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A Prophet in the Russian Wilderness: The Mission of Consul Felix Cole at Archangel, 1917–1919

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Benjamin D. Rhodes
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Extract

Two months before the Bolshevik Revolution, Felix Cole, a 29-year-old clerk at the American Embassy at Petrograd was promoted to vice-consul at frigid and remote Archangel. As the Allies, in the spring of 1918, began to advocate military intervention in North Russia, Cole came to a far different conclusion. In his view economic aid to the North, especially in foodstuffs, would do far more to maintain Allied influence than the use of force. However, Ambassador David R. Francis and his foreign service colleagues abruptly dismissed Cole's warnings against military intervention as being unworthy of serious consideration. Tragically for the 222 Americans who died in the resulting Anglo-American military expedition to Archangel, Cole was ignored when he predicted: “Intervention will begin on a small scale but with each step forward will grow in its demands for ships, men, money and materials.”

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , July 1984 , pp. 388 - 409
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1984

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References

1 Halliday, E. M., The Ignorant Armies: The Anglo-American Archangel Expedition: 1918–1919 (London, 1958), p. 218.Google Scholar The standard work, written by an anti-Bolshevik emigré almost forty years ago, is Strakhovsky, Leonid I., Intervention at Archangel: The Story of Allied Intervention and Russian Counter-Revolution in North Russia, 1918–1919 (Princeton, 1944).Google Scholar Strakhovsky's study has now been superseded by Kennan, George F., Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1920, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1956–1958),Google Scholar and Ullman, Richard H., Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, 3 vols. (Princeton, 1961–1962).Google ScholarKennan, , vol. 2, The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, 1958), 17–20, and 363–365,CrossRefGoogle Scholar briefly discusses Felix Cole's service at Archangel and his opposition to Allied military intervention. The North Russian intervention has been the subject of several journalistic accounts: Halliday, E. M., The Ignorant Armies: The Anglo-American Archangel Expedition: 1918–1919;Google ScholarFootman, David, Civil War in Russia (London, 1961), pp. 184–206;Google ScholarGoldhurst, Richard, The Midnight War: The American Intervention in Russia, 1918–1920 (New York, 1978), pp. 85–115, and 135–148;Google Scholar and Swettenham, John, Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918–1919 (London, 1967), pp. 187–200.Google Scholar Several participants have published books detailing their experiences: Moore, Joel R., Mead, Harry H., and Jahns, Lewis E., The History of the American Expedition Fighting the Bolsheviki: Campaigning in North Russia, 1918–1919 (Detroit, 1920);Google ScholarCudahy, John [A Chronicler], Archangel: The American War with Russia (Chicago, 1924);Google ScholarFrancis, David R., Russia from the American Embassy (New York, 1922);Google Scholar and SirIronside, Edmund, Archangel (London, 1953).Google Scholar Soviet “scholarly” literature on the Allied intervention, as Thompson, John M. points out in “Allied and American Intervention in Russia, 1918–1921,” in Rewriting Russian History: Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past, ed. Black, Cyril E. (New York, 1956), pp. 334–400,Google Scholar is badly marred by ideological bias, lack of objectivity, and uncritical assumptions concerning the sinister designs of “world imperialism.” Initially Soviet historians of the intervention treated the United States leniently, with France and Britain being depicted as the main villains. Not until the cold war did the United States emerge in Soviet histories as the main instigator of the intervention. Kennan, George F., “Soviet Historiography and America's Role in the Intervention,” American Historical Review, 65 (01 1960), 302–322,CrossRefGoogle Scholar finds that recent Soviet historiography concerning the Allied intervention is seriously defective due to its systematic misuse of evidence and its reliance on such clichés as “American imperialists,” “American reactionaries,” “American capitalists,” “imperialist circles of the U.S.A.,” “American bourgeois politicians,” “the interventionists,” “aggressive imperialist circles,” “American millionaires,” and “American leading circles.” Mazour, Anatole, The Writing of History in the Soviet Union (Palo Alto, 1971), pp. 249–252,Google Scholar also stresses the amateurish quality of Soviet history. Soviet historians Sivachev, N. V. and Yakovlev, N. N., Russia and the United States (Chicago, 1979), pp. 42–62,Google Scholar emphasize the “counterrevolutionary essence” of the American intervention. Finally, Long, John W., “American Intervention in Russia: The North Russian Expedition, 1918–1919,” Diplomatic History, 6(1982), 45–67,CrossRefGoogle Scholar demonstrates that “there is simply no evidence to support the contention that President Wilson was motivated by an ideological desire to crush Bolshevism and convert the Russians to his own political convictions” (p. 67). Long's essay contains an excellent survey of current Soviet historiography concerning the Allied intervention in North Russia.

2 University of Wisconsin, Directory of Offices and Students (Madison, 1905), 35;Google ScholarHarvard College Class of 1910, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary Report (Cambridge, 1935), 139–140;Google ScholarDepartment of State, Register of the Department of State (Washington, 1930);Google Scholar Cole to Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 1 April 1918, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, File No. 123C673/14, National Archives (hereafter cited as DSNA).

3 Cole to Director, Bureau of Accounts, 12 November 1919, RG 59, 123C673/52, DSNA.

4 William C. Huntington to David R. Francis, 26 May 1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box 26, Missouri Historical Society.

5 Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Archangel Fleet Counter Intelligence Bureau, A. Tam, 1 December 1917, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 12F54, DSNA.

6 Cole to Consul Roger Culver Tredwell, 25 September 1917, RG 84, 12F54, DSNA.

7 Memorandum by A. Tam, 1 December 1917, RG 84 12F54, DSNA.

8 Cole to Lansing, 15 January 1918, RG 59, 125.1462/1; Wilbur J. Carr, Director of the Consular Service, to Cole, 11 May 1917, RG 59, 125.1462/7a, DSNA.

9 Marine Note of Protest Ledger, October 1917, RG 84, 12F54; Major C. T. Williams, Deputy Commissioner American Red Cross to Cole, 3 December 1918, RG 84, 12F54, DSNA.

10 Cole to Lansing, 6 January 1918, RG 59, 861.00/1715, DSNA.

11 Cole to Lansing, 28 January 1918, RG 59, 861.00/1719, DSNA.

12 David R. Francis to Lansing, 22 July 1918, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: Russia, 2 vols. (Washington, 1932), 2: 502–503Google Scholar (hereafter cited as FRUS, followed by appropriate volume and year).

13 Cole to Lansing, 8 February 1918, RG 59, 861.00/1720, DSNA. Subsequently, the naval commander-in-chief, Eugene Somoff, was reinstated, but was stripped of all but “a small fraction of the power wielded by him six months ago” (Cole to Lansing, 16 February 1918, RG 59, 861.00/1721, DSNA).

14 Kennan, , Decision to Intervene, pp. 16–21, and 245–50;Google ScholarUllman, Richard H., Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917–1921, vol. 1, Intervention and the War (Princeton, 1961), 113.Google Scholar

15 Cole to Ambassador David R. Francis, 26 January 1918, RG 59, 861.00/1719, DSNA.

16 Ibid.Ullman, , Intervention and the War, pp. 112–113.Google Scholar

17 Francis to Lansing, 23 March 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 3: 111–112;Google Scholar Lansing to Francis, 27 March 1918, ibid., p. 113.

18 Kennan, , Decision to Intervene, pp. 249–50.Google Scholar

19 Kennan, George F., Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1921, vol. 1, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton, 1956), 38–40.Google Scholar

20 Francis to Perry Francis, 25 September 1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box 27.

21 Francis to Perry Francis, 26 November 1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box 28.

22 Francis to Perry Francis, 23 April 1918, David R. Francis Papers, Box 33.

23 Francis to Lansing, 20 April 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 3: 119;Google Scholar Francis to Lansing, 23 March 1918, ibid., p. 111.

24 Kennan, , Decision to Intervene, pp. 115–135;Google Scholar Francis to Maddin Summers, 14 April 1918, David R. Francis Papers, Box 33.

25 Kennan, , Decision to Intervene, pp. 211–12.Google Scholar

26 Poole to Lansing, 23 February 1918 (Consul General Maddin Summers transmitted Poole's advice “with my strong endorsement”), FRUS, 1918: Russia, 2: 53–54;Google Scholar Poole to Lansing, 30 June 1918, ibid., pp. 236–39; Harris to Lansing, 5 July 1918, ibid., pp. 239–40; Wright to Lansing, 26 March 1918, ibid., p. 91.

27 Francis to Lansing, 13 April 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 2: 124.Google Scholar

28 Francis to Lansing, 2 May 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 1: 519–521.Google Scholar

29 Cole to Francis, 1 June 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 2: 477–484.Google Scholar

30 Cole to Francis, 14 June 1918, RG 84, 12F54, DSNA.

31 Cole to Francis, 19 June 1918, RG 84, 12F54, DSNA.

32 Francis to Cole, 13 June 1918, David R. Francis Papers, Box 33.

33 Cole to Francis, 2 July 1918, David R. Francis Papers, Box 34; Francis to Cole, 21 July 1918, ibid.

34 Poole to Francis, 6 July 1918 (memorandums from Poole to F. Willoughby Smith, 25 June 1918, and Smith to Poole, 3 July 1918 enclosed), David R. Francis Papers, Box 34.

35 Cole to Lansing, 21 June 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 2: 486–87.Google Scholar

36 Francis to Lansing, 27 June 1918, ibid., p. 489.

37 Cole to Lansing, 22 July 1918, ibid., pp. 499–502.

38 Lansing to the Allied Ambassadors, 17 July 1918, ibid., pp. 287–90. Numerous explanations have been advanced by historians for the president's decision to participate in the Allied intervention. Unterberger, Betty Miller, America's Siberian Expedition (Durham, N.C., 1956)Google Scholar contends that the president acted to contain Japanese expansion in the Far East. Kennan, George F., Soviet-American Relations, 1917–1921Google Scholar cites Wilson's sympathy with the Czechoslovak Legion. Revisionists such as Williams, William A., American-Russian Relations, 1781–1947 (New York, 1971)Google Scholar and Gardner, Lloyd C., Wilson and Revolutions: 1913–1921 (Philadelphia, 1976)Google Scholar view the American intervention in Russia as motivated by an anti-Bolshevik phobia. This view is emphatically rejected by Long, John W., “American Intervention in Russia: The North Russian Expedition, 1918–19.”Google Scholar Finally, Trani, Eugene, “Woodrow Wilson and the Decision to Intervene in Russia: A Reconsideration,” Journal of Modem History, 48 (09 1976), 440–61,CrossRefGoogle Scholar plausibly suggests that President Wilson succumbed to Allied pressure for intervention. The primary consideration influencing the president was a feeling that America as a member of a war coalition must cooperate with its allies. But at the same time, the president was so harassed by the demands of domestic politics, mobilization, war strategy, and peacemaking, that he was unable to give much serious thought to the Russian situation.

39 Kennan, , Decision to Intervene, pp. 422–25, and 450–52.Google Scholar

40 Cole to Lansing, 6 August 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 2: 509–12.Google Scholar

41 Cole to Lansing, 10 September 1918, ibid., pp. 527–30.

42 Cole to Francis, 1 June 1918, ibid., pp. 478–79.

43 Poole's orders from the War Office failed to mention any restrictions upon the use of American troops in North Russia. Conceivably Ambassador Francis could have enlightened Poole. But, as an interventionist, Francis chose to interpret liberally Wilson's policy as sanctioning the pursuit of American supplies to wherever the Bolsheviks had shipped them. Not until 2 October when Poole had “a long and very friendly talk” with Francis did he learn that the American troops, many of whom were now 200 miles from Archangel, were to be used only for defensive purposes. Poole to the War Office, 2 October 1918, W0106/1153/HM06606, Public Record Office.

44 Cole to Lansing, 12 September 1918, RG 59, 861.00/3083, DSNA.

45 Cole to Francis, 1 June 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 2: 479.Google Scholar

46 Consul DeWitt C. Poole to Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk, 24 January 1919, FRUS, 1919: Russia, ibid., p. 608; Poole to Polk, 27 January 1919, ibid., p. 611; Long, , “American Intervention in Russia,” p. 62.Google Scholar

47 Cole to Francis, 1 June 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 2: 478.Google Scholar

48 Representatives of the Northern Region of Russia to President Wilson, 25 August 1919, FRUS, 1919: Russia, ibid., pp. 655–57.

49 Cole to Lansing, 14 August 1919, ibid., p. 650.

50 Cole to Lansing, 6 August 1919, RG 59, 124.612/80, DSNA; Lansing to Cole, 15 August 1919, ibid.

51 Cole to Lansing, 4 August 1919, RG 59, 123C673/39, DSNA.

52 Strother to Lansing, 21 August 1919, RG 59, 125.1461/2, DSNA; Strother to Lansing, 26 September 1919, RG 59, 123C673/44, DSNA.

53 Cole to Herbert C. Hengstler, Chief, Division of Foreign Service Administration, 10 December 1919, RG 59, 125.1461/3, DSNA.

54 Strakhovsky, , Intervention at Archangel, pp. 230–54.Google Scholar For the background of the British evacuation from North Russia see Thompson, John M., Russia, Bolshevism and the Versailles Peace (Princeton, 1966), pp. 212–21.Google Scholar

55 Department of State, Register of the Department of State (Washington, 1949);Google ScholarNew York Times, 25 07 1969.Google Scholar

56 Lansing to Cole, 24 October 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 3: 158–59.Google Scholar

57 Cole to Lansing, 22 August 1919, RG 59, 861.00/5218, DSNA.

58 Cole to Lansing, 1 June 1918, FRUS, 1918: Russia, 2: 477, 480–81.Google Scholar

59 Kennan, , Decision to Intervene, p. 365.Google Scholar