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Moral Facts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Peter Remnant
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia, Vancouver

Extract

An important part of ethics consists in the attempt to find a theoretical framework for the sincere moral discourse of ordinary people; to present, if possible, a consistent account of the ways in which such terms as “good,” “right,” “duty,” “obligation” are used in moral contexts. It is surprising that it should ever have been thought possible to account for such utterances as expressions of emotion. For the most part nothing could be less like the sighs, groans, shouts, and chuckles with which we normally express emotion than are our assertions about right and wrong, good and bad; these are usually the outcome of careful consideration and they are almost invariably expressed in cognitive terms. That is, we describe ourselves as “thinking out what we ought to do,” “coming to a conclusion as to what is right,” “knowing the difference between right and wrong,” “recognizing our obligations,” “seeing our duty.” When we do employ “emotive” words in these contexts it is almost always for the purpose of expressing anger or remorse or disgust with regard to our own moral lapses or those of others. Moral utterances, in short, have all the appearance of being statements of fact, and statements, moreover, which cannot be made in other than moral terms.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1957

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References

page 149 note 1 Ross, Sir David, The Right and the Good, pp. 2930. For the meaning of “prima facie” as used here cf. ibidem., p. 28.Google Scholar

page 149 note 2 S.T. 1a-2ae, XCIV, 2.

page 149 note 3 Ross, The Foundations of Ethics, p. 320. Cf. H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, p. 8: “This apprehension [that such and such an action ought to be done by us] is immediate, in precisely the sense in which a mathematical apprehension is immediate….”

page 150 note 1 Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 30.

page 150 note 2 Lord Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 155. It is perhaps more precise to say that mathematical expressions are first so employed by us that they are not exposed to empirical refutation, and that they subsequently become tautologies if and when the terms in them are defined in accordance with the ways they have been used.

page 151 note 1 A. Einstein, Sidelights on Relativity, p. 28.

page 151 note 2 Ross, Kant's Ethical Theory, p. 42.

page 152 note 1 Ross, loc. cit.

page 152 note 2 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 8.

page 153 note 1 Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. 320.

page 154 note 1 Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 30.

page 157 note 1 R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 166.