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Decline of a Patrimonial Regime: The Telengana Rebellion in India, 1946–51

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2011

Carolyn M. Elliott
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Recent studies of peasant rebellions in colonial countries have tended to focus attention on the persons who rebelled. The egregious conditions that aroused their indignation, the social and economic transformations that gave them the capacity to act, the leaders who came forward to mobilize them—these are the questions most commonly asked to explain peasant militancy and rebellion.

This perspective can yield only a partial view, for it leaves in the shadows one of the two major actors in such a confrontation; the regime. It is too easily assumed that the fate of traditional or colonial regimes is sealed, and need elicit little interest except as a source of grievances. Yet comparing regimes that have experienced rebellion with those that have not reveals that some have dealt much more successfully with modernization than others. While the attempts of some to modernize institutions only exacerbated the grievances of their restless populations, others have developed new capabilities for ruling. Indeed, the capabilities of political systems are probably more various than either the grievances or the capabilities of the groups challenging them.

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The Journal of Asian Studies , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , November 1974 , pp. 27 - 47
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Copyright © The Association for Asian Studies, Inc. 1974

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References

1 Failure to assess differences among regimes mars Eric Wolfs otherwise fine study of peasant rebellions. Peasant Wars in the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).Google Scholar

2 With its low yields, negligible investment, and preponderance of subsistence farming, a general survey of Hyderabad agriculture in 1950 concluded that it was “stabilized at the lowest level.” Techno-Econotnic Survey of Andhra Pradesh (New Delhi: National Council of Applied Economic Research, 1962), p. 28.Google ScholarPubMed

3 Economist Kesava Iyengar did find some signs that social ties were being strained, however, by an increase in landless tenants. Rural Economic Enquiries in the Hyderabad State 1949–51 (Hyderabad: Government Press, 1951), pp. 369–407. There is no evidence that they were being driven off the land, however, nor that the crucial middle peasantry was placed under greater pressure.Google Scholar

4 He specifically rejects socio-economic causes, arguing that peasants in Telengana were no worse off than peasants in many regions that did not witness rebellion. Moore, , Social Origins of Dictator-ship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966), p. 381.Google Scholar

5 Donal, Zagoria, “The Ecolog y of Peasant Communism in India,” American Political Science Review, LXV (March, 1971), p.Google Scholar 158, and Hamza, Alavi, “Peasants and Revolution,” The Socialist Register, 1965, pp. 141–177.Google Scholar

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9 Hyderabad in 1890 and 1891: Comprising All the tellers on Hyderabad Affairs written to the Madras “Hindu” By its Hyderabad Correspondent, (Bangalore, 1892).Google Scholar reports the factional conflicts between these groups. Karen Leonard, “Cultural Change,” p. 17, for the analysis of the conflicts.

10 “Freedom oi the Press,” reprinted from his journal Swarajya, November 1,Google Scholar 1923, in Misrule of the Nizam, D. Raghavcndra, Rao (ed.) (Madras, 1926). p. 23.Google Scholar

11 “Ruler's Eccentricities,” Sivarajya. November 13 1923,Google Scholar Ibid., p. 41.

12 The British tried lo curb these intrigues, but they were neither consistent nor forceful. Having decided in the early nineteenth century not to take direct control over Hyderabad, they exercised supervision via a Resident in the capital who worked primarily by indirect pressure, reinforced by the presence of a British regiment stationed just outside the city. Though ultimately the British had complete authority in Hyderabad, the costs of exerting it were more than they wished to pay, so they played the patrimonial politics of Hyderabad according to its rules. See Syed Abid, Hasan, Wither Hyderabad? (Madras, 1935). p.Google Scholar 31 and the correspondence of the British Resident with the British Viceroy, P. J., Patrick. “Summary of Barton Correspondence,” Hyderabad Affairs. 10R, L/P and S/1141, 1925.Google Scholar

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14 Officials were entitled to collect nazars as well, and also abused the privilege. Hyderabad in 1890.

15 Karen Leonard, in private correspondence June 20, 1072, has argued that the Nizam's increased touring was not an effort to reduce the aristocracy, but an attempt to extend traditional allegiance to a broader constituency. Whatever the motive, there is no doubt that his collections had a negative effect on his support.

16 It is reported how he used the rivalry be tween the Wanaparty and the Gadwal samasthans in P. J. Patrick, ibid.

17 For these manipulations in the nineteenth century, see Hyderabad in 1890. For the twentieth century, sec Rao and P. J. Patrick, ibid.

18 For a general discussion of this problem in traditional monarchies, see Samuel, Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: 1968).Google Scholar

19 Leonard, “Power Struggle.”.

20 In a state that was 88% Hindu, Hindus held I only 20% of the top administrative posts and Muslims over 6o%. Peep, p. 15, quoting from 1931 1 Census figures.

21 The Hyderabad Problem: The Next Step (Hyderabad: Hyderabad Struggle Committee, The Socialist Party, 1948), Appendix II.Google Scholar

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24 Muslims had a much higher proportion than Hindus in the “public force” (13.6%), as rentier landowners (12.2%), living off their own income (3%). and as artisans (12.7%). The remainder were traders (15.3%) or cultivators (535%). Census of India, Hyderabad 1931, Vol. 23, Part II, p. 182–5.Google Scholar For an argument that Muslims should retain their predominance in administration because they had no other economic base, see Kamil, Mir Zahid Ali, “Communal Problem in Hyderabad (Hyderabad: Hyderabad Printing Works, c. 1936).Google Scholar

25 48% of the state population spoke Telungu, 26% Marathi and 11% Kannada. Census of India, Hyderabad 1931, Vol. 23, Part II, pp. 206–7.

26 Of 99,184 village officers, 96,670 were Hindus, Kamil, Ibid..

27 Census of India, Hyderabad 1931, ibid.

28 For a study of these families, see Karen Leonard, “The Kayasths of Hyderabad City,” Ph.D. dissertation (Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1969).Google Scholar

29 For a history of the mulkis, see Leonard, “Cultural Change,” ibid.

30 There is some suggestion that the urban muikjs did not want an alliance with the rural notables, probably because they feared this economic competition or disliked their feudal methods. The secretary of the mulkis' Nizam's Subjects' League argued that the feudal class be maintained to protect the integrity of Hyderabad, but that the peoples' interest would be better served if the fcudals stayed out of state administration and worked on their estates. Hasan, p. 24.

31 Semi-official letter from Sir William Barton, Resident at Hyderabad, April 17, 1928, IOR, L/R&S/10/1141 1925, p. 906.

32 Times of India, March 14, 1928.

33 For a history of the Justice Party sec Eugene Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).Google ScholarPubMed

34 In 1931 the number of Kapus (Reddis) in high government offices was only 26, while the mucfc smaller Brahman Caste had 138. Census of India, Hyderabad 1931, Vol. 23, Part II, p. 184. Nor did they seek public recognition in the city. A listing of forty-eight prominent personalities in Hyderabad listed only eight Tclugus, among them only three Reddis, the caste of most of the indigenous aristocracy. Since these were paid listings, the few Reddi listings provides an indication of how few sought inclusion among the elite of the city. Chhabra, Hari Sharan, Hyderabad Personalities (Delhi: New Publishers, 1954).Google Scholar

35 There were stringent rules restricting the establishing of private schools and gymnasiums with controls over the courses of study, qualifications of teachers, and methods of teaching. These caused the number of schools to diminish from 4053 in 1925 to 1082 a few years later. Saroiini Regani, “The Movement for the Social and Cultural Revival of Tclcngana in the Erstwhile Hyderabad State (1921 to 46),” paper presented to Seminar on the Socio-Economic and Cultural History of the Dcccan, Hyderabad, Dec. 22–24, 1964, p. 7 referring to Report of the Third Hyderabad Peoples Educational Conference. There was one college in Hyderabad which was affiliated with Madras University and taught in English, but many district youths chose to attend colleges in neighboring British districts rather than make the move to the city. I am indebted to the J.A.S. referee for suggesting this analysis.

36 “Telegram from the 'Nanded' District people” to the Hon'ble the Resident at Hyderabad, dated the 20 October, 1925. IOR,i/P7S/io 1141, 1925. p. 906, Part 2.

37 Rao, Hanumanth, Telengana Andhrodyamamtt, Part II (translated for the author).Google Scholar

38 Individuals from Hyderabad had been going to Congress sessions in British India for some time, and in 1930 many youths had crossed the borders to participate in Gandhi's satyagraha. But except for a small group organizing spinning in the city, there was no Congress organization in Hyderabad until this late date. Hyderabad Problems, p. 34.

39 Freedom Struggle in Hyderabad (Hyderabad: Hyderabad Slate Committee for History of the Freedom Movement, 1966), Vol. IV, p. 132.Google Scholar

40 By this they meant having a ministry responsible to an elected legislature, as was instituted in British India under the 1935 reforms.

41 Following a large gathering of both Hindus and Muslims in favor of the Khilafat movement of the Indian National Congress in 1921, the Nizam forbade all public meetings and prohibited British Indian political leaders from entering the state. Subsequently the full ban was lifted, but organizations planning meetings were required to submit their agendas to government in advance, and discussions on such items as land revenue and free labor were disallowed. Political organizations, suspected of pressing the rights of Hindus, were completely banned. Peep, p. 26.

42 From the beginning, however, there were many who saw discrimination along religious rather than nativist lines, and raised basic questions of the legitimacy of the Muslim ruler. A group argued as early as 1850, for example, that a Hindu judge should be appointed to the High Court because only a Hindu could “interpret law in the light of the customs and manners of vast majority of His Highness's Subjects.” Hyderabad in 1890, p. 80.Google Scholar

43 “The Why of Hyderabad Agitation,” reprints from “Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore” (Delhi, c. 1938), p. 17.Google Scholar For the alliance between Muslim and untouchable leaders in Hyderabad, sec Venkatswamy, P., Our Struggle for Freedom (Secunderabad, 1955).Google Scholar

44 This was the second and stronger wave of Arya Samaj activity in the state. The organization entered Hyderabad City in the late nineteenth century but remained small and was seen as quite innocuous. Freedom Struggle, p. 61.

45 Bedford, Ian, “The Telengana Insurrection: A Study in the Causes and Development of a Communist Insurrection in Rural India,” 1946–1951, thesis submitted for Ph.D. degree (Department of International Relations, Australian National University, December, 1967), p. 186.Google Scholar

46 The organizers of the Arya Samaj satyagraha complained bitterly that no amount of money from British India would convince the Hyderabad Hindus to rise and help themselves. “Fortnightly Report on the Political Situation in Hyderabad,” IOR, File 28 P (s)/37 Coll. R/i/29/1531.

47 “Why,” p. 17, 21. “The Nizam defence Examined and Exposed” (Delhi: International Aryan League, c. 1938), p. 49.Google Scholar According to a Congress observer from British India, 20,000 untouchables were converted in 2 years. Taleyarkan, J. H., “Hyderabad and Her Destiny” (Bombay: Thacker & Co., 1948), p. 58.Google Scholar

48 “Nizam Defence,” p. 13.

49 Mir Laik Ali, The Tragedy of Hyderabad (Karachi: Pakistan Cooperative Book Society, 1962),p. 26. The Ittehad was also critical of the Nizam for not punishing Hindu groups sufficiently. Freedom dom Struggle, 1966, p. 84.

50 Hyderabad in Retrospect, pp. 6–7.

51 Hyderabad Problem, p. 80.

52 The Ittehad also prevented government from raising the ban on Congress in 1940 by threatening direct action. Freedom Struggle, 1966, p. 196.

53 Hanumanth Rao, Part I, passim.

54 Sarojini Regani, op. cit., pp. 13–14.

55 Alam, Shah Manzoor, Hyderabad-Secundcrabad (Bombay: Allied Publication, 1965), p. 136.Google Scholar

56 Alam, p. 80.

57 Census of India, Hyderabad 1951, Vol. 9, Part I–;B, p. 71.

58 Ibid. Furthermore, it had very few commercial or transport personnel for its size, compared to growing industrial centers of British India.

59 Iyengar, S. Kesava, Economic Investigations in Hyderabad State 1929–38, Vol. I (Hyderabad: 1931), Appendix 2, p. 14.Google Scholar

60 Census of India, Hyderabad 1931, p. 94.

61 This library movement was the first institutional link between Telcngana and Andhra, and its significance should not be neglected, as John Leonard argued in a private communication, June 20, 1972.

62 A government list of all associations in Hyderabad State in 1938 which were thought to have any possible political significance (societies for spinning Gandhian yarn, cultural associations, Hindu revival and reform associations) revealed only one society in Warangal, a town panchayat. 151 were in Hyderabad City while all the districts had only 35. Government of Hyderabad, Report of the Reforms Committee, 1938, Appendix I, p. 65.

63 Leader of the militants was Swami Ramanand Thirtha. Most of his followers were Maharashtrians, but there were many also in (Telengana among the lower middle classes and party workers. Sec Thirth's Memoirs of the Hyderabad Freedom Struggle (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966), p. 127.Google Scholar

64 As a long-time follower of Gandhi, Thirth felt some anguish over this strategy and consulted Gandhi. He recalls the conversation as follows: “I told him (Gandhi) frankly that people now had been allowed to act in self-defence in whatever manner they could do. Obviously, this hinted at the use of weapons also. At this frank admission of mine, he seemed to be appreciative and said in firm but kind tones, ‘Yes, it is good that they did not run away from the situation like cowards. They have acted like brave men though in a manner of violence. This is understandable.’” Thirth, p. 191.

65 Thirth, Ibid., p. 127.

66 Furthermore, the Congress militants received no support from Congress in British areas, for party leaders were reluctant to support any form of guerrilla activity. Interview, Hyderabad, October, 1963. Hyderabad Problem, pp. 62–3.

67 Though never restricted to Rcddi students, the hostel was given the caste name in an explicit attempt to arouse the interest of wealthy Reddis in their own community and contribute funds.

68 Osmania University hostel provided another important discussion center and recruiting ground for the same reasons.

69 For instance, moderate Congressmen proposed a quite radical measure, the abolition of jagirdari, in the state assembly in 1937.

70 He feared the Hindu communal groups associated would give the movement a communal coloration.

71 Khodwe, Achyut, The People's Movement in Hyderabad (Poona: Chanda Prakasan, 1947), p.Google Scholar 93. The movement was more active in the Ma-harashtrian areas, where the more left-oriented Congress gave it fuller support. In all, 449 persons in Hyderabad offered satyagraha.

72 Mohan Ram dates initial Communist organizing in Telengana to 1933, but states that the first illegal cell was founded in 1941. “The Communist Movement in Andhra Pradesh,” Radical Politics in South Asia, Brass, Paul R. and Franda, Marcus F. (cds.) (Cambridge: M.I.T., 1973), p.Google Scholar 10. Another source of communist recruitment was the organization of left-wing urban Muslims, the Comrade's Association, which was active among urban workers. It was formed in 1938 and joined in 1940 according to Hyder, Gulam, “Anti-Nizam Struggle: Participation of Muslims,” in Gour, Raj Bahadur, et al. ,Google Scholar “Glorious Telengana Armed Struggle” (CPI Publication, March 1973).Google Scholar

73 Rao, op. cit.

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75 In the cities a serious fall of prices for goods produced by Muslim industry after the war added to the community's sense of malaise. In the countryside, large-scale evictions of tenants following last minute government attempts to bring about tenancy legislation started sporadic unrest in 1945. Bedford, p. 165.

76 Another was a massive population transfer of Hindus in Hyderabad for Muslims in British India. Gour, p. 42.

77 Razvi was in touch with Mohammed AU Jinnah, founder of Pakistan, during this critical period. Vaishampayan, S. K., The Problem of Hyderabad (Poona: Deshmukh and Co., c. 1947), p. 11.Google Scholar

78 Hyderabad in Retrospect, p. 10.

79 Ibid., p. 26.

80 Gour, p. 66

81 Interview, Warangal District, January, 1964.

82 Most of the Hindu residents remained indoors because of fear of the gangs, while 30,000 of the middle and upper classes sought the protection of the British regiment in the army headquarters outside the city. Gour, p. 71.

83 Sundarayya, P., Telengana People's Struggle and Its Lessons (Calcutta; Communist Party of India [Marxist], 1972), pp. 36 ff.Google Scholar

84 Sundarayya's narrative shows the local nature of the struggle. Fighting was done largely with slicks, slings, stones, boiling water and chili powder, for most villagers had no arms and the party instructed its volunteers not to use those which were available for fear of all-India implications if the struggle were transformed to a rebellion against the government. Ibid., p. 40.

85 Sundarayya, who was the coordinator of the rebellion for the Andhra Communist Party, reports that, “One patent fact that emerges from the events of 1945 and 1946 is that our Party had not understood the depth of the revolutionary upsurge of the masses in the immediate postwar period.” It was only with considerable reluctance that the central party agreed to seizure and redistribution of landlord-held lands, and many Telengana communists did not support this policy. Ibid., pp. 152, 63.

86 Ibid., p. 49.

87 The party claims to have redistributed more than a million acres, though government sources claim only 12,600 acres changed hands. Gray, Hugh, in Myron Weiner (ed.), State Politics in India (Princeton: 1968), p. 407.Google Scholar

88 Many village officers also joined the movement out of sympathy or fear. Gour, p. 59.

89 Of 45 captives whose names were listed, 28 were Reddis; of the 12 leaders killed, 4 were Reddis; of the 29 leaders still at large, 14 were Reddis. Rao, Binod U., “Hyderabad Today” (Hyderabad Government of Hyderabad, 1949), p. Nalgonda district, the party stronghold, 6 top leaders were Reddis.Google Scholar

90 Sections among the rebellion's leadership explicitly comparted it to the Chinese revolution in a May 1948 document. P. Sundarayya, p. 394.

91 Gour, p. 16 ff.

92 Menon, V. P. reports the villages were “ruled by Razakars by day and Communists by night.” The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Bombay: Orient Longmans Ltd., 1956), p. 342.Google Scholar

93 Bedford, pp. 258–259. At the height of the rebellion in 1948, the party controlled more than 1,000 villages in Warangal and Nalgonda districts. (Sundarayya claims 3000, Gour claims 2000, even the socialist opponents acknowledge 1000. Sund-rayya, p. 29, Gour, p. 102, Hyderabad Problem, p. 71). Where their control was stabilized, communist dalams (squads to ten volunteers) set up peoples' courts to unite the village against allies of the landlords and expel offenders. They also settled internal village disputes, collected taxes, and even began to organize work teams for small development projects.

94 The Andhra communists opposed this strategy, however, and it is unclear how much the central decisions affected the local party. See Mohan Ram, pp. 22–23, for party debates on the strategy.

95 Hamza Alavi argues that the alienation of the middle peasants was one of the most important reasons for the failure of the revolution. Alavi, p. 270.

96 Hyderabad Reborn (Hyderabad: Department of Information, Government of Hyderabad, 1949), passim.Google Scholar

97 The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which the Indian party consulted in 1951 regarding the ending of the struggle, made a distinction between a partial struggle to defend peasant lands, which it would appjrove, and a liberation struggle against the Indian government, which it did not. For a discussion of the intra-party conflicts over calling off the struggle, see Sundarayya, pp. 391–435.

98 Sundarayya, p. 4.

99 See especially Anil Seal, “Imperialism and Nationalism in India,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 7. 1973, PP. 1–27.Google Scholar

100 This may explain why its successor state, Andhra Pradesh, has been subject to a much more fundamental challenge—an often violent movement for dismemberment of the state—than states which more directly inherited the power structure of British colonialism. On this movement see Hugh, Gray, “The Demand for a Separate Telengana State in India,” Asian Survey, Vol. II (May 1971). pp. 463–473.Google Scholar To my knowledge, however, there are no direct continuities between the current Telengana movement for separation from Andhra Pradesh and the Telengana rebellion. The class and leadership bases of the movements are very different, and most Communist leaders have denounced the current movement as a reactionary one. On the Srikakulam movement, see Ram, op. cit., and Biplap, Dasgupta, “Naxalite Armed Struggles and the Annihilation Campaign in Rural Areas,” Economic and Political Weekly, Annual Number, February 1973, pp. 172”188.Google Scholar

101 In its decision to call off the Telengana rebellion in 1951, the All India Conference of the Communist Party of India made the same argument. “Telengana Peoples' Armed Struggle III,”. Social Scientist, May, 1973, p. 30.Google Scholar

102 In an effort to discredit what they see to be adventurist tactics of recent Maoist activity in India, the Russian-oriented CPI now emphasizes the nationalist aspects of the struggle, even to the point of playing down the class basis of the rebellion and the land redistribution that was carried out. See Gour for this view. Sundarayya of the more radical Communist Party of India (Marxist) emphasizes the correlation of forces, and argues that the growth of a new rich stratum in the countryside has strengthened the ruling Congress, making it impractical for the party to engage in land seizures or immediate armed struggle, contrary to the sectarian policies of the Naxalites. Sundarayya, P. 439–442.