This article combines uniquely detailed household-level tax assessments with reconstituted family histories for an eighteenth-century agricultural village near Paris. The tax records reveal substantial diversity in income among taxpayers despite the exemptions given privileged landowners. High-income households had significantly lower levels of infant and adult mortality, earlier age at marriage of the wife, and slightly lower rates of emigration by their surviving children. Marital fertility was high at all income levels. These classic Malthusian patterns were found at the household level more than a generation after the last great subsistence crises and resulted in a much higher local rate of replacement for the better-off families.

Over a century ago the American economist Henry C. Carey wrote that the masters of slaves “feel that they consult their own interests in feeding, clothing, and lodging them well, because wealth increases faster than population, and their labor becomes daily more valuable.” The change in the wealth/labor ratio which Carey noted is a fundamental aspect of economic growth. Carey saw its consequences in terms of the better care bestowed upon the slave by his master, but with appropriate modifications the same consequences apply to the free worker in a maturing industrial society.

I decompose the market value of Colonial New Jersey's paper money into its component parts, namely its real-asset present value and transaction premium. Its market value was predominately determined by its real-asset present value. I also find a small transaction premium that is positively associated with the quantity of paper money in circulation and with the land-bank method of paper money injection. This paper money was not a fiat currency. It traded below face value due to time-discounting not depreciation.

The Gold Pool was probably the most ambitious case of central bank cooperation in history. Major central banks pooled interventions to stabilize the dollar price of gold. Why did it collapse? From at least 1964, the fate of the Pool was, in fact, tied to sterling, the first line of defense for the dollar. Sterling’s devaluation in November 1967 eventually spurred speculation and unbearable losses for the Pool. Inflationary U.S. policies were weakening confidence in the dollar. The demise of the Pool provides a striking example of contagion between reserve currencies and the limits of central bank cooperation.

What was the capacity of European colonial states? How fiscally extractive were they? What was their capacity to provide public goods and services? And did this change in the “developmentalist” era of colonialism? To answer these questions, we use archival sources to build a new dataset on colonial states of the second French colonial empire (1830–1962). French colonial states extracted a substantial amount of revenue, but they were under-administered because public expenditure entailed high wage costs. These costs remained a strong constraint in the “developmentalist” era of colonialism, despite a dramatic increase in fiscal capacity and large overseas subsidies.

The geographical distributions of French and British foreign investment portfolios differ markedly before World War I. Did French portfolios favor European investments just as British portfolios favored “New World” assets? Should economic rationality have encouraged investors to invest widely in the “New World” rather than in Europe? Combining Modern Portfolio Theory and a new data set comprising assets listed on the Paris and London Stock Exchanges, we show that investing in the “New World” did not yield higher returns than investing in Europe. The “European preference” of the Paris Bourse and, by extension, of French investors was not inefficient.

In this study we show that French foreign investment from the end of the nineteenth century until the eve of the First World War was driven by economic and financial considerations. This refutes the hitherto accepted thesis that French capital exports were motivated by diplomatic and political factors. By using economic modeling that combines microeconomic and econometric approaches, we show that the geographic distribution of French financial flows was consistent with rational economic behavior.

Colonial economies suffered from a scarcity of specie that traditionally has been attributed to a chronic external drain. An analysis of the Canadian currency in the early nineteenth century suggests that the explanation for the specie scarcity lies in the multi-coin monetary standard imposed by the currency laws. Gresham's Law accurately predicts the coins that circulated in Canada, and it is concluded that the colonists suffered from a lack of quality rather than quantity of specie.

This article investigates Victorian investor financial portfolio strategies in England and Wales during the second half of the nineteenth century. We find that investors held on average about half of their gross wealth in the form of four or five liquid financial securities, but were reluctant to adopt fully contemporary financial advice to invest equal amounts in securities or to spread risk across the globe. They generally held under-diversified portfolios and proximity to their investments may have been an alternative to diversification as a means of risk reduction, especially for the less wealthy.

In an attempt to divide and marginalize the black population, the apartheid regime forcefully relocated some 3.5 million South Africans to rural homelands between 1960 and 1980. This event, considered one of history’s largest social engineering exercises, created overcrowded and economically deprived communities of displaced people. This article uses geo-coded data to explore the long-term effects of removals on current measures of social capital. Comparing people within the same homeland, I show that those living close to former resettlement camps have higher levels of trust towards members of their social network, people in general, and members of other ethnic groups. These findings are important, as solidarity among suppressed people is believed to be a critical factor in explaining the demise of the apartheid regime.

I examine how production of a child labor–intensive crop (cotton) affected schooling in the early twentieth-century American South. Because cotton production may be endogenous, presence of an agricultural pest (the boll weevil) is employed as an instrument. Using newly collected county-level data for Georgia, I find a 10 percent reduction in cotton caused a 2 percent increase in black enrollment rate, but had little effect on white enrollment. The shift away from cotton following the boll weevil's arrival explains 30 percent of the narrowing of the racial differential in enrollment rates between 1914 and 1929.

Has the golden age of U.S. agricultural productivity growth ended? We analyze the detailed patterns of productivity growth spanning a century of profound changes in American agriculture. We document a substantial slowing of U.S. farm productivity growth, following a late mid-century surge—20 years after the surge and slowdown in U.S. industrial productivity growth. We posit and empirically probe three related explanations for this farm productivity surge-slowdown: the time path of agricultural R&D-driven knowledge stocks; a big wave of technological progress associated with great clusters of inventions; and dynamic aspects of the structural transformation of agriculture, largely completed by 1980.

The causes of the United States’ exceptional economic performance are investigated by comparing American wages and prices with wages and prices in Great Britain, Egypt, and India. American industrialization in the nineteenth century required tariff protection since the country's comparative advantage lay in agriculture. After 1895 surging American productivity shifted the country's comparative advantage to manufacturing. Egypt and India could not have industrialized by following American policies since their wages were so low and their energy costs so high that the modern technology that was cost effective in Britain and the United States would not have paid in their circumstances.

This article tests the hypothesis that price shocks in international commodity markets would by themselves have led to a fall in agricultural labor demand in rural Ireland in the absence of the Famine. This hypothesis has been used by revisionist historians to argue that the Famine was not a structural break between two distinct eras in Irish economic history. In refuting the hypothesis, this article joins a more recent cliometric tradition that has sought to restore the Famine to its rightful place as a major watershed in nineteenth-century Ireland.

In the 1730s and 1750s the English government proposed to refinance the redeemable debt by “lowering the interest rate.” In the ensuing coordination game among creditors, large investors like the Bank of England could block the policy change by demanding cash. Using 4 percent and 3 percent annuities prices to analyze market expectations, this article studies two refinancing episodes with very different fates. Lord Barnard failed in 1737 because his terms were too strict and financial agents induced a temporary market crash. Lord Pelham succeeded in 1750 because his better terms fit market prices, and interest rates had fallen much faster than expected.

Disagreement on the state of the economic health of the new nation has persisted since contemporary observers disputed over the changes wrought by the end of the War for Inpendence. In recent years, diagnosis has ranged from the gloomy picture of commercial depression painted by Curtis Nettels to the rather different evaluation of Merrill Jensen, who found the period “one of extraordinary economic growth.”