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Comments on Dennis Schulting: Kant’s Radical Subjectivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 February 2018

Alexandra Newton
Alexandra Newton*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this paper I discuss four ways in which Schulting’s phenomenalist interpretation of Kant faces the challenge of accounting for the possibility of objective cognition. First, I ask whether objective cognition requires the understanding to be a faculty of absolute, not merely relative spontaneity. Second, is objectivity compatible with thinking of the transcendental ‘I’ as an indexical? Third, does objectivity require that the objects have being independently of the understanding? Finally, is it a threat to objectivity if objects can be given to me in sensibility without standing under the categories?

Keywords

objectivitytranscendental idealismphenomenalism
Type
Author Meets Critics
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , March 2018 , pp. 123 - 130
Copyright
© Kantian Review 2018 

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References

1 Translations from the first Critique will be those of Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); from Metaphysik L1, cited further on, the translation is from Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).