajabu, supra note 82.

101 All 49 cases, ending with Houngue Eric Noudehouenou, supra note 75.

102 For the drafting history of Art. 7, see Plagis and Riemer, supra note 6, at 18.

103 A discussion on the context and procedure of these cases is found in Gathii and Mwangi, supra note 6, at 223–33; see Plagis, supra note 98; A. Possi, ‘“It Is Better That Ten Guilty Persons Escape than That One Innocent Suffer”: The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Fair Trial Rights in Tanzania’, (2017) 1 African Human Rights Yearbook 311.

104 See Alex Thomas, supra note 78; Wilfred Nganyi, supra note 81; Mohamed Abubakari v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2016] ACtHPR, App. No. 007/2013; Kennedy Onyachi, supra note 98; Christopher Jonas v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2016] ACtHPR, App. No. 011/2015; Kijiji Isiaga v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2018] ACtHPR, App. No. 032/2015; Nguza Viking (Babu Seya) and Johnson Nguza (Papi Kocha) v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2018] ACtHPR, App. No. 006/2015.

105 See, e.g., Alex Thomas, supra note 78, paras. 95, 157–158.

106 Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador, Merits, [1997] IACtHR, Series C No. 35, para. 72.

107 See Alex Thomas, supra note 78, para. 104.

108 Ibid., para. 104 refers to Suárez Rosero, supra note 106; Case of Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil, Merits, Reparations, and Costs Judgment of 4 July 2006, [2006] IACtHR, Series C No. 149; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs Judgment of 1 July 2006, [2006] IACtHR, Series C No. 148; Case of Baldeón García v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs Judgment of 6 April 2006, [2006] IACtHR, Series C No. 147.

109 T. M. Antkowiak and A. Gonza, The American Convention on Human Rights: Essential Rights (2017), 184.

110 Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. v. Colombia, Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of 7 July 2009, [2009] IACtHR, Series C No. 201, para. 155.

111 See Alex Thomas, supra note 78, para. 114; 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 2, Art. 7. Art. 7 states that ‘the Court shall apply the provisions of the Charter and any other relevant human rights instruments ratified by the States concerned'.

112 See Alex Thomas, ibid., para 88. Compared with para. 114.

113 This has generated some criticism, see J. D. Mujuzi, ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Its Protection of the Right to a Fair Trial’, (2017) 16 The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 187, 202. See also The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. State of Libya, [2016] ACtHPR, App. No. 002/2013 (Judge Ouguergouz, Separate Opinion), para. 8.

114 See Alex Thomas, supra note 78, para. 123.

115 Ibid., para. 118, refers to Benham v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 10 June 1996, [1996] ECtHR, App. No. 19380/92, para. 59; Quaranta v. Switzerland, Judgment of 24 May 1991, [1991] ECtHR, App. No. 12744/87, para. 33; Zdravko Stanev v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 6 November 2012, [2012] ECtHR, App. No. 32238/04, para. 38; Talat Tunç v. Turkey, Judgment of 27 March 2007, [2007] ECtHR, App. No. 32432/96, para. 56; Prezec v. Croatia, Judgment of 15 October 2009, [2009] ECtHR, App. No. 48185/07, para. 29; Biba v. Greece, Judgment of 26 September 2000, [2000] ECtHR, App. No. 33170/96, para. 29. The criteria are not expressed as four distinct factors in these cases. Quaranta v. Switzerland is the closest but sees it as three criteria, by linking the seriousness of the offence with the severity of the potential sentence. See Quaranta, supra note 115, paras. 32–35.

116 See Alex Thomas, supra note 78, para. 118; Wilfred Nganyi, supra note 81, para. 177.

117 The African Court also draws inspiration from the UN Human Rights Committee in Anthony Currie v. Jamaica, on the interpretation and application of Art. 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR, as the case had similar circumstances and the interest of justice required free legal aid. Alex Thomas, ibid., para. 120.

118 See Mohamed Abubakari, supra note 104, para. 153, note 19, citing Prosecutor v. Mucić (Čelebići Case), Judgment on Appeal, Case No. IT-96-21, 20 February 2001, para. 607.

119 See Kennedy Onyachi, supra note 98, para. 143, citing Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment of 30 November 2010, paras. 56, and 54–55.

120 See Mohamed Abubakari, supra note 104, para. 158, note 20, citing Pélissier and Sassi v. France, Judgment of 25 March 1999, [1999] ECtHR, App. No. 25444/94, para. 52; Balta and Demir v. Turkey, Judgment of 23 June 2015, [2015] ECtHR, App. No. 48628/12, para. 37; Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of 6 May 2008, [2008] IACtHR, paras. 102–109.

121 See Mohamed Abubakari, supra note 104, para. 224, citing and quoting Lorenzetti v. Italy, Judgment of 10 April 2012, [2012] ECtHR, App. No. 32075/09, para. 37. This reference allows a certain amount of flexibility within regard to the openness of verdicts but has been met with some disagreement. See Mohamed Abubakari, ibid., (Dissenting Opinions by Ben Achour and Partly Dissenting Opinion by N. Thompson).

122 Ibid., para. 139.

123 See Kennedy Onyachi, supra note 98, para. 104.

124 Ibid., para. 105.

125 Ibid., para. 105, note 21, citing Granger v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 March 1990, [1990] ECtHR, App. No. 11932/86, para. 44.

126 See Christopher Jonas, supra note 104, para. 77, referring to the Abubakari case when considering whether free legal aid should have been granted.

127 Term used by the International Court of Justice to describe its own consistent case law. See Alschner and Charlotin, supra note 35, at 84.

128 See Nguza Viking, supra note 104, para. 72.

129 See for example Jibu Amir @ Mussa & Another v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2019] ACtHPR, App. No. 014/2015, para. 86, where the Court finds that the right to be informed of one’s right to counsel is essential, as repeatedly stated by the ECtHR.

130 In Armand Guehi v. United Republic of Tanzania (Republic of Côte D’Ivoire Intervening), [2018] ACtHPR, App. No. 001/2015, para. 83, the intervening state refers to Abdulgafur Batmaz v. Turkey, as a support for the contention that a person facing criminal charges must have a lawyer present at all times. In Kenedy Ivan v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2019] ACtHPR, App. No. 025/2016, para. 79, the respondent state refers to Melin v. France, as support for the state letting an individual defend themselves.

131 See Armand Guehi, supra note 130, para. 133, on lack of food in prisons, citing Moisejevs v. Latvia; Lucien Ikili Rashidi v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2019] ACtHPR, App. No. 009/2015, para. 89, on undignified cavity searches, citing El Shennawy v. France and Frérot v. France.

132 See Ally Rajabu, supra note 82, para. 103, citing Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin v. Trinidad & Tobago and Boyce & Joseph v. Barbados. See also Ally Rajabu, ibid., para. 149, citing Soering v. the United Kingdom on the death penalty.

133 This also includes references of the UN Human Rights Committee, though this has not been included in the current analysis. These references do, however, follow the same pattern as the studied references. See further Mujuzi, supra note 113, at 222.

134 On practices of repetition see W. Werner, ‘“Once Upon a Time, There Was a Story That Began”: Repetition in Security Council Resolutions’, in W. Werner, Repetition and International Law (2022), 72.

135 APDF & IHRDA v. Republic of Mali, [2018] ACtHPR, App. No. 046/2016.

136 Sébastien Germain Marie Aïkoue Ajavon v. Republic of Benin, [2019] ACtHPR, App. No. 013/2017.

137 See Lucien Ikili, supra note 131.

138 See Ally Rajabu, supra note 82.

139 See Fidèle Mulindahabi, supra note 83.

140 See Lucien Ikili, supra note 131, para. 76, citing Stretch v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 24 June 2003, [2003] ECtHR, App. No. 44277/98.

141 See Fidèle Mulindahabi, supra note 83, para. 95 citing Lagos del Campo v. Peru. Also cited are two ICJ judgments on the customary nature of certain rights of the UDHR, as well as an ECOWAS Court of Justice judgment.

142 See Sébastien Ajavon, supra note 136, para. 179, citing Grande Stevens v. Italy.

143 See Ally Rajabu, supra note 82, para. 103, citing Hilaire, supra note 132, and Boyce, supra note 132. See also Ally Rajabu, ibid., para. 149, citing Soering, supra note 132.

144 See Venzke, supra note 20, Ch. IV.

145 See Hernández, supra note 35, at 158.

146 See Rachovitsa, supra note 65; Rachovitsa, supra note 69.

147 See Mujuzi, supra note 113, at 219.

148 Mujuzi points to the raised criticism in the separate opinions of Abubakari as a possible sign of things to come, though neither opinion criticises any ‘Europeanisation’. In fact, both opinions urge the Court to follow the ECtHR’s Del Rio Prado v. Spain judgment. Ibid., at 219–20.

149 M. Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’, (2001) 42 Harvard International Law Journal 201; O. Yasuaki, ‘Towards an Intercivilizational Approach to Human Rights’, (1997) 7 Asian Yearbook of International Law 21, 63; S. Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018).

150 L. Eslava and S. Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law’, (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 103; J. T. Gathii, ‘Africa and the Radical Origins of the Right to Development’, (2020) 1 TWAIL Review 28.

151 Gevers sees it as a ‘moderate’ Pan-African solution, rather than a ‘radical’ one. C. Gevers, ‘To Seek with Beauty to Set the World Right: Cold War International Law and the Radical “Imaginative Geography” of Pan-Africanism’, in M. Craven, S. Pahuja and G. Simpson (eds.), International Law and the Cold War (2019), 492, at 503. See further A. A. Yusuf, Pan-Africanism and International Law (2016).

152 Bedjaoui describes the establishment of the OAU as ‘the triumph of pragmatism’. M. Bedjaoui, ‘From the Pan-Africanist Movement to the African Union: Brief Historical Overview of Steps to African Unity’, in A. A. Yusuf and F. Ouguergouz, The African Union: Legal and Institutional Framework (A Manual on the Pan-African Organization) (2012), 9, at 16.

153 See Gathii and Mwangi, supra note 6. See likewise, O. D. Akinkugbe, ‘Houngue Éric Noudehouenou v. Republic of Benin’, (2021) 115 AJIL 281.

154 See Gathii, supra note 150. Gathii builds on his previous work that characterized two perspectives of African engagement with international law – a contributionist and a critical theorist perspective, and adds a third ‘middle way’, exemplified in the work of Keba Mbaye. See Gathii, supra note 8.

155 Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. United Republic of Tanzania, [2018] ACtHPR, App. No. 012/2015 is an example of this. Here, the UDHR and ICCPR are invoked and found to have been violated as the African Charter does not contain a right to nationality.

156 See, for example, ICCPR, Art. 14(3)(d) in the Fair Trial cases.

157 See Umozurike, supra note 61.

158 Plagis and Reimer show how the drafters of the African Charter were debating whether to copy existing international instruments or create an autochthonic instrument that enhanced regional sensibilities. See Plagis and Riemer, supra note 6.

159 O. Yasuaki, A Transcivilizational Perspective on International Law: Questioning Prevalent Cognitive Frameworks in the Emerging Multi-Polar and Multi-Civilizational World of the Twenty-First Century (2010), Vol. 342, 386; E. Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (2001); C. Medina, ‘The Bumpy Road to Human Rights Enjoyment - The Americas Sim Lecture 2008’, (2008) 26 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 627, 628; A. A. Cançado Trindade, ‘Conclusion: Reflections on the 2015 Strasbourg Conference’, in A. van Aaken and I. Motoc (eds.), The European Convention on Human Rights and General International Law (2018), 285, at 303.

160 M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’, (2004) 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 197, 205–6.

161 See note 41, supra, in reference to Venzke, supra note 18, at 822.

162 Voeten finds that the ECtHR only cites international court judgments in three percent of its judgments that engage in new legal interpretation. E. Voeten, ‘Why Cite External Legal Sources?: Theory and Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights’, in C. Giorgetti and M. Pollack (eds.), Beyond Fragmentation: Cross-Fertilization, Cooperation and Competition among International Courts and Tribunals (2022), 162, at164.

163 Case of El Amparo v. Venezuela, Reparations and Costs, [1996] IACtHR, Series C No. 28. See Rev Christopher R Mtikila, supra note 74.

164 Kurt v. Turkey, [1998] ECtHR, App. No. 24276/94, para. 84.

165 This distinction was explicitly noted in the Separate Opinion of Judge Pettiti, ibid., (Judge Pettiti, Separate Opinion).

166 See Venzke, supra note 18, at 822.

167 See Venzke, supra note 22, at 126.

168 B. Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’, in H. R. Fabri, R. Wolfrum and J. Gogolin, Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law, Volume 2, 2008 (2010), 1, at 25.

169 See Schauer, supra note 10, at 1957–8.

Figure 0

Table 1. References found in ACtHPR judgments (2013 – 2020)

Figure 1

Figure 1. A stacked column chart showing the total number of external references in each judgment, and the references to the cited courts.

Figure 2

Figure 2. Central nodes of red (ACtHPR judgments on the merits) and blue (ACtHPR cases declared inadmissible but that are cited by judgments on the merits) are shown chronologically from 2013 to 2020 (arrow indicates start). ECtHR (green) and IACtHR (yellow) are placed in a circle according to when they are first cited. The size of nodes is relative to the number of times they are cited.

Figure 3

Figure 3. Citation network of the African Court highlighting the 24 Tanzanian Fair Trial cases (blue) and the 51 cited external judicial decisions (red).