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Pains and Places

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 January 2003

John Hyman
John Hyman
Affiliation:
The Queen's College, Oxford
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Abstract

I argue that itches, tickles, aches and pains—sensations of all sorts—are generally in the places where we say they are. So, for example, if I say that I have an itch in the big toe on my left foot, then, by and large, that is the very place where the itch is. James denied this in the 1890s; Russell and Broad denied it in the 1920s; Wittgenstein and Ryle denied it in the 1940s; Lewis and Armstrong denied it in the 1960s; and since then various kinds of materialists have denied it. But if itches etc. are states of the sensitive parts of bodies, then it is true.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 78 , Issue 1 , January 2003 , pp. 5 - 24
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2003

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