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What Price Neurophilosophy ?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Eric Saidel
Eric Saidel*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin-Madison
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Extract

If the appropriate cognitive model of the mind is a connectionist model, then what does the future of folk psychology (FP) look like? “Bleak” say the eliminative materialists. In several recent articles and books Paul and Patricia Churchland have been arguing by demonstration that there are models on which to explain all behavior—not merely cognitive behavior—models which are more fruitful than FP. These models, which are connectionist in nature, are supposed to describe a better theory of behavior than FP, and so will eventually replace it. In this paper I look at several arguments the Churchlands have advanced for the thesis that FP will be replaced in a mature cognitive science, i.e., that connectionism will supplant FP.

Type
Part XII. Issues in the Philosophy of Psychology
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 461 - 468
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I am indebted to Berent Enc and Malcolm Forster for comments and suggestions based on earlier drafts of this paper, and to Elliott Sober for helpful discussions and suggestions.

References

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