Queensland's Fitzgerald Inquiry was expected to last six weeks. It ran for two years (1987–1989). The inquiry was established to look at suspected police misconduct. It ended up exposing vertical corruption and widespread abuse of power in the Police Force; a less than arms-length relationship between police and the National Party government which contributed to the lack of effective police accountability processes; other official misconduct by non-police public servants; and political dishonesty and corruption.

The 1989 Fitzgerald Report into police and governmental corruption in Queensland has been a model for public sector reform in Australia. It is especially timely to consider the impact of those reforms in light of the current overhaul of the largest police agency in Australia, the New South Wales Police Service, and of continuing problems with public sector probity in other states. Queensland made significant advances in improving electoral and administrative processes, and creating external independent oversight of the police. Nonetheless, unforeseen gaps in the Fitzgerald agenda allowed reactionary forces to dilute the reform process. Three primary areas remain ‘unreconstructed’. Reform has not been firmly established from the top down, beginning with progressing the system of representative democracy and opening up cabinet. Additionally, the Police Service appears to have successfully resisted the prescribed re-orientation away from law enforcement to community policing. Detection and control of misconduct also remain weak. A more interventionist Criminal Justice Commission is needed, with more proactive strategies for developing compliance with ethical standards.

The interest in the evaluation of police work has been growing rapidly over the last eight years. The economic growth of the early 1980s has been replaced with the economic stringency of the 1990s. There has been an adoption of the private sector approach to evaluating public services. Value for money has never been more important, and all public services have been called to demonstrate efficiency in operation. Performance indicators have been developed for the police to aid in demonstrating this.

The British scientist Lord Kelvin once asserted that if something can be measured, it can be understood. To the extent that this is true, social scientists who want to understand political corruption or police misconduct would seem to be in big trouble, for some fairly obvious reasons. Corruption and misconduct by their nature usually involve prohibited actions committed by consenting adults in private, the offenders sometimes occupy positions of considerable power, any victim is often as compromised as the offenders or (especially in the case of an organisation) is unaware of being victimised, and whistleblowers historically have got such a raw deal from their departments and from the authorities that only the most heroic have persevered with their claims. No doubt its covert nature and reach into the upper echelons of power are reasons why there is still debate about how much corruption there really was in Queensland prior to the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and why there is continuing controversy about whether the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), set up in late 1989 to continue the work of the Inquiry, has been a success or a failure.

On 24 September 1997 the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) released a comprehensive report entitled Integrity in the Queensland Police Service: Implementation and Impact of the Fitzgerald Inquiry Reforms, in line with its statutory obligation to report to Parliament on the implementation of the recommendations of the Inquiry. Earlier reports have examined the implementation of the Inquiry's recommendations relating to recruitment and training and the restructuring of the police service (see CJC 1993, 1994). This most recent report addresses issues such as whether the Fitzgerald reforms have enhanced the effectiveness of the complaints investigation process, led to improved standards of behaviour within the Queensland Police Service (QPS), reduced the incidence of corruption and weakened the influence of the police ‘code of silence’. In addition to providing a retrospective assessment of the ‘Fitzgerald reforms’, the report identifies key areas where further action is required by the QPS and provides a reference point against which to measure future progress. This article summarises the key findings of the report and briefly discusses the implications for further reform of the QPS and the role of the CJC in that process.

In Australia, the role of police unions has assumed a prominence in contemporary debates surrounding the legitimate role of police in today's society. There is a perception that police unions in particular exercise undue influence over the political process, management practice and law reform. These perceptions are invariably grounded in “orthodox” accounts of policing that are based in part on the assumption that the police force, as an institution, is part of the “natural order of things”, that is, that the role of police is simply to “enforce the law as laid down by Parliament and the courts on behalf of the community”. Contemporary studies of policing have begun to challenge these views. Their observations suggest that the police are not merely passive instruments of the state but are actively engaged in influencing the processes of police administration and law reform. This body of work however does not specifically address the issue of police organisation and its impact on these processes. If we are to resolve contemporary concerns regarding police participation in the political sphere, a more adequate account of police practices and the institutions within which these practices have evolved is required.

On 11 November 1996 the Premier of Victoria, Jeff Kennett announced that his government would refer its powers over industrial relations to the Commonwealth. This decision, he said, “reflects the overwhelming consensus among industrial relations experts that a single industrial relations system is both desirable and inevitable”. The announcement was greeted enthusiastically by the proposed recipients: to the Prime Minister, John Howard, it was a “practical example of cooperative Commonwealth/State relations” and “a ringing endorsement of the Federal Government's industrial relations reforms”. The Minister for Industrial Relations, Peter Reith (who was credited with successful negotiation of the intergovernmental agreement on the terms of referral) hailed it as “a major micro-reform initiative.” Media commentary was only marginally less optimistic. It was reported that the other key national players — the ACTU, employers, the federal Opposition and the Democrats — also welcomed the move to a unitary industrial system. Benefits were seen in the elimination of duplication and administrative hurdles, making the state more attractive for overseas investors, and in the provision of an enhanced safety net for Victorian workers. The general theme of the coverage was summed up in the comment that the decision was “a victory for the national interest”.