Surveys taken by the Michigan Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics in the 1890s reveal that unemployment was pervasive among unskilled workers. The incidence of unemployment was not associated with personal characteristics, but rather with the type of employment contract and job: those with high risk of layoff commanded a wage premium. Seasonality is an important part of this late nineteenth-century story, and the subsequent demise of seasonal activities may have had an important impact on the evolution of labor market institutions.

Much of the controversy over Mercantilist policies has focused on the relevance of political exigencies as against economic principles. Some economists have also attempted to evaluate Mercantilist policies in terms of the difference between various short-run and long-run adjustments. By contrast, the concern here has been with some purely economic but rather basic characteristics of the Mercantilist age. I have attempted to explain Mercantilist policies by the actual pattern of the specie flow, the characteristics of some of the commodity trade, the nature and limitation of foreign investment, and in terms of the existing monetary systems.

This article shows how asymmetric information shaped slavery by determining the likelihood of manumission. A theoretical model explains the need to offer positive incentives to slaves working in occupations characterized by a high degree of asymmetric information. As a result, masters freed (and, more generally, rewarded) slaves who performed well. The model's implications are then tested against the available evidence: both in Rome and in the Atlantic world, slaves with high asymmetric information tasks had greater chances of manumission. The analysis also sheds light on the master's choices of carrots versus sticks and of labor versus slavery.

It is sometimes asserted that a laissez-faire policy toward financial intermediaries tends to deepen financial development and accelerate economic growth. The two decades preceding the American Civil War provide a challenging case for this proposition because they witnessed something approaching a natural experiment. During those years the Federal government withdrew from the regulation of banking, a policy that was the final outcome of Andrew Jackson's war with the Second Bank of the United States. A wide range of experiments concerning entry into commercial banking were tried, from “free” banking to “socialized” banking. Moreover, other kinds of legislation affecting banking varied from state to state as well. While the regions of the United States differed in terms of economic structure, a common language, a common legal tradition, and, to some extent, a common culture permeated all regions. Thus, the period provides excellent conditions for observing the effects of financial legislation on the extent of financial intermediation. In this paper I will assess the impact on financial development of the three most important forms of regulation: the commercial banking laws, the usury laws, and the mutual savings banking laws.

There is now a rough consensus of opinion among English economic historians about the broad chronology of English population history. According to this chronology there were three main phases of rapid growth. The first occurred in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and was brought to an end by a marked fall in population in the fourteenth century. The second phase occupied most of the sixteenth century and the early seventeendi, after which there was some slowing down in the later seventeenth century and possibly an absolute check in the 1720's and 1730's. And finally tliere was the sustained cumulative increase that started in the later eighteenth century.

The transition from a classless to a class society has been a major dilemma to Marxist economic historians. Using the Wolof social formation of West Africa as its historical example, this paper produces a class theoretic analysis of primitive communism. From this analysis, it is then able to show how such a transition could take place.

Corporate farming is not new in the United States. The companies of “gentlemen adventurers” setting out in the seventeenth century to establish settlements in the New World were not corporations in a modern sense, but in organizational form and motivation they bear a striking resemblance to corporation farming ventures of recent decades. The twin lures of short-run profits and long-run capital gains have been major forces in shaping land use patterns and institutional structures throughout America's history. For over 300 years repeated efforts were made to use large scale organizational forms to reap these rewards in agriculture. Up to 1950 the record was one of almost consistent failure.

Did macroconomic interventions make any contribution to Argentina's revovery from the Great Depression? Macroeconomic policy deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. Fiscal policy was conservative. Monetary policy became unorthodox after 1931, when the Caja de conversión began rediscounting to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflation. This change predated the creation of the central bank in 1935. A wider literature links the interwar depression in the core to flaws in the gold standard, and active monetary policy to escape from defaltion and slump; our work extends this idea to the periphery.

Industries that have different structures in Europe than in America can teach useful lessons about industrial evolution. Despite similar initial histories, European professional sports leagues adopted team promotion and relegation, which facilitates much easier entry than is possible in North America, where leagues themselves create new franchises to sell to investors. By contrasting the histories of the English Football League and the National Baseball League, we show that their structures arose from differences in geographic compactness, the entertainment level of games, and territorial monopolies. As the evolution becomes more understandable, the persistence of the intercontinental difference becomes more problematic.

Few recent intellectual currents have been so self-consciously controversial as the New Economic History. It has been a rare meeting patronized by historians or economists that has not featured a discussion of the merits and defects of applying theoretical and quantitative constructs to historical problems. This occasion is obviously no exception. Yet milestones must be respected, and on this thirtieth anniversary, a review of the profitability, if not the viability, of the new techniques being applied to economic history seems very much in order.

The sustained unemployment in the United States during the recovery from the Great Depression has proved difficult to explain, as has the rapid elimination of unemployment in Germany. I argue that employment in the United States was restricted by high wages, which government policy raised above the level of efficiency wages. Socialist control and military expansion by the Nazis reduced unemployment, but also held down consumption.

This paper examines several recent arguments about the role of slavery in the settling of the New World, the viability of slavery as an economic institution in the nineteenth century, and the causes and consequences of slave emancipation in the Americas. Comparisons are made between the analysis of slavery and that of other labor institutions, such as serfdom and free labor.

This article presents an analysis of empirical research on the course of agricultural prices and wages in Maryland over the century 1750 to 1850. An attempt has been made to present the data in a form comparable to other studies for other regions. In addition to the long-term movement of price and wage series the paper focuses on the use of these data to draw inferences on changes in the standard of living and productivity growth.

Infrastructure construction is often associated with excessive, even corrupt, profits. This article argues that construction profits earned in Spanish railroads in the mid-nineteenth century were a response to the lack of credibility of the Spanish state. It also makes the first attempt to document excess construction profits in Spanish railroads by demonstrating, for example, financial links between railroad stockholders and the providers of construction goods and services and by directly estimating construction profits. The estimated excess construction profits only provided railroad entrepreneurs with a normal rate of return to their entire railroad-related investments.

During the five years of inflation, price stability, and hyperinflation in Germany after World War I, three factors determined the growth of the money supply. First, the Reichsbank freely issued money in exchange for whatever government or corporate debt the private sector did not wish to hold at the official discount rate. Second, the government persistently ran large deficits. Political instability and the inflation itself prevented taxation adequate to pay for social programs, subsidies to the railroad and businesses, and reparations to the Allies. The third factor was expectations of inflation, which, as they became more pessimistic, led people to hold less and monetize more of the outstanding stock of debt. Thus, the money supply was partly endogenous and partly dependent on government fiscal policy. The monetary policy of the Reichsbank, although essential to the inflation process, was a constant and passive one until stabilization at the end of 1923.

Interindustry factor mobility is a crucial determinant of the income-distribution effects of exogenous changes in relative commodity prices. This examination of interindustry variation in wages and profits using data from manufacturing industries from 1820 to 1990 suggests that interindustry factor mobility may be strongly related to the processes of industrialization. Development in the nineteenth century produced a sharp rise in mobility (a decline in interindustry wage and profit differentials) due to rapid improvements in transportation and the introduction of factory production. Twentieth-century industrialization, involving greater reliance on specialized equipment and knowledge, reduced levels of interindustry mobility.

The difficulty sovereign actors face in making their promises credible is widely appreciated (e.g., North and Weingast 1989; Myerson 2008). In this article, I argue that the English repeatedly used institutions of monopoly brokerage to mediate trades between the sovereign (offering various promises) and subjects (offering revenues). Once set up—at different times in different markets—institutions of monopoly brokerage sparked substantial and abrupt growth in state revenues. Moreover, these revenue increases cannot be explained by changes in promise-holders’ ability to punish nonperformance, changes in the preferences of pivotal state decision makers, or changes in high constitutional structure alone.

This paper should begin with a brief defense of its title. “Variety” and “unsuccessful” are doubtful if not dirty words to most economists and many economic historians. The “success stories” of rapid development in Western Europe, Russia and Japan have been the most frequent subject of this Journal's articles on non-American topics. And the discovery of uniformity in the past, rather than variety, is admittedly essential to the development economist's search for predictability in the future that has informed so much of the economic history written since the Second World War.