When the “Fort Hood Three” announced their intention to refuse to serve in Vietnam because the war, in their conscientious judgment, was immoral, illegal, and unjust, a spokesman for the Pentagon condemned them on the ground that they could have applied for conscientious objector status before induction.

But under present Selective Service law the Fort Hood Three could not have applied for conscientious objector status, because they are not pacifists. I believe that most American young men who refuse to serve in Vietnam are in the same position: they are not conscientiously opposed to all wars, but they are conscientiously opposed to this war.

In the first sense of the term, the representation of that not actually present, it is in fact a fantasy “that military service in this country's aimed forces is an option exercisable solely at the discretion of the individual,” as Freedom House proclaims. The “option” of military service is indeed not exercised today “solely at the discretion of the individual,” neither in this country nor any other. Such an option is “not actually present”.

Which means what? Simply that a central meaning of freedom — “… existing under a government which … does not encroach upon individual rights … acting of one's own will or choice; not determined from without” — is not yet a reality for young men anywhere on this planet.

“Is military service in this country's armed forces an option exercisable solely at the discretion of the individual?”

A quick answer to this question would be to say: “That depends on his discretion.”

This is to say that whether an individual is apt rightfully to exercise the choice extended him by a system of optional service would depend on how his conscience — his discretion — has been formed and informed. Moreover, whether any government in securing the political common good could ever grant armed service at the discretion of individuals depends on whether the citizens of a nation are more like Socrates, who while suffering imprisonment and death for conscience's sake still effectually acknowledged “the conscience of the laws,” than they are like Sophists putting in individualistic claims that their own subjective opinion is the measure of truth.

If the current U. S. desire to conclude a nuclear nonproliferation treaty with the Soviets raises some difficult questions with respect to future U. S. relationships with its allies (principally the Indians, Japanese, and Germans), it raises even more troublesome questions in connection with what many would regard as a highly desirable new objective of U. S. foreign policy. I would think it could be accepted as a verifiable fact that many of those who favor the nonproliferation treaty also favor, with equal or nearly equal vehemence, the “normalization” of relations between the U. S. and China. As this is written, the most recent expression of such a viewpoint is the proposal for a new “Two China” policy which could become the basis for the entry of China into the United Nations.