This article provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the composition, development and use of the List of World Heritage in Danger (IDL) under the 1972 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. The statutory records of this Convention have been coded in order to generate an overview of the development and use of the IDL between 1978 and 2017. The quantitative data was further developed by reference to World Heritage and transnational law literature. A key finding of this article is that the IDL serves a dual purpose in regulation: firstly, as a ‘fire alarm’ to alert the international community of imminent dangers at World Heritage sites; secondly, as a non-compliance procedure used for ‘naming and shaming’ states that breach the rules. The findings in this article have relevance for heritage scholars and policy makers concerned with the governance of World Heritage as well as those with a broader interest in non-compliance procedures under transnational environmental law.

The landmark 2015 decision by the Hague District Court in Urgenda v. The Netherlands represents the first time a national court has expressly used the international environmental law (IEL) principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities (CBDRs) of the climate regime as a complementary tool to interpret the scope of a state’s climate obligations under domestic law. This article highlights that despite the marked engagement of national courts with IEL in recent decades (including engaging with principles such as sustainable development, polluter pays, intergenerational equity, and precaution), until this decision CBDRs had remained outside the purview of environmental law jurisprudence at the national level. The article examines how the Hague Court used CBDRs to help address two common barriers to climate liability: causation and the ‘political question’ doctrine. The article argues that the Court was able to find normative content in a core element of the climate-related CBDRs: the ‘leadership’ role of developed countries in climate action. This core element has remained remarkably consensual throughout the contested history of CBDRs in the climate regime – a history that has gained a new chapter with the signature of the Paris Agreement in December 2015. The article concludes that Urgenda v. The Netherlands may serve as a starting point for a more productive and extensive use of CBDRs in climate litigation, provided litigants make more explicit use of the persuasive authority of the principle.

Meat production and the transport sector contribute almost equally to global warming. However, unlike the transport sector, in terms of climate change policies meat production is relatively unregulated. Many scientists have called for a meat tax as a means of reducing consumption but governments and politicians have not responded. Has the law been an obstacle to the acceptance of a meat tax? To address that question, this article analyzes three examples of European Union (EU) taxes that could be imposed on the consumption of domestic and imported meat, and examines them in relation to the international climate change regime, human rights law, and the legal regimes of the World Trade Organization and the EU. It shows that, if carefully designed, an EU meat tax is consistent with these bodies of law. To address adequately the industrial sectors that give rise to global warming, governments will need to overcome the taboo relating to the concept of a meat tax.

Examples abound of national and international legal developments that indicate growing concern and respect for animals. However, a key barrier remains: animals are not recognized as legal persons and therefore do not have standing to pursue independent legal action. This significantly limits the scope for legal redress when animals’ interests are harmed. This article examines recent attempts in the United States and Europe to establish standing for animals via strategic litigation and the barriers that have so far undermined this project. The article argues that, despite their lack of success to date, cases that seek to establish standing for animals should continue to be pursued. Societal views about the value of animals’ lives are continually evolving such that these cases may soon be successful. Furthermore, even if unsuccessful, these cases help in creating the socio-cultural space required to redefine the human–animal divide and potentially transform animals into rights bearers.

This article assesses current and proposed European Union (EU) climate and environmental law, and the legal instruments associated with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), to see whether soil carbon sequestration is sufficiently promoted as a promising example of ‘climate-smart agriculture’. The assessment shows that current and proposed policies and instruments are inadequate to stimulate large-scale adoption of soil carbon projects across Europe. Given the identified structural flaws, it is likely that this is true for all climate-smart agricultural practices. An alternative approach needs to be developed. Under EU climate policy, agriculture should be included in the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) by allowing regulated industries to buy offsets from the agricultural sector, following the examples set by Australia and others. The second element of a new approach is aimed at the CAP, which needs to be far more focused on the specific requirements of climate change mitigation and adaptation. Yet, such stronger focus does not take away the need to explore new income streams for farmers from offsets under the ETS, as the CAP will never have sufficient funds for the deep and full transition of Europe’s agriculture sector that is needed.

Environmental law remains grounded in a ‘one-world world’ paradigm. This ontological structure asserts that, regardless of variation in world-construing, all beings occupy one ‘real’ world of discrete entities. The resulting legal system is viewed as an independent set of norms and procedures regulating the ‘human’ use of the ‘environment’ by specifying allowable harm rather than adjudicating on mutually enhancing relations. This legal form fails to fulfil its purpose of prevention and remediation, and constitutes a significant barrier to overcoming world(s)-destroying conditions. As such, we take up the injunction for a ‘legal ontological turn’ so as to lay bare these assumptions, and to be able to move beyond their constraints into a renewed exploration at the intersection of vastly differing legalities. In dialogue with systems-grounded ecological jurisprudence(s), Indigenous legal thinking, and anthropological insight, we seek to ground future discussions towards building a truly earth-sustaining form of environmental law for all beings.

In the context of sustainable development, both developed and developing countries are implementing policies that encourage economic growth, environmental protection and social well-being in resource decisions. According to the 2012 Rio+20 Declaration, market-based instruments that complement regulations can offer an economically efficient push to sustainable growth. Market-based instruments, such as payments for ecosystem services (PES) and other market incentives, may play a crucial role in enhancing the livelihoods and wider well-being of poor people. However, for economic tools such as PES to prove valuable in managing natural resources, the decision-making and implementation processes must integrate adequate rights allocation and participatory mechanisms. This article examines forest ecosystem services in the context of the mangrove reserve forest of the Sundarbans in Bangladesh. It is a UNESCO World Heritage site and one of the largest remaining areas of mangroves in the world with an exceptional level of biodiversity. The article argues for a more realistic and equitable approach to PES projects in Bangladesh. It underscores the need for effective participatory tools, third-party monitoring and multi-service PES schemes to improve multiple mangrove ecosystem services in the Sundarbans.

The proper division of responsibility for environmental protection between national and state governments has long been the subject of fierce debate. During the 1970s the United States Congress decided to shift the most important environmental responsibilities from state governments to the federal government. The main reason for this decision was to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in that states competing for industries could otherwise be lax in implementing and enforcing federal environmental standards. Yet, some scholars have argued that there could just as easily be a ‘race to the top’ among states as they compete to attract people and businesses concerned with environmental protection. China, in turn, is plagued with severe air and water pollution and soil contamination, which is attributed largely to ineffective enforcement of its national environmental laws. This article investigates whether China’s experience confirms the race-to-the-bottom theory. It demonstrates that devolution of responsibility for environmental protection to lower levels of government tends to result in lax implementation and enforcement of national environmental laws, particularly where national governments also create strong incentives for economic growth. It concludes that China’s highly devolved system of environmental governance is consistent with this theory, even if it does not provide conclusive evidence of its correctness.

There is no definitive approach to assessing the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. In order to explore the regime established by the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution this article broadly integrates the approach to effectiveness taken by Peter H. Sand in The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, and Daniel Bodansky in The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law. The article finds that compliance, institutional, and normative effectiveness can be evaluated relatively confidently. An effectiveness assessment of the long-range transboundary air pollution (LRTAP) regime indicates that, on the whole, it has helped states to reach agreement on contentious issues and achieve results in air pollution reduction. However, it faces significant challenges with regard to participation, implementation procedures, empowerment of domestic stakeholders, and funding. The article provides an in-depth and up-to-date look at the LRTAP regime, including the most recent amendments and its relationship with European Union and international law.

This article examines the international legitimacy of unilateral dam development in an international watercourse from the perspective of international water law. Drawing upon technical analysis over the Harirud River Basin, the article discusses probable negative impacts of unilateral dam development in Afghanistan on downstream Iran and Turkmenistan. Competing claims are analyzed to assess emerging transboundary damage under customary international water law. Applying these insights to the case study, this article explores how legal norms and principles can contribute to transboundary water cooperation. It investigates how equitable and reasonable utilization, as required by the United Nations Watercourse Convention, could be reached and whether current activities are in conformity with international norms. Based on this analysis and in the light of international customary law, the article questions the compatibility of unilateral control and capture of water resources in Afghanistan, particularly through the Salma Dam, with ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ and ‘no significant harm’ rules. The article also argues that building the Salma Dam results in significant transboundary harm to downstream states. Hence, such harm could be considered as significant transboundary damage. Conclusions point to an understanding of water law as a form of institutional guidance in order to provide a transparent setting for transboundary water cooperation among riparian states.

The emergence of market mechanisms for the protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services in recent years has been portrayed by most conservation institutions and epistemological frameworks as an unprecedented opportunity for the conservation of nature. This article shifts the focus from the improved effectiveness arguments concerning such mechanisms to examine their institutional and political context and origins. It outlines the field of transnational biodiversity markets and uncovers the normative biases it displays. The regulatory vocabulary of ‘market mechanisms’ is juxtaposed to the more explicit ideological approach professed by the critics of neoliberalism. The argument is that, rather than an inevitable component in contemporary conservation governance, market mechanisms imply a set of contested choices for certain values, a particular economic development trajectory, a particular understanding of the biodiversity problem, and a weak role for legal obligations. Transnational environmental law needs to establish its interest beyond that of the regulation literature if it is to account for the proliferating movements around the world in favour of a reasserted normative guidance for the markets and against the process of marketing the market.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is conventionally understood as voluntary and market- based corporate behaviour without direct government involvement. The development of CSR in China challenges this understanding in the light of the growing role of government in promoting it. Over the past decade China has demonstrated a state-centric approach towards promoting CSR. Existing studies focus only on Chinese domestic CSR practices. However, with the rise of Chinese companies in Africa under China's ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, it is important to examine how the state-centric approach applies to the overseas CSR practice of Chinese companies. This article aims to fill the literature gap through in-depth interviews and analysis of the Standard Gauge Railway project in Kenya. It shows that close institutional, relational, and bureaucratic ties between the state and the business community give the Chinese government the power to influence the behaviour of Chinese state-owned enterprises overseas. The Chinese government can influence the CSR practices of Chinese companies overseas through mandating, facilitating, endorsing and partnering in order to minimize the negative externalities of companies’ overseas activities. However, the state-centric CSR approach limits the space for civil society engagement and the effectiveness of the approach abroad is constrained by a variety of institutional contexts and corporate ownership models.

On 10 April 2019 the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom delivered judgment in the case of Vedanta v. Lungowe, which concerned the liability of an English company for environmental damage caused by its subsidiary in Zambia. The decision confirms that English parent companies can owe a duty of care to foreign claimants affected by operations of their subsidiaries abroad and that the English courts may have jurisdiction to hear such cases, even when a foreign court is a more appropriate place for the trial. It establishes an important precedent for providing access to justice for foreign claimants in transnational corporate liability litigation. Given the global presence of English companies and the fact that their foreign subsidiaries have been involved in multiple cases of environmental damage in the host states, the decision could give an impetus to future claims being brought in the English courts. Also, the decision opens some interesting possibilities for climate change liability litigation against English parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries, as their cumulative greenhouse gas emissions are likely to be considerably higher than when taken separately, arguably making prospective claims against them more viable.

Many multilateral environmental agreements have adopted differentiated rules for different countries, based on the recognition of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDRs) of states. By establishing two rigid groups of countries with and without emissions reduction obligations, the intergovernmental climate regime represents the most extreme case of such differentiation. The regime has struggled to overcome this rigidity and the resulting political deadlock between developing and developed countries. Transnational climate governance (TCG) initiatives have emerged as an alternative to provide mitigation, adaptation or finance outside the multilateral process. By drawing on synergies between public and private actors, it is hoped that they overcome the paralysis of the intergovernmental process. Yet, they take place in the same world of unequal peers, with different levels of capacity and responsibility for climate change. This article investigates the extent to which such TCG initiatives reflect the CBDR principle. Do different types of initiative – involving different types of actor or with different climate-related goals – address differentiation in distinct ways? Does taking account of CBDRs affect the membership of transnational initiatives? This article explores these questions empirically by analyzing a sample of TCG initiatives in terms of how they include differential treatment of states and non-state members. It concludes that TCG initiatives address differentiation in a pragmatic way. Most frequently, they either offer participants flexibility in how to implement their commitments, or provide support to members from developing countries. Such support is, so far, still insufficient to address the limited involvement of developing country actors.

Resilience thinking – an approach for understanding and managing change – is increasingly central to climate change adaptation law and policy. Yet the influence of adaptation law and policy on the distribution of climate impacts is often overlooked in studies of socio-ecological resilience to climate change. This article demonstrates how environmental justice scholarship helps to address this gap in the literature relating to adaptation law and resilience. Drawing on existing literature, the article identifies four principles to promote resilience and justice through climate adaptation laws. Climate adaptation laws must (i) prepare for, and respond to, change; (ii) address the distributive effects of climate change and adaptation; (iii) promote participation in adaptation processes; and (iv) cross sectors and scales. Each criterion can be implemented in part through existing legal processes, but might also be further supported by incremental law reform. Developing both resilience and justice dimensions will enhance the effectiveness of adaptation laws in addressing climate impacts.

Differential treatment in international environmental law is the broader manifestation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDRs). It reflects equity concerns that have underlain most environmental debates on a North-South basis for several decades. Over the past two decades, various forms of differentiation have been introduced in environmental law instruments to the point where it has become an essential element of any international environmental agreement. At the same time, differential treatment has been the object of sustained criticism, arguing that it should be temporary, that it fails to target beneficiaries appropriately, and undermines environmental outcomes. This article takes the opposite view and argues that differentiation remains crucial in a world where widespread inequalities remain. Beneficiaries need to be identified on the basis of environmental and social indicators and differentiation should constitute the basis on which environmental measures are adopted. Worsening environmental conditions and an evolving global context call for adding new elements to the existing framework for differentiation. This requires thinking beyond the current structure centred around nation states and conceptualizing differentiation around common heritage equity. It also requires expanding differentiation beyond the field of environmental law, to include all areas of sustainable development law. Further, differential treatment needs to be implemented in a way that benefits the most disadvantaged in every country. These measures are necessary to foster a vibrant international environmental law which addresses the equity needs of all states in years to come.

This paper traces back the efforts, in particular in Europe, to promote transnational legal provisions which grant a right of access to environmental information. Initiatives in the 1970s failed to establish a fundamental right to a clean environment. However, the establishment of fundamental procedural rights of access to information, participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters has been more successful – culminating in the 1998 Aarhus Convention. This paper describes the – until now unsuccessful – attempts to extend the territorial scope of application of the Aarhus Convention to non-European countries and regions, and ultimately the conclusion of a global convention on access to environmental information.

Formally adopted in 2012, environmental public interest litigation in China has expanded standing beyond individual rights by granting administrative authorities, procuratorates, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the ability to initiate environmental public interest litigation (PIL). However, the aims of enhancing the enforcement of environmental regulation and the development of the ‘objective legality’ model through civil society have not been met. This is as a result of administrative authorities and procuratorates being granted standing, which inhibits NGOs from initiating their own PIL in line with the aims of the ‘objective legality’ model. In order to promote participation by civil society and its actors in environmental law enforcement, NGOs should be granted preferential standing in environmental PIL. To this end, the current requirements for NGOs to be granted standing should be relaxed, and the standing granted to administrative authorities and procuratorates should be limited or removed.

Three sets of social institutions deal with catastrophic risk: government regulation through rule making, the market, and civil liability. Climate disasters expose the limitations of all of these social institutions and often result in extensive uncompensated losses, particularly in developing countries. The author proposes the establishment of a fossil fuel-funded Climate Disaster Response Fund to compensate victims for the ‘residual’ risk of climate disasters in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. This Fund, established under the UNFCCC’s Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts, would comprise levies placed on the world’s top 200 fossil fuel companies. This proposal is modelled on various domestic and international funds which have been established to overcome the difficulties posed by tort law and which require companies to pay for the hazardous consequences of their activities and products. Precedents include funds to compensate for the damage caused by toxic chemicals, oil pollution spills, asbestos and nuclear accidents.

The law and regulation of the energy sector in Australia is subject to overlapping responsibilities of both federal and state governments. Crucially for energy transition efforts, neither energy, environment nor climate is mentioned in the Australian Constitution. Australia has a tradition of creative cooperative federalism solutions for responding to problems of national importance. In the energy sector this has resulted in an intricate national framework for energy markets, which relies on mirror legislation passed by participating states, with oversight by state and federal executive governments. Independently of these frameworks, both federal and state governments have passed climate change legislation, which crucially includes renewable energy support mechanisms. At a time when a rapid transition to a decarbonized energy system is essential, legal frameworks struggle to respond in a timely fashion. The political discourse around energy has become increasingly toxic – reflecting a dysfunctional state–federal relationship in energy and climate law. Australia needs to consider whether its cooperative federalism solutions are sufficient to support the energy transition and how climate law at the state and federal levels interacts with energy market legal frameworks.