For techniques diffusing as commodities, sales form a critical medium of technological communication which facilitates secondary invention. While sales may also influence the incentives to invent, I argue that the technical learning associated with selling provides a fuller account of invention for the case of the sewing machine in the United States. A study of some 3,500 patents and forty-eight city directories shows that as sales expanded in extent and location, so did patenting by first-time inventors. Moreover, patent use generated a flow of information back to inventors which increased the likelihood and extent of repeat patenting. In these ways, sales sustained technological change as a cumulative process.

A distinctive feature of the nineteenth-century international economy was the mass movement of people out of Europe. Between 1840 and 1914 over forty million persons permanently left Europe and settled in the New World, Asiatic Russia and Oceana. In contrast with contemporary population transfers, nineteenth-century international migration occurred within an international political framework which placed few restrictions on geographic mobility. Within this institutional context there were substantial country by country differences in the participation of European populations. This article is concerned with the secular determinants of intercountry differences in emigration.

An index of childhood mortality is proposed as a good measure of socioeconomic well-being and inequality. The index is used to investigate the relationship between childhood mortality and occupation and income of parents. The sources consist of the 1900 United States Census public-use sample and the published 1911 Census of Marriage and Fertility of England and Wales. Results revealed more inequality in mortality and income across social-class groupings in England and Wales than in the United States. The outcome arose more because of relatively higher childhood mortality for white-collar groups in the United States than because of a better situation for blue-collar groups.

The literature on French economic history generally dates the onset of the agricultural revolution in France from the midnineteenth century. However, the available empirical evidence on national agricultural trends, brought together in 1961 by Toutain, shows that the rapid, sustained growth in both total and per capita agricultural production comes earlier, during the period from 1815–24 to 1865–74. This article explores the sources of this rapid national growth by assembling and analyzing previously unutilized regional data on production and hectares of major field crops. The southern diffusion of mixed farming is identified as the change in the productive process which may account for the French agricultural revolution.

The prevailing view of new mechanical technology is that it has, in large part, pushed labor out of agriculture. An alternative hypothesis is that labor has been pulled out of agriculture by higher wages in nonfarm occupations. The mechanical cotton harvester is used to test the two hypotheses. Estimation of a simultaneous-equation model of the labor market for cotton pickers reveals 79 percent of reduction in hand picking of cotton was due to increased nonfarm wages—the pull effect; the remaining 21 percent is attributed to the decreased cost of machine harvesting—the push effect.

Criticism of the Federal Reserve Board for not advancing rates earlier in 1919 to halt a rampant inflation is seldom as severe or nearly as devastating as the criticism heaped upon it for not easing credit sooner during the sharp but brief depression episode of 1920–1921. After the collapse of prices in May 1920, the immediate goal of Federal Reserve policy was to prevent a widespread financial crisis by maintaining the liquidity of the banking system. Congress had created the Federal Reserve System for the specific purpose of preventing a recurrence of the financial panics that had plagued our pre-World War I monetary experience. In 1920 the Federal Reserve Banks succeeded in this task by making funds freely available at relatively high discount rates. Somewhat surprising is the fact that there was no liquidation of bank credit nor decline in the money supply during the first six months of the downswing. Loans at commercial banks continued to increase, and member-bank indebtedness continued to rise. The action taken by System officials probably warded off what might easily have been the worst financial catastrophe in our history. Unfortunately, the policy they pursued, though successful in preventing a banking crisis, was inimical to a quick recovery of business activity. Inventory decumulation, particularly in the agricultural sector, was hampered by a bumper harvest and a railway transportation bottleneck which was not eliminated until October.

This article examines the determinants of interprefectural patterns of Japanese emigration to the U.S. Pacific Northwest, using a multiple regression analysis. In estimating the regression equations, new proxies are introduced for the “family- and-friends” effect that are free of the statistical problems common in previous studies on long-distance migration. The result shows that the information networks that developed between pioneer immigrants and their home districts played a central role in shaping emigration patterns. The lack of an alternative means of obtaining reliable information about conditions in the United States appears to be responsible.

“The peasant” is consistently cited as an obstacle to economic development in Africa. He is unwilling, it is said, to alter traditional practices and behavior, and is thus unable to take advantage of economic opportunities. As Stephen Enke puts it, “The resource in shortest supply, in most backward but developing countries, is officials who can argue ordinary people into forsaking tradition and risking new ways.” And E. S. Mason has stressed the complexity of “the process by which a group of tribally organized and self-sufficient peasants, sowing and reaping in accordance with age old traditions and possessing limited and easily satisfied wants, become a collection of risk-taking individuals, responsive to price and income incentives, and interested in conserving their land and improving its productivity.” In numerous instances, however, African farmers have rapidly accepted new crops and new techniques and have shown a high propensity to innovate, to accept risk, and to invest well in advance of returns. The sharp increases in the production of export crops show this to be true. Between 1919 and 1959, exports of Ghana (Gold Coast) rose 838 per cent, those of Nigeria 955 per cent, and those of (former) French West Africa 1,031 per cent. In all three cases, radical shifts in crop pattern and new practices in cultivation, planting, and harvesting were involved.

Using evidence from leases and price series, this article examines the total factor productivity of farming in the Paris Basin between 1450 and 1789. Existing evidence about productivity is unreliable, the article argues, and the leases provide historians with a new and valuable source for the study of productivity and economic growth. The article defends the methods used with the leases, which point to spurts of noteworthy growth on local farms but also to setbacks during times of war and increased taxation. It concludes with an analysis of the causes of economic growth in preindustrial agriculture.

The expansion of staple agriculture into the American West after the Civil War was an important event in the economic history of both the United States and the world. This migration of commercial farmers transformed the world's commodity markets. We would expect to find that these farmers were responding to price signals in a commercial fashion. Curiously, the existing literature has failed to detect a price responsiveness in western expansion. This failure appears to stem from a lack of appreciation of the importance of the spatial distribution of prices in the late nineteenth century. This study shows that when this factor is considered, the expansion of western cultivation clearly is connected to the prevailing local price of wheat.

Between 1890 and 1914, California agriculture rapidly shifted from extensive to intensive crops, emerging as one of the world's major suppliers of Mediterranean products. Based on an analysis of new data on price and quantity movements, this article calls into question the traditional emphasis on changes in transportation, water, and labor market conditions as explanations for California's transformation. It argues that increases in fruit supply outpaced increases in demand and that declining farm interest rates and biological learning played crucial, if relatively neglected, roles in the intensification process.

A discussion fifty years ago of comparative economic history would have taken a broader view and would probably have been concerned very largely with exploring along the trails blazed by Max Weber and Marc Bloch. They were interested in many other aspects of economic history besides economic growth and I hope that similar broader interests will shortly show signs of reanimation. In spite of the present popularity of quantitative studies of changes in production, I hope some discussions at this meeting will examine comparative studies of forms of economic organization and the human qualities those structures reflected or generated. But my remarks here accord with the present preoccupation with that kind of economic history in which the all-important questions relate to the causes of economic growth. And I limit myself to one aspect only, the influence of governments.

In the last half of the nineteenth century the economy of the American South experienced three separate shocks which have been analyzed separately by different authors. This note synthesizes the literature and presents an integrated story in which the decline in the rate of growth of the demand for cotton (noted by Wright) and the results of emancipation on the southern labor supply (noted by Ransom and Sutch) had equal impacts on measured income in the post-bellum South. The Civil War itself had a much smaller and less lasting effect on southern income than Coldin and Lewis assumed; in the long run, it was the least important of the three shocks.

You cannot get them to talk of politics when they are well employed.— William Mathews, 1833.

I have observed during the whole time I have been in Lanarkshire that any rise in the rate of discount at the Bank of England has been immediately, or at least shortly, followed by an increase both of crime and of civil suits, and if it continues long, of mortality and typhus fever. So much so, that, as I am an official member of the prison board and of most of the Charities, I have always made it a rule to say … “Gentlemen, the Bank of England have raised their discounts, you had better immediately take measures for enlarging the prison accommodations and for extending the infirmaries and Poor houses.”—A. Alison, Sheriff of Lanarkshire, 1848.

From 1580, the Jesuits introduced European sciences to China―an autarkic civilization whose intelligentsia was dominated by Confucian literati. Drawing upon prefectural distributions of the Jesuits and Chinese scientific works, this paper demonstrates that the Jesuits stimulated Confucian literati to study science. On average, the literati’s scientific works increased four times in prefectures with Jesuit scientists after 1580. But this effect shrank after the Jesuits were expelled by the emperor of China in 1723. Since China’s scholar-official system remained unchanged, the literati’s scientific research aimed to serve the needs of statecraft rather than translating into economic progress.

This paper considers the German principality of Hesse-Cassel in the 1850s, comparing inheritance institutions and landholding inequality for roughly a thousand mostly agricultural villages and towns. The principality lay between impartible northern Europe and the partible southwest. Inequality in landholding size is measured, showing an average Gini of 0.615 and substantial variation across communities. Places with relatively larger populations and ones that practiced impartible inheritance had mostly higher wealth inequality. The main result is that inheritance norms played a role in causing higher landholding inequality. Higher emigration rates in the impartible communities helped to alleviate landholding inequality.

Executive pay fell during the 1940s, marking the last notable decrease in the past 70 years. We study this decline using a new panel data set on the remuneration of top executives in 246 firms. Government regulation—including explicit salary restrictions and taxation—had, at best, a modest effect on executive pay. By contrast, a decline in the returns to firm size and an increase in the power of labor unions contributed greatly to the reduction in executive compensation relative to other workers’ earnings from 1940 to 1946. The continued decrease in relative executive pay remains largely unexplained.

The evolution from indentured to redemptioner servitude as a means of financing immigration to late eighteenth-century Pennsylvania is documented. The compensating differences between methods are used to explain contract choice. The rate of return to shipping redemptioners is estimated and compared with the default rate needed to make it a competitive return. The expected incidence of defaults and the implications for risk pooling among families and risk spreading across voyages are investigated.

The experience of Russia is examined to establish whether the area underwent a process of proto-industrialization comparable to that found in Western Europe. It is argued that the process did take place in this region, even with unfree labor, and served as the basis for much later industrial development. It is also argued that the Russian case differed a good deal from that found in the West. The major factors operating to make the pattern different include the previous existence of the “non- European” marriage pattern, marked differences in family and household structure, the relative immobility of labor, and the degree to which there were half-peasant, half-manufacturing households that dominated much of manufacture.

The hypothesis that the fear of foreclosure of farm mortgages provided an important impetus to American agrarian reform movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is reconsidered. This hypothesis is consistent with the observation that farm income, although volatile, on average improved over this period.Indeed, despite low average foreclosure rates, the temporary effects of foreclosures on specific regions in which there was unrest appears to have been dramatic. An examination of indebtedness data and measures of unrest both for the period of the Alliance movement and for the era of the Nonpartisan League in North Dakota appears to support the hypothesis linking the fear of foreclosure to agrarian unrest.