This article argues that the emergence and development of subaltern political process is a significant conflict dynamic found in the escalation of ethnic nationalist movements. These ethnie-defined modes of political participation are in turn an expression of the autonomous nature of ethnic nationalism, but occur ‘underneath’ and often antecedent to the organised violence and militancy which distracts most analyses of these conflicts. The article discusses this process of insurgent political mobilisation as a response to the structural paralysis of the post-colonial state, using the ethnic nationalist conflict in Indian Jammu and Kashmir as the central case study. In its discussion of this case, the article seeks to argue that the presence of such subaltern political process provides additional empirical evidence of the autonomous nature of ethnic nationalism, and its capacity to carve out alternative options for democratic action and popular participation.

The Roman–Jewish wars of 66–70, 115–17 and 132–35 CE destroyed the territorial, social and political bases of militant Jewish nationalism. Successive defeats brought a Roman ban on Jewish residence in Jerusalem and on proselytisation. Most of the Jewish population of Judaea, in southern Palestine, was annihilated or exiled. The creative heart of Judaism shifted to Galilee, where the study of rabbinic law and homiletics flourished, mostly in Hebrew, and the Mishna – the basis of the Talmud – was edited by the Tannaim (Mishna teachers). This culture was an implicit rejection of Graeco-Roman civilisation and values in favour of a more exclusivist religious-cultural nationalism. It is argued in this paper that this form of nationalism, though rare in the ancient world, anticipates more recent national movements of defeated peoples.

The formation of nation-states from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East after World War I, under colonial auspices, proceeded with negotiations in some instances and hostilities in others from previously autonomous communities, some of them formally designated as millets. Iraq comprised a diversity of religious and ethnic communities. The Assyrians, Christian mountain tribes, mostly refugees from Turkish Kurdistan under British protection, were one community which actively resisted integration into the new nation-state and, as a result, were subject to violent attacks by the nascent Iraqi army in 1933. This episode and the way it was perceived and interpreted by the different parties is an interesting illustration of the political psychology of communitarianism in interaction with nationalism, complicated by religious identifications, all in a colonial context. Subsequent histories and commentaries on the episode are also interesting in illuminating ideological readings.

This paper examines the relationship between nationalist movements and minority languages, with particular emphasis on examples from Britain and Ireland. This relationship is less straightforward than often assumed, and the media's role in it is particularly complex. The varying political uses of minority language broadcasting are discussed, along with the implications of the separation between cultural and political nationalism. The notion of the routine banality of daily broadcasting is used to indicate how such broadcasting can work against nationalist mobilisation. Finally, Ireland is examined in the light of the previous discussion in order to offer an explanation of why it was so far behind many other areas in the provision of minority language broadcasting.

The fundamental improvement between the Sunningdale and Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreements as conflict regulation processes is the recognition of opposing nationalisms as the core cause of conflict and, by extension, the development of a more symmetrical intergovernmental relationship between British and Irish governments which maximised the basis of consent for addressing conflicting claims to national self-determination. While the Agreement reflects a liberalisation of opposing nationalisms, it does not represent a ‘post-nationalist’ solution; the evolution of conflict regulation from 1985 to 1998 reflects a bi-national trend. The key to cultivating a ‘ripe moment’ for a constitutional settlement was based on the recognition that Northern Ireland's constitutional status needed to be redetermined and that the processes of self-determination needed to address and modify ‘constitutive’ aspects of sovereignty which preceded partition, as well as ‘regulative’ aspects which have evolved since the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.

F. C. Erasmus became South Africa's defence minister in 1948 after two decades as the leading political organiser for the National Party. Although an architect of the Nationalists' post-war victory, he was not considered a minister of the first rank. Erasmus initiated a process of ridding the defence force of officers who he believed were associated with the government of the Anglophile Jan Smuts and replacing them with party supporters. As a result, the military often lost experienced and talented officers, many with combat exposure. Erasmus felt that the armed services had been too British in ethos and appearance. He inaugurated tighter regulations on bilingualism, introduced Boer rank titles, launched new uniforms and original medals and decorations, to the acclaim of the Afrikaner Volk. His purpose was to have a defence force which was uniquely ‘South African’.