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What Sort of Imagining Might Remembering Be?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 April 2021
Abstract
This essay unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the philosophy of memory over whether episodic remembering is simply a kind of imagining. So far, this debate has been hampered by a lack of clarity in the notion of imagining at issue. Several options are considered and constructive imagining is identified as the relevant kind. Next, a functionalist account of episodic remembering is defended as a means to establishing two key points: first, one need not defend a factive (or causalist) view of remembering in order to hold that causal connections to past experiences are essential to how rememberings are typed; and, second, current theories that equate remembering with imagining are in fact consistent with a functionalist theory that includes causal connections in its account of what it is to remember. This suggests that remembering is not a kind of imagining and clarifies what it would take to establish the contrary.
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- Information
- Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , Summer 2021 , pp. 231 - 251
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association
Footnotes
Special thanks to Sarah Robins, Kourken Michaelian, and André Sant'Anna for generous feedback that improved this essay.
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