Faced with platforms such as Uber, riders are resisting individually and organising actions such as Riders X Derechos in Spain. Some of these ‘new proletarians’ have even organised themselves into cooperatives. To the global utopia of investor-owned platforms, platform cooperativism opposes the utopia of delivery without exploitation or carbon emissions through local cooperatives owned by riders. Based on the case study of the Mensakas cooperative in Barcelona, this ethnography analyses the link between riders’ protests and cooperative platforms. It questions the concrete effects of ‘counter-platform politics’ and the relationship between politics and labour. It also examines the strategies of intercooperation in the ‘cyclelogistical’ sector to understand the institutional, social, and political conditions that foster the ‘re-embeddedness’ of the bike delivery market.

Geoffrey Harcourt remained a steadfast left Keynesian all his life. He applied his economic analysis in framing policy recommendations targeting the welfare of the poor. He undertook incisive and comprehensive surveys of the work of Cambridge post-Keynesians, some of whom were involved intellectually or practically in the economics of developing economies. Keynes, remaining an imperialist as far as India was concerned, nevertheless produced a corpus which has been immensely helpful in understanding developing economies and prescribing policy solutions for them. First, Keynes created the modern macroeconomics discipline and refined the concept of national income, allowing methods of collecting and organising economic and social data enabling assessment of intersectoral impacts. Second, still relevant today is his idea of an International Clearing Union, disciplining countries with excessive balance of payments surpluses or deficits, even though American opposition at Bretton Woods prevented its adoption. Third, although an economist of the short run, Keynes took up issues of vital concern for the development of an underdeveloped economy, departing from his long-held fears about excessive population growth and contributing to policies for stabilising commodity prices. While Keynes remained a Eurocentric imperialist, his dreams for Europe in general and Britain in particular proved relevant for many developing countries today. He supported public investment and state involvement in solving problems of unemployment and industrial restructuring. His analysis of the instability of stock markets and dangers of financialisation remains highly relevant in a world experiencing major stock market crashes in almost every decade since the 1970s.

This paper examines the application of the techniques of economic analysis to occupational health and safety regulations using occupational noise as an example.

The paper explores the extent to which economic impact studies are practically feasible and useful in relation to occupational health and safety legislation. Six studies of the same regulatory change, from four countries were analysed. The results of these studies ranged from a strongly negative to a significantly positive net present value, depending on the assumptions made. The factor which had the greatest influence on these differences was the way in which benefits are costed.

It is shown that in the field of Occupational Health and Safety, economic analysis does not produce a single valid net present value or benefit to cost ratio on which a decision to legislate can sensibly be based. However the analysis can, if properly directed provide useful information on factors which will enable organisations to optimise their response to the regulation and authorities to introduce regulations in a way which does not bear with unreasonable weight on specific sectors of the community.

There has recently been intense debate about the relative merits of a centralised wage-setting system vis-a-vis a decentralised system. Most of the theoretical and empirical works on this issue focus on the static or current macroeconomic performance in terms of employment and inflation and microeconomic efficiency resulting from enhanced labour market flexibility. Following Lancaster’s work and subsequent extensions by Schott and Vartiainen, this paper regards wage bargaining as a dynamic game involving conflict over the distribution of current and future income. It is argued that the intertemporal decision makings of both workers and employers are influenced by so-called prisoners’ dilemma. In such situations, it is claimed that centralised or corporatist wage negotiations system leads to higher investment rates. This claim is corroborated with evidence from selected OECD countries.

Throughout the English-speaking world, collective bargaining has commonly been considered to be an option for workers discontent with the default system of management-determined conditions of work. In this article it is argued that, as a universally acclaimed human right, collective bargaining should be considered a minimum condition for everyone employed under standardised conditions of work. The government policy of offering workers a choice to bargain or to refrain from bargaining, in effect in countries such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, does not meet that standard. Just as the equity goal of governments is the absence of inequality based on traits such as sex and colour, the government bargaining policy goal should be universal collective bargaining. Anything short of universality should be considered a social problem in search of a more effective policy solution.

Having outlined a traditional model of British public sector industrial relations, this article focuses on developments from the 1980s to 2001. It argues that there has been a reorganisation of the state through privatisation and an historical shift in employment relations, from the state as a ‘model’, administrative employer to an increasingly managerial employer. In effect, a depoliticisation of employment relations has taken place, with the withdrawal of central government from direct control over operational and organisational activity in the public services. As part of these processes, the public services in Britain have been marketised, with the creation of a public service sector, no longer defined by ownership but by the service provided. These developments are reflected in the changing patterns of industrial relations activity in the public services, with profound implications for trade unionism.

This paper attempts to test the recent British Industrial Relations model of trade union membership by an examination of a survey of early school-leavers in Dunedin, New Zealand which was carried out in October 1989. The findings offer strong support for the model because the same distinct strands of core motivation and remainder attitudes were evident. This demonstrates that the model could be successfully applied in a different institutional, cultural and economic context. The major cross-national differences to emerge were that most Dunedin youngsters intended to join a union; for them, collective instrumental reasons were very important and values of little significance. Furthermore, there was little evidence of disinterest or ignorance amongst the minority which was negative towards trade union membership.

A recent article on trade union membership (Cregan and Johnston, 1990) suggested that conventional neoclassical theories are flawed by the free rider paradox, whereby a rational individual will not bear the costs of joining a union to gain rewards that are available to all the workforce as public goods. It proposed that the dilemma could only be solved by a membership theory which takes into account several different sources of individual motivation drawn from several disciplines. These were identified in a longitudinal survey of London early school-leavers, 1979–1981, in reasons given by young people for their membership decision, positive or negative, from which employees could be categorised in social movement parlance as core and remainder. However, the authors proposed that further direct investigations should be made in different contexts. For example, it may be that some responses were culturally or institutionally specific, or were based on economic context. Accordingly, a similar survey of a single cohort of early school-leavers was carried out ten years later in Dunedin, New Zealand. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to test the validity of the framework of the model within a different national context.

The article will be organised in the following way. First, a brief summary of the Industrial Relations model of trade union membership will be presented and two hypotheses will be drawn from it. Second, the latter will be tested by a discussion of the results of the Dunedin survey and a comparison with those of the London survey. Third, implications of the findings for the consequences of the 1991 Employment Contracts Act will be briefly examined.

A number of regulatory controls, aimed at reducing water and air pollution, have been implemented in New South Wales. These controls are examined in the paper. The paper also explores the evolution to market based controls, in particular those linked to the notion of property rights.

Previous research reveals that failure to resolve intra-union conflict may lead to the emergence of breakaways. Drawing on evidence from the Australian entertainment industry, this study examines the more unusual case of an attempt to secede by elements of the leadership (rather than membership) from the Australian Theatrical and Amusement Employees Association. Following secession, the breakaway group merged with a different union. The paper argues that the country’s system of industrial relations shaped the form of the breakaway and ultimately provided the legal vehicle for the disaffected group to split from its parent union. It further shows how union breakaways are not necessarily caused by union merger activity although it often appears that they are.

In recent years National Wage guide-lines have attempted to facilitate the implementation of a system of “administered flexibility”. The Efficiency and Restructuring Principle adopted in March 1987, and the Structural Efficiency Principle adopted in August 1988, have been the major instruments of this attempt. In different industries and enterprises these principles have resulted in differing outcomes and approaches. In some industries, such as the chemical, steel and aluminium industries, restructuring has taken place at a company and/or enterprise level. In other industries such as metal fabrication, road transport, building and construction, a “blue-print” industry approach has been adopted. This paper examines award restructuring in such a “blue-print” industry.

At first glance, Part 3–1 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) seems to overlap with long-established anti-discrimination laws, offering protection against adverse, attribute-based conduct in employment. On close analysis, however, it turns out to be a new and quite different regime. Although the Fair Work Act offers a simple alternative to dated and complicated anti-discrimination laws, its provisions are at times overly-simple, raising uncertainty about how they will operate. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the approach to discrimination protection in the Fair Work Act, while an important addition to the remedies available to Australian workers, is compromised by failing to take account of lessons learned in the long history of anti-discrimination law.

The 1995 Congress was unusual. It was considerably shorter than all recent Congresses and there was only one substantial policy item: the recruitment and retention of union members. Nonetheless, the Congress provided the platform for important speeches from government and ACTU leaders. These reaffirmed the Accord process and, with an election looming, contrasted it with the Opposition’s approach. The Congress also provided for a smooth transition, with Jennie George endorsed as President-elect to replace Martin Ferguson on his anticipated departure to Federal Parliament.

The WorkChoices legislation was controversial at the time of its introduction. The controversy has continued as to what its outcomes have been, and in whose interests it has operated. One outcome of the legislation has been a proliferation of extremely comprehensive analyses of its effects to date. This review article on those reports concludes that the overwhelming weight of evidence is that the legislation has benefited employers at the expense of employees. However, this article provides a materialist analysis of WorkChoices and the wider employer offensive which contrasts with the dominant interpretations amongst the critics of WorkChoices. The paper situates WorkChoices as part of a longer-term employer offensive designed to maintain profitability by increasing the rate of labour exploitation.