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Against Evolutionary Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Paul Thagard
Paul Thagard*
Affiliation:
University of Michigan-Dearborn
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Extract

By “evolutionary epistemology” I mean Darwinian models of the growth of scientific knowledge. Such models rely on analogies between the development of biological species and the development of scientific theories. Recent proponents of evolutionary epistemology include the psychologist Donald Campbell (1974a), the sociobiologist Richard Dawkins (1976), and philosophers of science Karl Popper (1972), Stephen Toulmin (1972), and Robert Ackerman (1970). I shall argue that the similarities between biological and scientific development are superficial, and that clear examination of the history of science shows the need for a non-Darwinian approach to historical epistemology.

The neo-Darwinian model of species evolution consists of Darwin's theory of natural selection synthesized with twentieth century genetic theory. The central ingredients of the neo-Darwinian model are variation, selection and transmission. Genetic variations occur within a population as the result of mutations and mixed combinations of genetic material.

Type
Part VII. Evolutionary Epistemology and the Sociology of Knowledge
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1980 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1980 , 1980 , pp. 186 - 196
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I am grateful to Daniel Hausman and B. Holly Smith for suggestions.

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