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Eluding efficiency: why do we not see more efficient breach at the WTO?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 August 2010

KRZYSZTOF J. PELC
KRZYSZTOF J. PELC*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, McGill University
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

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Type
Review Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , October 2010 , pp. 629 - 642
Copyright
Copyright © Krzysztof J. Pelc 2010

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