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Crisis and Coordination: Regulatory Design in Financial Crises

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2017

Robert B. Ahdieh*
Affiliation:
Center on Federalism and Intersystemic Governance, Emory University School of Law

Abstract

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Type
Preventing the Next Financial Crisis: Coordination and Competition in Global Finance
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2010

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References

1 See Diamond, Douglas W. & Dybvig, Phillip H., Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 401 (1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004); Raustiala, Kal, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 1 (2002)Google Scholar; Whitehead, Charles K., What’s Your Sign? International Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 695 (2006)Google Scholar.

3 See Miller, Geoffrey P. & Rosenfeld, Gerald, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 807 (2010)Google Scholar; Zaring, David, International Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 475 (2010)Google Scholar.

4 See Zaring, supra note 3, at 478; see also Zaring, David, Three Challenges for Regulatory Networks, 43 Int’l L. 211, 215-16 (2009)Google Scholar.