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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
The subject of this panel discussion is probabilistic explanation. However, I would like to broaden the scope of my remarks to include the subject of probabilistic causality as well. For, I will argue in this paper that recent attempts to develop a theory of objective probabilistic causality are vulnerable to the same criticisms that in a previous paper I have advanced against the theories of objective probabilistic explanation proposed by Salmon and Fetzer.
During the past decade or so, both Salmon and Fetzer have written widely on the subject of probabilistic explanation, - and the Statistical-Relevance and Causal-Relevance models for which they are, respectively, well known have been extensively discussed in the literature. During this same period, Patrick Suppes' (1970) monograph has been a common reference point for discussions of probabilistic causality (though as Salmon points out in a recent article , Suppea' account shares many features with earlier accounts of causality proposed by Good and Reichenbach).
I wish to thank James Fetzer and Paul Humphreys for the lively correspondence and exchange of ideas that took place during the months preceeding this panel discussion. It helped greatly to clarify my thinking on the subjects of probabilistic explanation and probabilistic causality.