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Scientific Explanation and Norms in Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

David Gruender
David Gruender*
Affiliation:
Florida State University
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Extract

For some thirty years, now, discussions of explanation in science have begun with the theory most clearly articulated by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). It has been modified, extended, and defended by Hempel with perserverance and patience since then (1965). As a result, it has served as the standard against which competitors strived, and the clarity with which it has been set forth and defended has played a large role in the fecundity of the debate it has aroused.

It is not my intention here to attack or defend the theory in any of its versions, but to examine some aspects of the debate as they bear on the development of our concepts of what science is about. For the theory has been, taken by its friends and its enemies to play a dual role: it is, on the one hand, intended to be descriptive of what science does; while, at the same time, it is to serve as a model or ideal of what science ought to strive to be.

Type
Part XI. Explanation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1980 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1980 , 1980 , pp. 329 - 335
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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