Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 July 2016
From the beginning of the Divine Comedy — ‘where the sun is silent’ — to the final vision of light, the poem is a carefully ordered hierarchy of light and shadows. We are not only asked to see clearly but we are asked to see qualitatively, to distinguish degrees of light and kinds of vision. It is in the last canto of the Paradiso that the degree of light is most intense and that our attention is called to a unique kind of seeing. With extraordinary insistence, Dante repeats some form of the verb vedere (to see) or a derivative there-of every few lines. The transition from time to eternity and from the finite to the infinite makes all the more sophisticated resources of language inadequate, and one must revert to a childlike form of emphasis, mere repetitions. This simplest of rhetorical devices is, by some miracle of art, adequate for the expression of the most unimaginable of possible experiences. In every line we feel something of Dante's joy in the possession of a ‘novella vista’ and his rapture in the divine vision, an effect conveyed by the very struggle to express the inexpressible. The struggles of course are those of Dante the pilgrim; Dante the poet is in perfect control of his artistic resources, and it is through the masterly rendering of inadequacy that the whole presentation becomes — paradoxically — adequate.
1 Baeumker, Clemens, Witelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts (his Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 3.2; Münster 1908) 358ff. 2 Edgar de Bruyne, Études d'esthétique médiévale (Bruges 1946) III 17ff.Google Scholar
3 Baeumker, , Witelo 362ff.Google Scholar
4 St. Augustine, De genesi ad litteram 4.28.45 (PL 34.315). Google Scholar
5 Baeumker, , Witelo 362–372.Google Scholar
6 St. Augustine, Soliloquia 1.8.15 (PL 32.877): ‘Ergo quo modo in hoc sole tria quaedam licet animadvertere, quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat: ita in i llo secretissimo Deo, quem vis intelligere, tria quaedam sunt, quod est, quod intelligitur et quod cetera facit intelligi.’ Google Scholar
7 Ibid. 1.1.3 (PL 32.870): ‘Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo et per quem intelligibiliter lucent quae intelligibiliter lucent omnia.’Google Scholar
8 Cf. Baeumker, , Witelo 377.Google Scholar
9 St. Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum 20.7 (PL 42.372): ‘Quando enim discrevistis lucem qua cernimus ab ea luce qua intelligimus? … Et tamen etiam hoc lumen [i.e., intelligibile] non est lumen illud quod Deus est. Hoc enim creatura est, creator ille; hoc factum, ille qui fecit.’ Also, De gen. ad litt. liber imperfectas 5.20 (PL 34.228), where St. Augustine: distinguishes between uncreated light and created light whether corporeal or incorporeal; ‘Alia est lux de Deo nata, et alia lux quam fecit Deus: nata de Deo lux, est ipsa Dei Sapientia; facta vero lux est qualibet mutabilis sive corporea sive incorporea.’ Google Scholar
10 Ibid. 5.21: ‘Et fortasse quod quaerunt homines, quando angeli facti sunt, ipsi significantur hac luce, brevissime quidem tamen convenientissime et decentissime.’ Cf. Baeumker, Witelo 374–5.Google Scholar
11 St. Augustine, De libero arbitrio 3.5.16 (PL 32.1279). Google Scholar
12 For an excellent study of Augustinian light speculation with special reference to his theory of knowledge, see Regis Jolivet, Dieu, soleil des esprits, la doctrine augustinienne de l'illumination (Paris 1933). Cf. for sui generis light, De Trinitate 12.15.24 (PL 42.1011). Google Scholar
13 Bruyne, De, op. cit. III 17–18. See also Crombie, A. C., Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100–1700 (Oxford 1953) 91–134, for a thorough treatment of the scientific importance of light speculation, and also Crombie's Augustine to Galileo: The History of Science, A.D. 400–1650, (London 1952) 19–43. The bibliographical material in the Grosseteste volume is most complete. Concerning Grosseteste's interest in light metaphysics Crombie says: ‘The analogy between the corporeal lux, whose mathematical laws he held to underlie the operations of physical things, and this spiritual lux gave an additional force and interest to Grosseteste's belief that the study of geometrical optics was the key to knowledge of the natural world, and it must be reckoned among the reasons for the popularity of optics and mathematical science in the Oxford school’ (131). Grosseteste claimed that it was by divine illumination that man had certain knowledge of reality, in this following St. Augustine. Crombie refers to the following series of traditional analogies Grosseteste makes between corporeal and spiritual light: it illustrates the relationship between the persons of the Trinity, the operation of grace on free will, which is like light shining through colored glass, the nature of the relationship between the various orders in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the bishop for example ‘reflecting’ power to the clergy like a mirror. Crombie adds: ‘With some of his followers in Oxford the physical science of optics became a method of arriving at a sort of analogical knowledge of spiritual reality and truth.’ From a more philosophical and theological point of view the general treatment of light metaphysics in volume two of Ueberweg-Heinze's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie is perhaps the best, by Bernhard Geyer, Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie (Basel 1951; reprinted without change from the 1927 edition) 287–325, 357–380.Google Scholar
14 Bruyne, De, op. cit. III 18. The De intelligentiis was first attributed to Witelo by Baeumker (1908) and dated about the third quarter of the thirteenth century. This attribution was later (1924) withdrawn and the date of the work moved back to about Grosseteste's period, or the first few decades of the century. Some manuscripts indicate that the work may be by an Adam Pulchra Mulier or Adam Mulier Pulcherrima and that it originated in Paris. The book, in any case, enjoyed considerable circulation. See Baeumker's article, ‘Zur Frage nach Abfassungszeit und Verfasser des irrtümlich Witelo zugeschriebenen Liber de intelligentiis’ Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle I (Studi e testi 37; Rome 1924) 87–102.Google Scholar
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16 St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent. d. 13 q.1 a.3 (vol. 8 Fretté). Google Scholar
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18 St. Thomas Aquinas, Quodl. 6 q.11 a.19 contr. 1 (vol. 15 Fretté, which contains all of the Quaestiones quodlibetales). ‘… liber de intelligentiis non sit auctoritatis alicujus; nec etiam verum sit quod omnis influxus sit ratione lucis, nisi lux metaphorice accipiatur pro omni actu, prout omne agens agit in quantum est ens actu.’ Google Scholar
19 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1, q. 1, art. 9. (The citations from the Summa Theologiae are from vols. 4–12 of the Leonine edition of the Opera omnia in course of preparation, 16 vols., Rome 1882–1948.) Google Scholar
20 St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. prol. q.1, 5c. 3 and ad 3 (vol. 7 Fretté). Google Scholar
21 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentarium in II libros Aristotelis Posteriorum Analyticorum 1.1 (vol. 22 p. 105 Fretté). On the conflict between scholasticism and poetry in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. from German by Trask, Willard R. (London 1953) 203–227, 480–484. Cf. St. Thomas, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis commentaria nn. 61–63 (ed. M.-R. Cathala [3rd ed. Turin 1935]), where he comments on Aristotle's remark that the poets maintain that the gods are jealous of men (1.2.12–14 [982d-983a]). Thomas says that the poets were liars in this as they were about many other things, as the ‘common proverb goes’: ‘Sed poetae non solum in hoc, sed in multis aliis mentiuntur, sicut dicitur in proverbio vulgari’ (n. 63),Google Scholar
22 Liber de intelligentiis 6 (ed. Baeumker in Witelo p. 8): ‘Prima substantiarum est lux. Hoc manifestari potest per auctoritatem beati Augustini in II super Genes. ad litteram dicentis [the author means to cite De genesi ad litt. 4.28.45 (PL 34.315)], quod Deus non dicitur lux, sicut dicitur agnus; dicitur enim agnus translative et non proprie, lux autem dicitur proprie et non translative.’Google Scholar
23 Ibid.: ‘Manifestari etiam potest per hoc quod ipsius est natura una, per prius et posterius secundum magis et minus participat; et hoc est in eis maxime divinum et nobile, quod autem in istis sensibilibus apparentibus maxime est nobile, hoc est lux …’Google Scholar
24 Ibid. 7 (p. 8): ‘Omnis substantia influens in aliam est lux in essentia vel naturam lucis habens … Si enim a substantia prima est influentia in omnibus aliis, omnis autem substantia influens in aliam est lux in essentia vel naturam lucis habens: …’Google Scholar
25 Fr. Bartholomaeus de Bononia, Tractatus de luce 4.7, in Antonianum 7 (1932 [the edition, with annotations by Irenaeus, P. Squadrani, O.F.M., occupies pp. 227–238, 337–376, 465–494 of the volume]) 478.Google Scholar
26 Ibid. 4.7 (p. 479).Google Scholar
27 Ibid. 4.1 (pp. 370–71).Google Scholar
28 Ibid. 4.1 (p. 371): ‘Sicut autem lux haec conciliat et ad quandam amicitiam reducit illas maioris mundi principales partes, quae ad invicem contrarietatem habent, scilicet quattuor elementa, ita etiam per lucem divinam, postquam fuerit in mentem per adventum gratiae recepta, ad amicitiam et conciliationem reducit minoris mundi, scilicet hominis, principales partes, carnem scilicet et spiritum, ad invicem rebellionem ac pugnam habentes.’Google Scholar
29 Ibid. 4.4 (p. 469).Google Scholar
30 Ibid. 4.4 (p. 470).Google Scholar
31 De intelligentiis (cited supra n. 22) 8 (p. 9).Google Scholar
32 Magnus, Albertus, De causis et processu universitatis 2.1.25 (vol. 10, p. 475b in Borgnet). (The citations from Albert are from the Opera omnia, ed. by Augustus Borgnet, 38 vols., Paris 1890–1899). See Baeumker, , Witelo 407–414, for the inconsistencies in Albert's thought brought about by the conflict between his Christian theism on the one hand and his Neo-Platonism on the other. The De intellectu et intelligibili in vol. 9 and the commentaries on the works of Pseudo-Dionysius in vol. 14 are the works in which Albert presents his speculations on the metaphysics of light.Google Scholar
33 De causis et proc. univers. 1.4.5 (p. 419a).Google Scholar
34 Bruyne, De, op. cit. III 21 note 4.Google Scholar
35 De intelligentiis 8 (p. 9, 10): ‘Unaquaeque substantia habens magis de luce quam alia dicitur nobilior ipsa … nobilitas vero in omnibus attenditur secundum appropinquitatem maiorem et participationem esse divini.’Google Scholar
36 Ibid. 9 (p. 11): ‘Lux in omni vivente est principium motus et vitae calore disponente. Natura lucis est in omnibus; non tamen in omnibus operatur motum et vitam; et defectus est ex parte materiae Google Scholar
37 Grosseteste, , De luce (ed. Baur, L., in Baeumker's Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 9 [Münster 1912] 51–59) p. 51: ‘Lux … per se in omnem partem se ipsam diffundit, ita ut a puncto lucis sphera lucis quamvis magna generetur nisi obsistat umbrosum … Atqui lucem esse proposui, cuius per se est haec operatio: scilicet per se ipsam multiplicare et in omnem partem subito diffundere.’Google Scholar
38 De intelligentiis 9 (p. 11).Google Scholar
39 Bruyne, De, op. cit. III 19.Google Scholar
40 Grosseteste, , De luce, loc. cit. (supra n. 37). 41 Ibid. Google Scholar
42 St. Bonaventura, In II Sent. d. 12 art. 2 quest. 1 (vol. 2 p. 318a Quarracchi). Google Scholar
43 Ibid. d. 12 a.2 q.2 arg.4 (p. 304b.)Google Scholar
44 Ibid. d.13 a.2 q.2 (p. 320b).Google Scholar
45 Ibid. d.13 a.2 q.2 (p. 321a).Google Scholar
46 Ibid. d.13 a.2 q.2 (p. 321a).Google Scholar
47 Ibid. d.12 a.2 ad.5 (p. 321b).Google Scholar
48 De intelligentiis 8 (p. 10).Google Scholar
49 Ibid. 9 (p. 12). Cf. Aristotle's conception of the generative powers of the sun in De coelo 2.12 (292b.28–30). In the De intelligentiis we also read that this light emanating from the empyrean is a divine power or causes a divine power because of which it can ‘vivify’; cf. cap. 9 (p. 12), referring to the light of the empyrean: ‘quae lux diffusa vel est virtus divina vel deferens virtutem divinam, propter quam ipsa habet virtutem vivificativam.’Google Scholar
50 St. Bonaventura, In II Sent. d.13 a.2 q.2 f.4 (p. 319a). Google Scholar
51 Idem, IV Sent. d.19 dub.3 (vol. 4 p. 496 a).Google Scholar
52 Idem, II Sent. d.15 a.1 q.3 f.2 ad oppos. (vol. 2 p. 379b).Google Scholar
53 Ibid. d.14 p.1 a.3 q.3 (p. 348b).Google Scholar
54 Bartholomew of Bologna, Tract. de luce (cited supra n. 25) 4.4 (p. 467). 55 Cf. Baeumker, , Witelo 401ff.Google Scholar
56 De intelligentiis 9 (p. 13): ‘… sive sit lux corporea, sive incorporea; semper enim est multiplicativa sui et suae virtutis in aliud.’Google Scholar
57 E.g., the following passage from Bartholomew, in which he says that all created things depend on Christ just as lumen, radius and splendor depend on lux (1.2 [p. 235] on Christus lux): ‘Est etiam stabilissimum, et sic non cadit circa ipsum fluxibilitas; et absolutissimum, et sic non cadit in eo ulla dependentia, imo potius ab ipso dependet quaelibet alia natura creata, quemadmodum a luce dependet aliorum trium natura, scilicet radii, luminis et splendoris, ut ostensum est supra.’ The imagery suggests emanation of all things from the Son, but it is clear that he is using a corporeal exemplar to explain a theological truth. Baeumker says that the De intelligentiis does not follow out the pantheistic tendencies implicit in its doctrine and that the emanationism it propounds is not ‘substantial’ or ‘inherent.’ Its emanationism is sicut in deferente. However, there is a community of being between the divine light and the light of the universe. See Witelo 603 and 432 n.3. Google Scholar
58 St. Bonaventura, In II Sent. d.13 a.1 q.1 obj.3 (p. 311b): ‘… lux de spiritualibus et corporalibus dicitur proprie, magis tamen proprie de spiritualibus quam de corporalibus, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram. Propriissime enim Deus lux est, et quae ad ipsum magis accedunt, plus habent de natura lucis.’ Google Scholar
59 Ibid. d.13 a.2 q.1 ad 4 (p. 318a). Spiritual light whether created or uncreated is fully actual: ‘spiritualis lux in omnimoda actualitate.’Google Scholar
60 Ibid. d.13 a.2 q.2 f.2 (p. 319a): ‘Lux inter omnia corporalia maxime assimilatur luci aeternae, sicut ostendit Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus, et maxime in virtute et efficacia.’Google Scholar
61 Bartholomew, , Tract. de luce 2.2 (p. 349): ‘Ad evidentiam autem aliorem trium modorum quibus descendunt mentales illuminationes ab hac prima luce, notandum est pro unoquoque illorum modorum materiale exemplum de emanatione materialium luminum.’Google Scholar
62 Ibid. Google Scholar
63 Bartholomew's elaborations of light analogies are the most fanciful of all: e.g., in 1.3 (p. 236) he says that Christ chose to be born in Jerusalem because it is the center of the world, in order that the doctrine of salvation might ‘radiate’ out from a ‘central source.’ Google Scholar
64 An unpublished manuscript of Grosseteste's Hexaemeron, London, B.M., Royal MS 6.E.v, fol. 147v, cited in De Bruyne, op. cit. III 23. Google Scholar
65 St. Bonaventura, Comment. in Sapientiam 7.10 (vol. 6 p. 153b Quaracchi). Google Scholar
66 Bartholomew of Bologna, Tract. de luce 4.4 (pp. 467–68). Google Scholar
67 Ibid. 4.5 (p. 472): ‘… quanto enim lucis subiectum magis exaltatur versus caelum, tanto, ceteris paribus, lucis natura decorat ipsum. Abundantius enim decoratur a luce ipsum empyreum quam cristallinum, et cristallinum quam stellatum. Per maiorem in eo lucis aggregationem, ut patet in sole respectu aliarum stellarum, et in aliis stellis respectu aliarum partium orbis.’Google Scholar
68 De intelligentiis 10 (p. 14): ‘Proprium et primum principium cognitionis est lux. Si autem exordium cognitionis inspexerimus, dicemus: lux est ipsa virtus cognoscitiva. Principium cognitionis est lux, sensitivae autem operationis calor.’ Google Scholar
69 Ibid. 11 (p. 15): ‘Omnis substantia cognoscitiva quanto lux purior est et simplicior, tanto magis in ea apparent rerum species, et potentia eius se extendit ad plura. Si enim luci debetur virtus cognoscitiva: quanto simplicior est et purior, magis cognoscet et magis rerum species apparebunt in ea; sicut in speculo materiali quanto magis politum est et tersum, tanto magis in eo apparent imagines.’ Google Scholar
70 Ibid. 12 (p. 16): ‘Lux inter omnia apprehensioni est maxime delectabile, secundum vero naturam calor. Quod est quia maxima delectatio est in conjunctione convenientis cum convenienti, ergo, si subiectum cognitionis vel virtus cognoscitiva est lux, ex unione lucis exterioris cum ipsa erit delectatio maxima.’Google Scholar
71 Ibid.: ‘visus inter omnes sensus maxime habet de actione animali et maxime cognoscitivus est … operatio autem visus fit mediante luce, et ipsa lux maxime delectabilis est. unde Plato beneficium oculorum ostendens dixit: “Quibus carentes debiles caecique maestam vitam lugubremque agunt” [Timaeus 47B].’ Delectatio is Aristotelian hedonē, or Italian piacenza and piacimento. These terms have both an objective and subjective meaning. Subjectively they mean pleasure, but objectively they mean beauty or that which pleases. See Witelo's Perspectiva in Baeumker's Witelo 172–174, esp. p. 172 (‘Fit enim placentia animae, quae pulchritudo dicitur’).Google Scholar
72 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. 1–2 q.27 a.1. 73 Ibid. 1–2 q.27 a.2. Google Scholar
74 Ibid. 1–2 q.4 a.4 ad 4.Google Scholar
75 De intelligentiis 18 (p. 23): ‘Amor in eodem naturaliter antecedit cognitionem; perficitur tamen per cognitionem et deliberationem … delectatio autem vel amor est complementum appetitus, sed rationalis appetitus amor, cuiuscunque vero delectatio, nec tamen omnino amor completus est, nisi participetur; et ideo per cognitionem et deliberationem perficitur, non quia cognitio sit complementum amoris, sed quia ex cognitione multiplicatur et viget in se ipso, cognitio enim ordinat appetitum cum suo appetibili, in qua unione perficitur, amor et delectatio; ex cognitione enim perficitur amor; non tamen cognitio est perfectio eius, sed potius e contrario; ad delectationem enim et amorem ordinatur cognitio. Unde sicut actus prior est potentia in eodem, sed incomplete, potentia tamen ab actu perficitur: ita et amor in eodem antecedit cognitionem, sed incompletus; per cognitionem vero postea in se ipso multiplicatur et cognitionem perficit et in se ipso perficitur.’ Google Scholar
76 Baeumker, , Witelo 512–513.Google Scholar
77 De intelligentiis 19 (p. 24): ‘Delectatio enim est ex coniunctione convenientis cum convenienti, quae coniunctio vel unio fit per appetitum naturalem in substantia non congnoscente, per desiderium et amorem in substantia sensibili, per voluntatem in rationali. unde appetitus, desiderium vel voluntas media sunt per quae ordinantur vel unitur potentia activa cum exemplari. ex ea unione relinquitur delectatio …’Google Scholar
78 Baeumker, , Witelo 24.Google Scholar
79 St. Bonaventura, In II Sent. d.13 a.1 q.1 ad 3 (p. 313a). Google Scholar
80 Tuitiensis, Rupertus, In Genesin 1.11 (PL 167.207): ‘Nec vero pro similitudine, sed pro re vera lucem dicimus appellatam [sc. angelicam naturam], id est non ideo quod similitudinem visibilis lucis habet. Nam ista potius visibilis lux, haec astra visibilia secundum similitudinem lucis illius sunt facta, ut cognoscat spiritualis homo, sic sanctos angelos in eadem felicitate differentis esse honoris et gloriae sicut “stella differt a stella in claritate” [1 Cor. 15.41], sic eos in comparatione solis aeterni, scilicet creatoris sui, veram lucem non esse, sicut stellae circa solem in toto hemisphaerio nequeunt suum lumen ostendere.’Google Scholar
81 Purg. 14.145. Quotation and translation from The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri by Sinclair, John D. (3 vols., New York 1948). Quel fu il duro camo che dovria l'uom tener dentro a sua meta. Ma voi prendete l'esca, sì che l'amo dell’ antico avversaro a sè vi tira; e però poco val freno o richiamo. Chiamavi ‘l cielo e'ntorno vi si gira, mostrandovi le sue bellezze eterne, e l'occhio vostro pur a terra mira; onde vi batte chi tutto discerne.Google Scholar
82 St. Bonaventura, Sermones de tempore, Dominica i Albis, Serm. 1.2 (vol. 9 p. 290 Quaracchi). Google Scholar
83 Cap. 1 (ed. Bardenhewer, O., Die Pseudo-Aristotelische Schrift über das reine Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de causis [Freiburg in Breisgau 1882] 164).Google Scholar
84 Ibid. 5 (p. 168).Google Scholar
85 Joannes Scotus Eriugena, Super Ierarchiam caelestem Dionysii S. 1.1 (PL 122.128D). 86 Cf. De causis 19 (pp. 181–182 Bardenhewer). Google Scholar
87 Maurice de Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, trans. by Messenger, E. C., I (London 1952) 104.Google Scholar
88 Areopagita, Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia 3.1,2 (PG 3.164D-165A and 165B). Cf. also Epist. 10 (PG 3.1117A-1120A).Google Scholar
89 Dionysius, , De divinis nominibus 4.1 (PG 3.693B).Google Scholar
90 Ibid. 4.4 (PG 3.697B-700C, esp. 700B). Paragraph numbers are given in the text.Google Scholar
91 Ibid. 4.5 (700C-701A).Google Scholar
92 Ibid. 4.7 (701C).Google Scholar
93 Ibid. 4.7 (704A-704B).Google Scholar
94 Ibid. 4.8 (704D).Google Scholar
95 Bruyne, De, op. cit. III 37, 58ff. See also Ven. Thomas abbas Vercellensis Sancti Andreae Ord. Bened, S., Commentarius Hierarchicus in Canticum Canticorum, in Pez, B. and Hueber, P. (eds.), Thesaurus anecdotorum novissimus … II (Augsburg and Graz 1721) 1.504–690.Google Scholar
96 Bruyne, De, op. cit. III 65, 66, 60.Google Scholar
97 In an appendix to his edition of Bartholomew's Tractatus de luce, Squadrani has edited the Sermo in nativitate Domini fratris Bartholomaei de Bononia (op. cit. [supra n.25] 488ff.). Here we read: ‘… videtur lux increata per nudam et revelativam inspectionem, scilicet in patria, ubi pupilla oculi Sanctorum facta est aquilina (et) videt solem in sua rota…. Secundo modo Verbum exponit se nobis visibile … in assumpta humanitate…. Tertius modus videndi illud Verbum est per speculum, et isto modo lux increata exponit se nobis visibile in quolibet creato. (p. 489). On the spiritual senses see Karl Rahner, ‘La doctrine des “sens spirituels” au moyen âge, en particulier chez saint Bonaventure,’ Revue d'ascétique et de mystique 14 (1933) 263–299. and ‘Le début d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origène,’ ibid. 13 (1932) 113–145.Google Scholar
98 Conv. 3.7.2–3 (all citations from the Convivio are from the Opere di Dante in an extensively commented edition begun under the direction of Michele Barbi and still in progress: Il Convivio, ridotto a miglior lezione e commentato da Busnelli, G. e Vandelli, G. con introduzione di Michele Barbi [2 vols. Firenze 1934, 1937]. Volume I has books I to III and vol. II has book IV).Google Scholar
99 Liber de causis (pp. 181–2 Bardenhewer).Google Scholar
100 Busnelli and Vandelli in their edition of the Convivio (I 460–463) cite appropriate passages from Albertus in Appendix III to book III, esp. De intellectu et intelligibili 1.1, tr. 3, 2 (vol. 9 p. 499f. Borgnet). Google Scholar
101 Conv. 3.7.3–4.Google Scholar
102 Conv. 3.7.5.Google Scholar
103 Conv. 3.7.6.Google Scholar
104 Conv. 3.7.6–7.Google Scholar
105 Aristotle, , Ethics 7.1.2 (1145a).Google Scholar
106 Conv. 3.7.7.Google Scholar
107 Conv. 3.7.8.Google Scholar
108 Conv. 8.3.Google Scholar
109 Conv. 3.8.11.Google Scholar
110 Conv. 3.8.8.Google Scholar
111 Conv. 3.8.9. He cites the passage from the De partibus animalium 3.10 (673a) in Epist. 10.26 (504–5 in Moore) and Vita Nuova II (42–4 Moore).Google Scholar
112 Conv. 3.12.6–8.Google Scholar
118 Conv. 4.22.17.Google Scholar
114 Conv. 3.14.4–6.Google Scholar
115 Conv. 2.6.9. Cf. 3.14.4 above.Google Scholar
116 Conv. 2.3.8–10.Google Scholar
117 Conv. 3.2.14.Google Scholar
118 Conv. 4.1.11.Google Scholar
119 Conv. 1.11.3–4.Google Scholar
120 Ep. 10.21 (lines 375ff.): ‘quia ex eo quod causa secunda recipit a prima, influit super causatum ad modum recipientis et repercutientis radium, propter quod causa prima est magis causa. Et hoc dicitur in libro De Causis, quod “omnis causa primaria plus influit super suum causatum, quam causa universalis secunda.” Sed hoc quantum ad esse.’ (All citations and translations from the letter to Can Grande [Ep. 10] are from Dantis Alagherii Epistolae, The Letters of Dante, Emended text with introduction, translation, notes and indices and appendix on the Cursus, by Paget Toynbee [Oxford 1920].)Google Scholar
121 Ep. 10.21 (lines 400ff.): ‘Propter quod patet quod omnis essentia et virtus procedat a prima, et intelligentiae inferiores recipiant quasi a radiante, et reddant radios superiores ad suum inferius, ad modum speculorum. Quod satis aperte videtur Dionysius de coelesti hierarchia loquens. Et propter hoc dicitur in libro De Causis quod “omnis intelligentia est plena formis.” Patet ergo quomodo ratio manifestat divinum lumen, id est divinam bonitatem, sapientiam et virtutem, resplendere ubique.’ The phrase ‘omnis intelligentia est plena formis’ is to be understood in the light of the principle that the effect is contained eminently in the cause, and that the possession of causality, of spontaneous efficacy and force, belongs preeminently to spiritual beings.Google Scholar
122 Ep. 10.23 (lines 427ff.): ‘Bene ergo dictum est, quum dicit quod divinus radius, seu divina gloria, “per universum penetrat et resplendet”: penetrat quantum ad essentiam; resplendet quantum ad esse. Quod autem subicit de magis et minus habet veritatem in manifesto, quoniam videmus in aliquo excellentiori gradu essentiam aliquam, aliquam vero in inferiori; ut patet de coelo et elementis, quorum quidem illud incorruptibile, illa vero corruptibilia sunt.’Google Scholar
123 Cf. Geyer, , op. cit. (supra n. 13) 549–51.Google Scholar
124 Ep. 10.24 (lines 437ff.): ‘Et postquam praemisit hanc veritatem, prosequitur ab ea, circumloquens Paradisum; et dicit quod fuit in coelo illo quod de gloria Dei, sive de luce, recipit affluentius. Propter quod sciendum quod illud coelum est coelum supremum, continens corpora universa, et a nullo contentum, intra quod omnia corpora moventur (ipso in sempiterna quiete permanente), a nulla corporali substantia virtutem recipiens. Et dicitur empyreum, quod est idem quod coelum igne sive ardore flagrans; non quod in eo sit ignis vel ardor materialis, sed spiritualis, qui est amor sanctus sive caritas.’Google Scholar
125 Ep. 10. 25 (lines 453ff.): ‘Quod autem de divina luce plus recipiat, potest probari per duo. Primo per suum omnia continere et a nullo contineri; secundo per sempiternam suam quietem sive pacem. Quantum ad primum probatur sic: Continens se habet ad contentum in naturali situ sicut formativum ad formabile, ut habetur in quarto Physicorum. Sed in naturali situ totius universi primum coelum est omnia continens; ergo se habet ad omnia sicut formativum ad formabile; quod est se habere per modum causae. Et quum omnis vis causandi sit radius quidam profluens a prima causa, quae Deus est, manifestum est quod illud coelum quod magis habet rationem causae, magis de luce divina recipit.’Google Scholar
126 Cf. De caelo 3.2 and 4.3, 4. Google Scholar
127 Ep. 10.26 (lines 471ff.): ‘Quantum ad secundum probatur sic: omne quod movetur, movetur propter aliquid quod non habet, quod est terminus sui motus; sicut coelum lunae movetur propter aliquam partem sui, quae non habet illud ubi ad quod movetur; et quia sui pars quaelibet non adepto quolibet ubi (quod est impossibile) movetur ad aliud, inde est quod semper movetur et nunquam quiescit, et est eius appetitus. Et quod dico de coelo lunae, intelligendum est de omnibus praeter primum. Omne ergo quod movetur, est in aliquo defectu, et non habet totum suum esse simul. Illud igitur coelum quod a nullo movetur, in se et in qualibet sui parte habet quidquid potest modo perfecto, ita quod motu non indiget ad suam perfectionem. Et quum omnis perfectio sit radius primi, quod est in summo gradu perfectionis, manifestum est quod coelum primum magis recipit de luce Primi, qui est Deus … Sic ergo patet quod quum dicit “in illo coelo quod plus de luce Dei recipit.” intelligit circumloqui Paradisum, sive coelum empyreum.’Google Scholar
128 Ep. 10.27 (lines 510ff): ‘Praemissis quoque rationibus consequenter dicit Philosophus in primo De Coelo quod coelum “tanto habet honorabiliorum materiam istis inferioribus, quanto magis elongatum est ab his quae hic.” Adhuc etiam posset adduci quod dicit Apostolus ad Ephesios de Christo: “Qui ascendit super omnes coelos ut impleret omnis.” Hoc est coelum deliciarum Domini; de quibus deliciis dicitur contra Luciferum per Ezechielem: “Tu signaculum similitudinis, sapientia plenus et perfectione decorus, in deliciis Paradisi Dei fuisti.”’Google Scholar