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The Naturalistic Response to Scepticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2003

Ruth Weintraub
Ruth Weintraub
Affiliation:
Tel Aviv University
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Abstract

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Hume is sometimes thought to provide a ‘naturalistic’ response to the sceptic. I consider two ways in which this response may be construed. According to the first, the fact that we are psychologically determined to hold a belief provides it with justification. According to the second, ‘natural’ beliefs provide limits within which reason can legitimately be employed, limits which the sceptic transgresses when he attempts to defend his position. Both versions of the naturalistic response to scepticism, I will argue, aren't plausible. And they aren't, at least not predominantly, Hume's.

Type
Editorial
Information
Philosophy , Volume 78 , Issue 3 , July 2003 , pp. 369 - 386
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2003