This paper traces the evolution of employment relations in the U.S. auto industry over the post World War II period with particular emphasis on recent developments. There is a strong movement toward growing variation in employment relations within both the assembly and parts sectors of the auto industry. Variation appears both through the spread of more contingent compensation and team systems of work organization. There is also wide variety across plants and industry segments in basic employment systems including low wage, human resource, Japanese-oriented, and joint team-based approaches. Declining unionization is a particularly strong influence in the parts sector although nonunion operations have now spread to the assembly sector. While these trends are well illustrated by developments in the auto industry, they are trends common to other parts of the U.S. economy.

This paper examines the different types of ideological positions (welfarist, realist, and socialist) and, by extension, the roles that trade unions may adopt in the future. It suggests that a distinction can be made between what trade unions should be, by definition, and what they can be as we move into the 21st Century. It argues that the optimum role that trade unions can assume is one in which they are autonomous, yet choose to work in close partnership with a state which is dedicated to improving the welfare of the citizenry. The rationale for this argument is that a strong state is in a position to garner support for beneficial development programs, while autonomous trade unions can ensure that the interest of members are factored into state policies, even as they seek to enhance their voice and ownership at workplace level. The Singapore case is used as a template to support the arguments generated in this paper.

This paper describes the new approaches the German automobile industry has developed during the last four years. It deals with product strategy, production concepts, work organization, industrial relations and technology. In the automobile industry, team concepts and groupwork have been the most important innovations in increasing efficiency. There are two fundamentally different approaches to team work The concept of ‘structurally conservative groupwork’ is a more or less modernized version of Taylorism. The job descriptions of production workers remain narrow, there is not much work autonomy and no reprofessionalization. By contrast, ‘structurally innovative groupwork’ builds on the specific assets of the German industrial order: the tradition of craft work (Facharbeiter), the strong focus on qualified, self-directed work, and the consensus orientation in the field of industrial relations.

This paper argues that the future direction for the development of Korean industrial relations will evolve through direct interaction between employers and trade unions (either conflictual or cooperative). The government is likely to play a less interventionist role in industrial relations, compared with the past, and to adopt the role of mediator between unions and employers. Characteristics of Korean industrial relations during the pre- 1987 period is firstly examined; four major factors are used to explain the industrial relations practice during this time. Changes after 1987 are also considered. Special consideration is given to interaction between the environment and the three major industrial relations participants, and the interactions between them. Both macro and micro aspects of industrial relations are examined. The special Presidential Address (26/04/1996), known as New Conception of Industrial Relations, is also analysed in terms of its implications for future industrial relations issues in Korea.

Since the late 1980s there have been significant problems in the Korean auto industry related to employment relations. This paper focusses on the experience of three companies: Hyundai, Daewoo and Kia, which have pursued somewhat different strategies in industrial relations and human resource management. Hyundai, which is the largest auto producer, has experienced major labour disputes almost every year since 1987, but has reached an accommodation with its union in the past couple of years. Daewoo and Kia have both faced militant union leadership since the early 1990s. Kia’s management was rather indecisive, but Daewoo was more decisive and industrial relations appear to have stabilised. However, major industrial conflicts at the end of 1996, following the government’s attempt to reform labour laws, and the formation of a new independent peak union council, indicate that industrial relations in the Korean auto industry are likely to remain unsettled for some time.

This paper describes the various stages of industrialisation through which Malaysia has passed, beginning with import substitution in the 1960s, export-oriented industries of the 1970s to heavy industries in the 1980s. The public sector, which used to employ a substantial percentage of the labour force and a high percentage of ethnic Malays, has been reduced as a result of the government’s decision to corporatise and privatise many of its agencies. However, as more Malays have began working in the industrial sector, a new phenomena of an emerging Malay proletariat alongside the non-Malays has become evident. They now form more than half of the union leadership and are strongly represented among skilled workers. Whether the government will become more liberal with its laws and policies towards unions in the future is uncertain, as the democratic process in Malaysia has yet to gain a firm hold.

International mobility of capital and competitive pressures are challenging Australian governments to reduce taxes, especially on capital, while conflicting demands, from deregulation, concerns about national savings, and pressures to reform indirect taxes, heighten the need for higher revenues and more progressive taxes.

We risk becoming a society of ‘rational fools’, where citizens value government services, but governments lack revenue to fund them. Taxpayers see the system as unfair and see others dodge taxes; tax resistance increases, and the revenue base further declines. Rational behaviour from an individual viewpoint is foolish from a communal perspective.

Deficiencies in the tax system must be remedied to break the cycle. The inability to raise adequate revenue is fundamental. Federal/state financial imbalance is intrinsic to the problem and must be addressed. Removing opportunities for ‘tax shirking’, and addressing major inequities and concessions in direct taxes would improve prospects for indirect tax reform. Increasing overall progressivity by asset or inheritance taxes would balance regressive effects of indirect taxes.

This article examines the process of financial deregulation in Australia during the decade when Australia’s financial system changed from a highly regulated system to a system with few quantitative or qualitative controls, a freely floating exchange rate and a deficit fully financed by the market. While existing accounts have tended to focus on a single explanatory variable (such as an ideological shift or economic pressures), this article argues that policy outcomes were the result of a more complex interaction of ideology, economic forces, institutional structures and political interests. In analyzing the effect of these significant influences, the article provides a more complete picture of the deregulatory process and places the Wallis Report in context.

The stock of capital goods will always be a mixture of new best-practice techniques and older vintages, associated with lower productivity and higher running costs yet still profitable to keep running if short-term variable costs are covered. A crucial determinant of the proportion of new to old machines in any industry’s stock of capital goods is therefore the level and rate of change of wages. The rate of accumulation not only has these supply-side effects; it is also obviously a major determinant of activity and employment. There is the possibility of a virtuous cumulative process. To achieve this, we need to make sure, that wages in all industries rise by amounts which are determined principally by the growth of overall productivity and the general price level.

The Wallis Report, adopted by the Government in September of this year, contained a wide-ranging set of reforms that are likely to alter significantly the style and structure of financial regulation in Australia. This survey offers some reflections on the Wallis Report, its key recommendations and the thinking underlying them.

The Committee saw market failure as the primary rationale for regulation. Markets fail to produce efficient, competitive outcomes for one or more of the following reasons: anti-competitive behaviour; market misconduct; information asymmetry; and systemic instability.

The Committee’s recommended reforms were designed to create a regulatory structure that matched the four motives for regulation. This will create a regulatory structure based on regulatory functions rather than institutions. The new structure should be more efficient, less duplicative and better able to cope with the regulatory pressures that are likely to emerge in coming years from on-going technological innovation.

The baseline Australian generational accounts for 1994/95 presented in this paper reveal a moderate imbalance in favour of current generations, and thus a reversal of the imbalance evident in the 1990/91 base year accounts (Ablett, 1996a). However, alternative simulations suggest the fiscal constraint implied by recent official government projections should be sufficient to correct the generational imbalance of the baseline accounts. Generational accounting results involving several migration scenarios are also presented. These lend support to the view that migration has an overall net positive effect on government finances.

The Wallis Report is a substantial document with many useful insights into the workings of the financial system and its interactions with the regulatory and deregulatory process. This article provides a brief review of the Wallis Report. It argues that the Report could have been improved by first, including a more sophisticated evaluation of prior deregulatory experience, second, providing a more thorough explanation of how its recommendations will work in the areas of systemic stability and depositor protection, and third, including recommendations for a formal and rigorous monitoring of he outcomes of the recommended legislative changes.

This paper examines the cyclical properties of gross flows and transition rates between the alternative labour market states of ‘employed’, ‘unemployed’, and ‘not in labour force’ for Australian workers for the period 1980–1992. The study is based on ABS monthly gross flow data, disaggregated by gender, and with the employment status disaggregated into part-time and full-time work. The principal finding is that the somewhat surprising pattern, of counter-cyclical monthly flows from unemployment to employment, is primarily the result of counter-cyclical male transitions to full time employment. The results are compared with those from European empirical studies. The paper also considers the consistency of the results with thé implications of theoretical models which emphasise the counter-cyclical ‘quality’ of the unemployment pool.

The paper provides an assessment of the recommendations of the Financial System Inquiry and the Government’s reform proposals relating to the regulatory structure, financial safety and the mega-prudential regulator, systemic stability, and competition policy in the financial sector. It is argued that key reform proposals are based on explicit or implicit assumptions relating to the workings of financial markets and institutions. The Report fails to test those assumptions against contemporary and prospective circumstances to determine the practical worth of the recommendations.

In April 1997 the Australian Industrial Relations Commission established a federal minimum award wage of $359.40 per week, and awarded a $10 per week safety net increase for workers who had been unable to obtain wage increases under the regime of enterprise bargaining. The Commission produced a split decision, the first time this has occurred in twenty years. This article provides a commentary on the respective decisions of the majority and minority. It examines the background or context of the case, the claims of the parties, and the reasoning of the majority and minority in their respective decisions. The case reveals a widening gap in the income of workers. Those without bargaining power are falling behind in both real and relative terms, in the regulatory world of enterprise bargaining. The situation has only been partially addressed by the decision in this case.