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Truth-triggered religious commitments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 March 2019

J. L. SCHELLENBERG
J. L. SCHELLENBERG*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Program, Mount Saint Vincent University, 166 Bedford Highway, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3M 2J6, Canada
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article describes a new type of religious commitment that is activated only if the associated religious propositions are true. The notion of a conditional intention provides the mechanism for understanding how it works, and the justification for forming such an intention in the religious case comes from an awareness of human immaturity combined with a more fundamental and unconditional commitment to truth, goodness, and beauty. The article's argument promises to contribute widely and to supersede certain older arguments, including Pascal's Wager.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 66 - 82
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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References

Ferrero, Luca (2009) ‘Conditional intentions’, Nous, 43, 700–741.10.1111/j.1468-0068.2009.00725.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schellenberg, J. L. (2015) The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy's New Challenge to Belief in God (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar