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Between Stresemann and Hitler: The Foreign Policy of the Brüning Government

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Wolfgang J. Helbich
Wolfgang J. Helbich
Affiliation:
Free University in West Berlin, the University of Heidelberg, and the University of Paris
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Extract

Most historians of the Weimar Republic, fully occupied with the domestic affairs of the Brüining government in its crucial place between democracy and dictatorship, show little interest in Germany's foreign policy of the early 1930's. If they do devote some attention to it, their evaluation tends to be highly negative, regardless of their political or national sympathies. Observers who can be classified as liberals, socialists, Nazis, and nationalists—at odds among themselves on virtually every other question—all voice strong criticism of the Brüning diplomacy.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , October 1959 , pp. 24 - 44
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1959

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References

1 E.g., Eyck, Erich, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik, 11, Zurich and Stuttgart, 1956, p. 374Google Scholar; Rosenberg, Arthur, A History of the German Republic, London, 1936, pp. 302, 309f.Google Scholar; Galera, K. S. Baron von, Deutschlands Schicksalsweg, 1919–1939, Berlin, 1940, p.93.Google Scholar

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4 In parry language, reparations were equivalent to exploitation of German workers by Allied capitalists; cf. the official party publication, Neubauer, Theodor, Deutsche Aussenpolitik heute und tnorgen, Berlin, 1932.Google Scholar

5 The Socialist representative Breitscheid, in a Reichstag debate in March 1931Google Scholar, Verhandlungen des Reichstags: Stenographische Berichte, Vol. 445, Berlin, 1931, p. 1653.

6 The Social Democrat Stampfer in February 1931, ibid., Vol. 444, p. 888.

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11 Excerpts from the speech printed in Ulrich Thuerauf, ed., Schulthess’ Europ' qualifications of August 16, ibid., p. 191.

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14 Cf. Toynbee, Arnold J., Survey of International Affairs, 1930, London, 1931, pp. 10, 125.Google Scholar

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18 From the Westarp papers, quoted in Karl Bracher, Dietrich, Die Auftösung der Weimarer Republik, Stuttgart, 1955, p. 377.Google Scholar

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21 Henderson to Rumbold, April 1931, ibid., 2nd ser., 11, p. 59; cf. also 11, p. 58, and 1, pp. 559f.

22 E.g., ibid., 2nd ser., 11, pp. 75, 129.

23 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Vol. 427, p. 4371.

24 Schulthess, 1930, p. 31.

25 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Vol. 427, p. 4728.

26 Dirksen, Herbert von, Moskau, Tokio, London, Stuttgart, n.d. (preface dated 1949). p. 115.Google Scholar

27 Quoted in Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, January 23, 1932, evening edition.

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29 Although it could not be located in the important economic journals, there is no reason not to believe Brüning's remark about this anonymously published article in a Reichstag speech (Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Vol. 446, p. 2195).

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32 An unbalanced budget had been the main factor that had forced Germany to agree to its foreign creditors’ proposals during the Young Plan negotiations in 1929, since the reduced annuities would alleviate the desperate state of the Reich's finances.

33 “Report of the Committee Appointed on the Recommendation of the London Conference, 1931,” British Documents, 2nd ser., 11, p. 491.

34 Ibid., 2nd ser, 11, p. 487; Schacht, Hjalmar, Das Ende der Reparationen, Oldenburg, 1931, pp. 38, 40.Google Scholar

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36 This is the advised opinion of Hoover (ibid., 111, p. 62) and Eyck, (Weimar, 11, p. 407).Google Scholar

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38 Ibid., 2nd ser., 11, pp. 72f.

39 To Henderson on July 21, ibid., 2nd ser., 11, p. 219.

40 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Vol. 446, p. 2070.

41 Brüning, to the Reichstag in March 1931Google Scholar, ibid., Vol. 444, p. 680.

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44 “The Governments represented here have … been concentrating upon some measure which will give immediate relief to Germany, without undertaking to deal with what are the fundamental causes of the trouble from which Germany is suffering at the present time. President Hoover … recognised what was the root cause of Germany's present financial plight, that it was due to political obligations of Germany. … We cannot shirk hard facts indefinitely” (Stenographic Notes of die Meetings of the London Conference, ibid., 2nd ser., 11, pp. 460f).

45 Ibid., 2nd ser., 111, p. 8.

46 Ibid., 2nd ser., 111, pp. 12f.

47 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Vol. 446, pp. 2195f.

48 The version of the speech given in Schulthess, 1932, p. 31, is slightly, but significantly, different: “There is one hope, and this hope lies. …” This may be more authentic than the official version, from which such revealing passages have possibly been expurgated.

49 Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Vol. 446, pp. 2596f.

50 Brüning in March 1931, ibid., Vol. 444, p. 680.

51 Ibid., Vol. 444, p. 680.

52 Eyck, , Weimar, 11, p. 407.Google Scholar

53 Nazi historians used to accuse him of “weakness” in pursuing the project, whereas liberal historians generally share Eyck's point of view or simply deplore the resulting growth in tension between France and Germany. On the other hand, a recent German study (Hauser, Oswald, “Der Plan einer Deutsch-Österreichischen Zollunion von 1931 und die Europäsche FÖderation,” Historische Zeitschrijt, Vol. 179, 1955, pp. 45–92)Google Scholar takes the side of the government in claiming the legal and moral right of Germany to propose the customs union (“no intention of a political Anschluss, a view of the union as the first step toward a European federation”) and, while blaming Curtius for the secrecy of the negotiations, apportions the greater share of blame for the failure and its consequences to France for her lack of good will.

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56 The German ambassador to France, von Hoesch, had predicted that the French reaction to the Austro-German step would be “a storm” (ibid., p. 194), but held that in the long run the French would resign memselves to the established fact (ibid., p. 190).

57 Bülow, , Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Rumbold, British Documents, 2nd ser., 11, pp. 45f.Google Scholar

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62 Ritter, to Thelwall, , British Documents, 2nd ser., 11, p. 36.Google Scholar

63 It should be noted here—for what it may be worth—that Sir Horace Rumbold reported to London that he “was informed … that the Chancellor was an unwilling adherent of the proposed Customs Union” (ibid., 2nd ser., 11, p. 278).

64 Considering all the available evidence, and particularly the reaction of German public opinion, one can say that there was no thought of immediate political Anschluss within the German government, but that the French accusations contained considerably more than a kernel of truth.

65 Stampfer, Deputy in February 1931, Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Vol. 444, p. 888.Google Scholar

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68 The United States ambassador in Berlin, , Sacket, , in a conversation with Briining on July 2, 1931, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, 1, Washington, D.C., 1946, p. 131.Google Scholar

69 British Documents, 2nd ser, 11, p. 221.

70 Ibid., 2nd ser., 11, p. 69. “… the alternative,” Vansittart continued, “was one that filled me and, I believed, everybody else with real alarm.”