Histories of the early American political economy present that world in fractured form, dividing political and constitutional dimensions from economic aspects. The fragmented approach reflects an old, oft-denigrated, but still powerful imagery, one that naturalizes economic activity as a set of myriad spontaneous and individuated exchanges, conducted with a conventional medium, money, and predictably composing a market sphere. The motif and its underlying assumptions in turn dissuade exploration of money and markets as territories of public decision, insulating by neglect the structural power of determinations made there. This essay traces the naturalization motif through a historiography of macroeconomic models of money. It then considers how money, recognized as a dynamics of value, would look if the law structuring it were approached as a complex set of relations that expressed, reiterated, and revised the distribution of authority in society. The early American political economy appears in a different light: money becomes a matter of value and governance at once, and therefore a crucial area of constitutional debate. Through that medium, the political economy of early America is transformed not once but repeatedly, from a mercantilist to a domestic paper to a liberal capitalist form.

This study analyzes the transformation of legal consciousness associated with the process of globalization. It examines changing conceptions of injury and compensation in northern Thailand, where global economic and cultural flows have had a dramatic impact over the past twenty years. In their “injury narratives,” ordinary Thai people describe the harm they have suffered, the causes they identify, the issues of responsibility with which they struggle, the obligations and remedy systems they consider relevant, and the role of law as they perceive it. These accounts, as well as litigation records from the Chiangmai Provincial Court, suggest that a transformation of Thai legal consciousness has indeed occurred, but not in the direction one might have expected. Rather than embracing liberal legalism or conceptualizing their grievances in terms of rights, injury victims in post-globalization Thailand are now less inclined to perceive their experiences in legal terms and more inclined to rely on a new form of religious discourse in which Buddhist precepts justify the injured person's decision to refrain from the pursuit of compensation. This article offers an explanation of why globalization appears to have pushed legal consciousness in the direction of religiosity rather than rights.

A dominant characterization celebrates property as a means to attain privacy and autonomy. Drawing on recent scholarship, I compare this idea with a proprietarian perspective, which emphasizes the ways in which private ownership comes freighted with public responsibilities. The garden, I shall argue, reveals both dimensions to property. Drawing from gardening debates over the past century and an empirical survey of gardening in Vancouver, Canada, I conclude by arguing, first, that the ends of property are more diverse than we suppose, and second, that these two conceptions should in fact be thought of not as incompatible and opposed, but as entangled and interrelated. While judicial and academic evaluations tend to rely on a binary view of property, so that privacy and propriety seem to live in different spaces, my findings suggest a more fluid cohabitation.

Contemporary studies of prosecutorial decision making at the state level are infrequent, and even fewer studies examine the discretionary decisions of federal prosecutors. In addition, virtually no scholarly literature examines the growing overlap between federal and state criminal jurisdiction. This paper advances both theoretical and empirical understandings of the organizational and political contexts in which prosecutorial discretion takes place by exploring the nexus between federal and state criminal jurisdictions. Drawing on interview research in a large urban area with several active federal/state cooperative prosecution programs, we suggest that these cooperative relations open new avenues of discretion for local and federal prosecutors; limit the authority of other court actors, including state judges; and erode the distinctions between federal and local criminal jurisdiction.

Drawing on the career of Philip Corboy, this article examines the construction of the plaintiffs' personal injury bar in the second half of the 20th century. Through a relational biography based on Mr. Corboy's career, we look at the development of this subprofession in the context of the sociopolitical environment within which Mr. Corboy and his peers operated, the social capital they possessed, and the particular strategies they used as they worked to establish both a professional and market niche. This analysis shows how and why Mr. Corboy and his peers constructed a thriving subprofession that is characterized by a unique blend of working-class ideology, trial craft, professional bar leadership, Democratic politics, local philanthropy, and a market referral system—all of which reinforce the dominance and prestige of its own elite.

This article analyzes narratives of sexual consent and coercion in 15 criminal seduction cases tried in New York City from 1903 to 1918. I explore courtroom accounts of seduction to explain how dominant notions of masculinity and femininity constrain the effectiveness of sex crime laws. Unlike men, women in the Progressive era (1900–1920) who engaged in premarital sex faced potentially significant social costs in the form of unwanted pregnancy and ostracism. These women could sometimes seek redress by bringing felony charges against men who reneged on their promises of marriage. New York's “seduction law” not only criminalized betrayal but it also functioned as a tool in the prosecution of sexual assault. Yet a patriarchal ideology of romantic courtship embedded in the statute, and defense attorney strategies that drew on this ideology, limited the law's ability to address sexual coercion.

Two competing schools of thought have emerged to explain how the Montgomery bus protest of 1955–56 brought about changes on the city's Jim Crow buses. The dominant explanation attributes the changes to the bus boycott led by Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Montgomery Improvement Association. A second interpretation emphasizes the critical role of the Supreme Court's decision striking down the state and local bus segregation laws. This essay prooides a third explanation: that these two strategies–the boycott and the litigation–interacted, each shaping and reinforcing the other. Each strategy war a critical part of the struggle, but neither brought change by itself. This essay argues that the two strategies of the Montgomery protest created a synergy that was the key to bringing about changes on the buses.

In this article I place U.S. punishment trends in comparative context, seeking to show that the contemporary penal regime in the United States resembles patterns of governance prevalent throughout Latin America, the world's most economically unequal region. In both the U.S. and Latin America, I argue, neoliberal reforms have produced societies characterized by ever greater divides between the haves and have-nots, and state criminal justice institutions increasingly position themselves to police this boundary rather than mitigate its effects. In this article, I examine these trends through the lens of wars on crime and terrorism, arguing that in societies polarized between a dwindling set of haves and an ever more numerous (and potentially unruly) group of have-nots, an inexorable pull makes criminal justice institutions more aggressive in their enforcement of class and racial boundaries. Hallmarks include a widening of the criminal justice net (by broadening definitions of criminal activity, for example) and a deepening of the deprivations visited on those ensnared within it. The article concludes with reflections on the need for reconfiguring conceptions of human rights and their relation to security.

Law professors and political scientists generally subscribe to opposed theories of Supreme Court decision making. Law professors, to a great degree, adhere to an internal view: Supreme Court justices decide cases according to legal rules, principles, and precedents. Political scientists follow an external view: justices decide cases according to their political ideologies or preferences. This article develops an interpretive-structural theory that harmonizes these seemingly opposed views. This interpretive-structural theory not only explains why the internal and external views often are both effective but also why, sometimes, one approach might be more effective than the other. The article concludes by comparing the interpretive-structural theory with the “new institutionalism” that is emerging in political science.

Emotions situate actors in relationships and shape their social interactions. Culture defines both the qualities of individual identity and the constitution of social groups with distinctive values and practices. Emotions, then, are necessarily experienced and acted upon in culturally inflected forms that define not only the conventions of their articulation through individual and collective action, but also the very words that name them. This article develops theoretical arguments to support these claims and illustrates their application in a description of differing emotional repertoires, and their consequences, in Aotearoa New Zealand. The effects of resentment and shame in an ethnic politics of rights and antidiscrimination law demonstrate that context is central to a nuanced understanding of how law and emotions connect in the practicalities of enforcing the protections of anti-discrimination law.

This paper examines the paradoxical and problematic position of rights discourses in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) parents' custody and adoption cases. In it, I analyze the ways in which different types of rights are framed by the litigants and, alternatively, by the judges, as well as how the same constitutional rights (e.g., the right to privacy) are often deployed both in defense of and in opposition to gay /lesbian parents. An in-depth analysis of judicial decisions over a 50-year period and interviews with key family law players reveal the indeterminacy and therefore complexity of rights as a strategy and a discourse in the family law context. Consistent throughout this analysis are the problematic intersection of the collective and the individual in rights-based claims, and evidence of the distinct nature of LGBT rights claims as revolutionary in both their bases and their implications. The analysis confirms in some ways, but also contradicts and complicates many assertions of the “rights critique” of the past two decades. It also suggests a more complex and less dichotomous relationship between rights, status, and contract.