We use plant-level data from the Census of Manufactures to study collusion in the United States macaroni industry during the Great Depression. The National Industrial Recovery Act was passed in 1933 to promote recovery through industry coordination of economic activity. While there is no change in the price-cost margin after the law is passed, a variety of markers of anti-competitive conduct suggest that collusion indeed increased. Prices became less responsive to changes in cost, the dispersion of prices decreased, and the persistence in prices increased.

A politicoeconomic model of the relationship between economic and structural variables and government popularity is developed and applied to the Weimar Republic. We obtained data from decentralized election results in the 1924 to 1933 period, using a weighted panel estimation method. Parameter estimates show a strong relationship between the development of economic variables and the decline in electoral support that confronted every government in this period. We link this finding to existing historiographie theories and extrapolate from it to estimate the effects of the economic recovery in the first years of the Nazi regime.

One should distinguish from the start between the economic interpretation of imperialism and economic imperialism. The one is an explanation, an essentially monistic explanation, of an historical phenomenon. The latter is an aspect of the phenomenon itself: if imperialism is the dominion of one group over another, economic imperialism is the establishment or exploitation of such dominion for continuing material advantage. The definition assumes that economic imperialism is more than simple, once-for-all pillage; rather that it tries to cultivate relationships that yield a recurrent harvest of profit, as the ground its corn. Moreover, it makes no distinction between dominion established for economic motives and dominion that, for whatever reasons established, is maintained and exploited primarily for material ends. Finally, it does not confine imperialism to cases of formal rule or protectorate, but includes that “informal” dominion that is often far more effective and lucrative than direct administration.

Applications of the staple approach by the late Harold Innis d by others influenced by Innis have produced many studies which, taken together, provide a remarkably coherent, plausible, and apparently consistent account of Canada's economic growth and history. In this paper I distinguish between the staple theory as a theory of economic development and as an economic interpretation of history and argue that the staple theory of Canada's economic development breaks down after 1820. In the conclusion I suggest an alternative, complementary approach to the study of the country's economic growth.

This paper uses a simple economic model of contract choice to explain the growth of sharecropping in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France—a topic that figures in much of the social and economic history of the period. The theory turns out to fit both qualitative and quantitative evidence, and although the results are as yet only preliminary, the theory does provide a better account of the spread of sharecropping than the explanations upon which early modern historians have tended to rely.

The businesses of developed Europe—transporting freight by a more advantageous mix of ships, trains, and horses—encountered logistic barriers to trade lower than those in the sparsely populated United States. Economically integrated, compact northwest Europe was a multinational market space larger than the United States, and, arguably, as open to interstate commerce as the contemporary American domestic market. By the early twentieth century, the First European Integration had enabled its manufacturers to build more than half the world's giant plants—many more than in the United States—as variously required by factor endowments, consumer demand, and scale economies.

In this article we use a unique source—a 30-year time series of the share transactions of two joint-stock companies—to examine the growth of the London capital market prior to and immediately after the Glorious Revolution. We argue that the London experience with open capital markets was not solely the result of 1689. Rather it was the learning by private individuals and goldsmith bankers which took place in the decades before 1689 that allowed the market to take full advantage of the property rights changes which occurred with the change in regimes.

This article uses money order data to examine the determinants of British migrant remittances prior to 1914. Using panel data and cointegration analysis, it provides evidence of four distinct types of remittance behavior, lending support to Lucas and Stark's theory that remittances are driven by an implicit contract between remitter and remittee. The relative strengths of these different forms of remittance varied across the English-speaking world, with the largest differences occurring between migrants residing in America and those in the self-governing dominions. The explanation for these differences is seen to lie in the distinctive nature of British emigration to America.

The demand for land in the United States was shaped by inherited attitudes and modern asset creation. Immigrants inherited the view that landowners had an enhanced chance of survival in a “starving time.” But the United States farmer also found that by clearing his unimproved acres he could create assets from otherwise idle time between seasonal peaks in the use of family labor. Public land sales in the South from 1820 to 1860 correlate well with variables that reflect expected money return and supply price. Substantial residuals for 1835–1837 chiefly trace to specific policy actions in Washington.

On the basis of new historical research on the Soviet command system we analyze the choices of a plan-setter and an effort-setter who interacted with each other and an external market to determine real output, hidden inflation, and the quality of corruption. We show that the performance of the Soviet economy was affected not only by the level of corruption but also by its quality, that is, how corrupt incomes were used. Our results explain rapid Soviet economic growth despite high corruption levels, and why slower economic growth in the 1970s was accompanied by increased privatization of rents.

Wage gaps between farm and city are used to assess whether industrialization in late nineteenth-century France was choked off by peasants' alleged reluctance to move. If industry suffered due to labor scarcity, wage gaps should have been large and rising. It turns out that the wage gap, when adjusted for costs of living and computed as an average of 20 regional wage gaps, was nil in 1852 and about 25 percent in 1892. Thus wage gaps were rising but were far smaller throughout the late nineteenth century than they were in England during similar stages of industrialization.

Prices rose in most years between 1933 and 1941 even though output was substantially below trend. This inflation cannot be explained as simply the effect of devaluation and changes in expectations. Rather, because prewar price changes depended significantly on the growth rate of real output, the extraordinarily rapid growth after 1933 was an important force leading to inflation. At the same time, the NIRA, by encouraging minimum wages and collusive pricing arrangements, caused a crucial diminution of the usual deviation-from-trend effect. The conjunction of these forces caused inflation at a time when the U.S. economy remained depressed.

Virtually all sectors of the nineteenth-century American economy were less capital-intensive than their British counterparts. This resulted from persistently higher American interest/profit rates, due in turn to American land abundance. The paper adduces the evidence in support of these propositions, and explores their interrelationships through the use of a linear model inspired by the writings of David Ricardo.

In any economic system, whether medieval or modern, “money, banking, and credit,” are so closely connected and interwoven that they cannot be separated. Banking involves the extension of credit, and credit leads to the creation of additional purchasing power or, to use a different phrase, of money substitutes. The importance of credit and banking in medieval times should not be underrated, as is sometimes done by placing undue emphasis on later developments in England. Professor Usher is preparing a treatise on the early history of banking in Italy and Spain. This paper, which summarizes the results of a similar investigation into the origins of banking in Bruges, will therefore supplement Professor Usher's work, as far as the development of banking in the Low Countries is concerned.

Interest rates in the Civil War South were quite stable and even declined a bit during the war. In this article we explain the mechanism that produced this puzzling result. The existence of a fixed-rate call certificate redeemable at par anchored interest rates expressed in terms of Confederate dollars. When expressed in terms of gold, they were volatile, high, and reflected war events.

Recently the Atlantic slave trade has received scholarly attention through the work of European and American historians. Account books of European merchants engaged in the slave trade, studies of the exports of given continental ports, and analyses of special trade routes have all led to a greater understanding of the dynamics of the trade. Also, the important work of Philip Curtin on the volume and direction of the entire Atlantic slave trade has finally provided us with the rough parameters of the trade in terms of total numbers.

Slave property rights yielded a source of collateral as well as a coerced labor force. Using data from Dun and Bradstreet linked to the 1860 census and slave schedules in Maryland, we find that slaveowners were more likely to start businesses prior to the uncompensated 1864 emancipation, even conditional on total wealth and human capital, and this advantage disappears after emancipation. We assess a number of potential explanations, and find suggestive evidence that this is due to the superiority of slave wealth as a source of collateral for credit rather than any advantage in production. The collateral dimension of slave property magnifies its importance to historical American economic development.

This study draws upon a large sample of probated estates from early Connecticut and Massachusetts. It finds that total probate wealth per adult male grew slowly over the colonial period and its growth was confined entirely to real estate. The value of consumption goods per estate fell during the early eighteenth century which raises questions about the impact of economic growth on household life.

The first domestic food to be regulated by the federal government in the United States, margarine had a unique regulation history. No other food products has been so harshly treated throughtout the world. The American margarine policy up to the 1950s is generally considered remarkably severe. The Canadian policy was even more stringent and more enduring. The province of Quebec, and until very recently of Ontario, still prohibits the yellow coloring of margarine. This article compares the history of margarine regulation in the two countries and uses the interest-group theory of government to investigate why it was so stringent.