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Hong Kong's Post-1997 Institutional Crisis: Problems of Governance and Institutional Incompatibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2016

Anthony B. L. Cheung
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Abstract

The protest by over half a million people on July 1, 2003, unleashed the most serious crisis of governance in Hong Kong since its retrocession to China in 1997. Triggered by the government's attempt to legislate new national security legislation, it exposed more fundamental institutional defects of an increasingly weakened government. This article puts forward two arguments. First, the political logic of the pre-1997 period was not compatible with the post-1997 political environment and public sentiment, resulting in a widening cognitive gap between government and people. Second, the former colonial administration, despite its non-democratic nature, was able to secure sufficient public acquiescence and acceptance through economic performance and service delivery. The new government was constrained by both economic and fiscal difficulties and unexpected social crises. A declining capacity to perform effectively had further eroded public support. Attempted reforms of the bureaucracy and the introduction of a new ministerial system had caused greater political-administrative disjunction and actually compounded the crisis of governance.

Keywords

executive-led systeminstitutional relationshipsstate capacitypolicy and implementation failurescrisis managementprobity and accountability shortfallnational security legislationconfidence in political institutionsconstitutional reformdemocracy substitution
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , April 2005 , pp. 135 - 167
Copyright
Copyright © East Asia Institute 

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References

Notes

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40. For example, Hin-chi, Tsang, a Hong Kong delegate to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, said on January 30, 2004, that some “political forces” in Hong Kong are trying to make the city independent by calling for an early introduction of universal suffrage. “Those political forces … want to seize power through general elections and turn Hong Kong into an independent or semi-independent political polity which undermines the ‘one country.’” Cheung, Gary, “Beijing Adviser Hits HK Drive for Independence,” South China Morning Post , January 31, 2004, p. 2. On the same day, in an interview with Bauhinia magazine, the official publication of the central government's liaison office in the SAR, Zhou Nan, the former director of Xinhua News Agency's Hong Kong branch, the predecessor of the liaison office, accused “a minority of people” of trying to hijack public anger over the economic downturn, saying “they tried to incite the masses and dreamt of toppling the Basic Law in the name of ‘public opinion.’” Leung, Ambrose, “Democracy Seekers Accused of Trying to ‘Topple Basic Law,’” South China Morning Post, January 31, 2004, p. 2. Zhu Yucheng, director of the State Council's newly established Institute of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, accused some democrats of trying “to turn Hong Kong into an independent or semi-independent political entity and [to] turn ‘high degree of autonomy’ into ‘full autonomy.’” Leung, Ambrose, “Democrats Accused of Seeking Full Autonomy; Some People Have Twisted the Basic Law, Says Think-Tank Chief,” South China Morning Post, May 16, 2004, p. 1.Google Scholar

41. The Democratic Party, the leading prodemocracy party, scored an 80 percent success rate in the seats it contested in the district council elections. Hong Kong Economic Times , November 25, 2003, p. A18 (in Chinese).Google Scholar

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43. In the run-up to the July 1, 2004 march, both the prodemocracy camp and mainland officials expressed the desire to have more mutual communication. Martin Lee, a former Democratic Party chairman, made a motion in Legco calling for cooperation with the central government, which was passed with the support of pro-Beijing legislators. However, a key member of the Democratic Party, Law Chi-kwong, was barred from entering Shanghai in August 2004 on an academic trip. His home return permit was also confiscated.Google Scholar