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Modelling complex conflicts: formalism or expertise?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Peter G. Bennett
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Extract

The use of game theory to study international conflict has seen peaks and troughs of enthusiasm, high hopes alternating with disillusionment. A revival in recent years is evidenced by the wide interest aroused by non-technical, accessible applications—notably Axelrod’s work on cooperation. Meanwhile, the increasing use of computers to analyze many types of decision lends credence to the notion that with this new-found analytical power, one can move beyond the simplified models previously on offer. Indeed, several pieces of game-based software are now commercially available. The enthusiastic might claim that we stand on the threshold of an age in which no important decision involving conflict should be made without the backing of powerful, on-line analysis. The even more enthusiastic (of whom more below) are prone to claim that the threshold has already been crossed. However, there remain those for whom such claims cut very little ice, and there Is little consensus amongst theorists as to what sort of practical help can be offered to decision-makers.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , October 1991 , pp. 349 - 364
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1991

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References

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23 Schrodt, , ‘Pattern Matching’, pp. 90–1Google Scholar. His reported predictions were as follows:

Egypt: Will protest due to violation of sovereignty Can’t [won’t] do much else because of dependence on U.S. aid

Did not help with the interception (U.S. should emphasise that)

This isn’t very good for Mubarak and will result in protests.

Italy: Will not extradite hijackers

There will be additional attacks on Italians

Will release the remainder of PLO [i.e., Abdul-Abbas]

PLO: Will protest interception

Won’t do much else [in direct response] because:

(a) Arafat claims this operation not endorsed by PLO

(b) The hijackers aren’t very nice—they are small potatoes and not too respectable to Palestinians generally.

Won’t try hijacking ships again.

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26 Binmore makes the point well: ‘A frequently-heard complaint is that “game theory doesn’t work”. Such complaints reflect the gulf that exists between theoreticians with long-term scientific aims and practical men concerned with resolving immediate questions of policy. … The difficulty … lies in the fact that men of affairs require answers now and in a form they find acceptable. Abstruse answers offered in the indeterminate future are therefore of little help to their advisers, who must cobble together what models they can from whatever material is available’. (‘Why Game Theory “Doesn’t Work”’, in Bennett, , (ed.), Analysing Conflict, pp. 23–24Google Scholar.

27 Since he admits—indeed stresses—the political context of leaders' decisions, Bueno de Mesquita’s argument for concentrating on individuals really translates into a recommendation for the latter approach.

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30 Thus Schrodt, for example, uses the term ‘formal’ to cover both knowledge-based as well as purely deductive approaches.

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