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Radical and Conventional Models of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Making

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Pat McGowan  and
Stephen G. Walker
Pat McGowan
Affiliation:
Arizona State University
Stephen G. Walker
Affiliation:
Arizona State University
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Abstract

Two radical models of economic foreign policy making are summarized: instrumentalist and structuralist. By means of an issue-based policy paradigm, the views of several leading conventional scholars are described. The contrasting radical and conventional models are shown to be related—radicals providing useful insights into the setting of policy and conventional scholars being strongest regarding the policy process. Cautious synthesis is recommended to students of U.S. foreign economic policy making.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , April 1981 , pp. 347 - 382
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1981

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4 What liberals regard as mistakes, accidents, and discontinuities, radicals interpret as a rational, coherent, and continuous pattern. What liberals ascribe to misunderstandings and misjudgments, radicals tend to attribute to the designs of American officials … in furtherance of their institutional and class interests. Whereas liberals puzzle over apparent contradictions between United States purposes and the instruments chosen to advance them, radicals see clear linkages. What liberal writers believe unnecessary, radicals think to be determined by the requirements of the North American system. What liberals find surprising, radicals regard as predictable.

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101 These considerations are our criteria for evaluating radical and conventional analyses as competing models. We agree with Heilbroner that all models of behavior—radical and conventional—can only be evaluated on the twin grounds of logical consistency and empirical accuracy. Most radicals, and certainly Domhoff, Miliband, and Wright, share these criteria. See Heilbroner, (fn. 45), 44–51Google Scholar, and Wright (fn. 12), chap. 1.

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